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ABSTRACT 
The doctrine of undue influence has undergone reconsideration by the House of Lords in Royal Bank of 
Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2004] 4 All ER 449. The case was an attempt by the House of Lords to 
clarify the law and dispel some of the misconceptions that have developed in the law over the last 200 
years. 
 
This thesis will examine the law of undue influence. It will examine the theoretical basis of undue 
influence, the general misconceptions in the law, the impact of the Etridge case, and related doctrines 
of duress and unconscionability. Given the developments in the law due to Etridge, issues regarding 
simplification of the law will be examined. The three doctrines share much in common, and issues of 
fusion of one or all of the existing doctrines will be considered, and whether this would lead to a better 
understanding of the law in this area. 
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In 1807 Lord Eldon in Huguenin v Baseley1 held that undue influence is a doctrine utilised by the 
courts of equity to set aside a transaction that has been obtained by the use of undue influence, in the 
sense that the transaction was not the pure voluntary and well understood act of the influenced party, 
but a transaction entered into without knowledge of the effect, nature and consequence. Such 
transactions are against public policy. Nearly two centuries later Sir Martin Nourse in Hammond v 
Osborn2 held that there were continuing misconceptions surrounding the doctrine of undue influence. 
The passage of time and the body of case law has not assisted with the understanding of the doctrine. 
Todd writes that “in recent times the Courts have debated at length about how the doctrine operates and 
how best to arrange and explain the cases.”3 This thesis will examine the doctrine of undue influence, 
and the closely related doctrines of duress and unconscionability. 
 
The thesis will begin with an examination of the theoretical basis of undue influence, which is whether 
it is concerned with the wrongful conduct of the influencing party, or the excessively impaired consent 
of the plaintiff. The recent focus of the courts utilising public policy as the fundamental basis has 
clouded this inquiry. How public policy interacts with the defendant or plaintiff based arguments will 
be considered. 
 
The evolution of undue influence will be examined. This will consider how undue influence has been 
established in pre-Etridge law, the misconception of the effect of the presumptions that existed, and the 
role and misunderstanding of manifest disadvantage. The Etridge case and the restatement of the law 
by the House of Lords will be analysed. Then, in light of Etridge the elements required to prove undue 
influence will be examined with post-Etridge cases. This will determine whether any meaningful 
understanding of the law has developed, or whether the continuing misconceptions in the law continue 
to plague it. 
 
In the final chapters of this thesis, the doctrines of duress and unconscionability will be examined. 
These doctrines are closely related to undue influence, and there is substantial overlap between the 
three. The elements of establishing duress and unconscionability will be examined. Issues relating to 
the amount and type of pressure in the doctrines will be raised, illustrating the similarities that exist 
within the three doctrines. In order to simplify and clarify the law, the debate concerning whether some 
or all of these doctrines can be merged will be considered in the conclusion. 
                                                 
1 [1803-13] All ER Rep 1, per Lord Eldon, p 13. 
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 885. 
3 S Todd, Burrows Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 351. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1887 Lindley LJ posed the question: 4 
What then is the principle [of undue influence]? Is it that it is right and expedient to save persons from the 
consequences of their own folly? or (sic) is it that it is right and expedient to save them from being victimised by 
other people? 
Over a hundred years later, that question is still debated by judges and academics. What is the 
theoretical basis for undue influence? Is the doctrine plaintiff based, that is, centred on the impaired 
consent of the plaintiff? Or is it defendant based, that is, “ … the law … seeks to prevent 
‘victimisation’ or improper conduct by one party that results in the victim entering into a transaction 
without free and informed consent.” 5 
 
Before that question can be answered, the definition of undue influence should be considered. Finding 
the definition of undue influence has proved to be remarkably elusive.6 “As no Court has ever 
attempted to define fraud, so no Court has ever attempted to define undue influence…”7 However 
despite the lack of a comprehensive definition, it can be said that: 
“Influence” … is the ascendancy acquired by one person over another. “Undue influence” is the improper use by 
the ascendant person of such ascendancy for the benefit of himself or someone else, so that the acts of the person 
influenced are not, in the fullest sense of the word, his free, voluntary acts.8 
Similar comments can be found in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2);9 that “undue influence has 
a connotation of impropriety. In the eye of the law, undue influence means that influence has been 
misused.” 
DEFENDANT BASED ARGUMENTS 
Allcard v Skinner10 has been referred to as the orthodox view of undue influence.11 Lindley LJ made 
the distinction between two types of influence a defendant may exercise over a plaintiff: 
First, there are the cases in which there has been some unfair and improper conduct, some coercion from outside, 
some over-reaching, some form of cheating, and generally, though not always, some personal advantage obtained 
by a donee placed in some close and confidential relation to the donor… 
The second group consists of cases in which the position of the donor to the donee has been such that it has been 
the duty of the donee to advise the donor, or even to manage his property for him. In such cases the Court throws 
upon the donee the burden of proving that he has not abused his position, and of proving that the gift made to him 
has not been brought about by any undue influence on his part. In this class of cases it has been considered 
                                                 
4 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145, at p 182. 
5 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home, (2002), p 7. 
6 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 378. 
7 Allcard v Skinner above n 4, per Lindley LJ p 183. 
8 Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Whitelaw [1906] VLR 711 per Hodges J at p 720. 
9 [2001] 4 All ER 449 per Lord Nicholls p 462. 
10 (1885) 36 Ch D 145. 
11 National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821, per Lord Scarman at p 830. 
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necessary to shew that the donor had independent advice, and was removed from the influence of the donee when 
the gift to him was made.12 (Emphasis added) 
For the purposes of this thesis, the terminology of the forms of undue influence to be adopted is actual 
undue influence for the first category described above, and the evidential presumption of undue 
influence in respect of the second category.13 
 
The argument that actual undue influence is based on the influence the defendant exercises over the 
plaintiff is “fairly uncontroversial”14 and well supported by academics15 and authority.16 The defendant 
exerts actual pressure on the plaintiff so that the plaintiff’s will is overborne.17 Similarities between 
actual undue influence and duress have been drawn.18 The difficulty arises in cases relying on the 
evidential presumption of undue influence. In these cases there is often no clear pressure applied to the 
plaintiff. However, while the defendant exerts an influence over the plaintiff: 
the will of the victim is not ‘overborne’. There may have been misplaced trust or reliance, but the victim still acts 
‘intentionally’, perhaps even acceding to the transaction euphorically … what the ascendant party does in the 
undue influence context … is wrongfully make the option put to the subservient party (ie, of entering into the 
transaction in question) appear to be a reasonable thing to do in the circumstances.19 (Emphasis added) 
 
In many cases there has been no wrong doing on the part of the defendant. Such a case is Allcard v 
Skinner.20 Miss Allcard joined a sisterhood, took the vow of poverty, and undertook not to “seek advice 
                                                 
12 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145, per Lindley LJ at p 181. 
13 See discussion below on the decision of Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No2) [2001] 4 All ER 449 at p 35-9. 
14 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 382. 
15 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 382; N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of 
Contract, (8th Australian ed, 2002); J Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining (1991); M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence 
and the Family Home, (2002); M Cope, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Bargains (1985); P Vout, (ed and 
Current Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia (2006); J McGhee, Snell’s Equity (31st ed 
2005); G H L Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada (5th ed, 2006); G Andrews, and R Millett, Law of Guarantees (4th ed 
2005), p 160; and N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 9-005. 
See discussion by S Todd, Burrows Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 350-1. 
16 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 ChD 145; National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821; Royal Bank of 
Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449; Goodman Estate v Geffen 81 DLR (4th) 211, [1991] 2 SCR 353; Brandon v 
Brandon 2001 WL 454384 (Ont SCJ), [2001] OJ No 2986200, (cited CarswellOnt 2688, Westlaw); and Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce v Finlan [1999] OJ No 54, 78 OTC 241, (cited 1999 CarswellOnt 80, Westlaw). 
17 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 76. Birks and Chin concede that cases of actual relational undue influence have all been 
examples of pressure. See also discussion by Bigwood, above n 14 p 384. 
Despite the overwhelming authority that cases of actual undue influence involve pressure from the defendant, there is 
recognition that actual undue influence may be unintentionally exerted, see Hittinger v Turgeon 2005 Alta DJ 2293, 2005 
Alta DJ LEXIS 140 (cited Lexis.com, at 20 October 2006), per Belzil J, para 78 where he stated that “I accept that my 
finding the Plaintiffs did not intentionally place undue influence on the Defendant is not dispositive of the issue in that the 
law recognizes that undue influence may be unintenionally (sic) exerted.” Such cases by its nature will be very rare, and no 
successful case on the issue has been found during the course of research on this thesis. 
See discussion below p 45-7 on issues regarding extreme submissiveness. However the cases in the discussion do not 
illustrate unintentional actual undue influence. 
18 M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) NZULR 
509, p 514; P Vout, (ed and Current Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia (2006), para 35.8:1. 
19 R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?’ (1996) 16 Oxford J Legal Stud 503, p 511. 
20 Allcard v Skinner above n 12. 
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of any extern without the superior’s leave.”21 In order to achieve poverty status, she was required to 
give away all her property. The rules did not require her to give it to the sisterhood; she could have 
gifted it to the poor or to her relations. Miss Allcard gifted all her property to the sisterhood. When she 
left the sisterhood she sought the return of her property. 
 
Lindley LJ approached the theoretical basis of undue influence as defendant based. “Courts of Equity 
have never set aside gifts on the ground of the folly, imprudence, or want of foresight on the part of 
donors.”22 The behaviour that the plaintiff needs to be protected from is “from being forced, tricked or 
misled in any way by others into parting with their property.”23 Despite endorsing the defendant based 
approach, Lindley LJ found that there was no form of objectionable conduct on behalf of Miss Skinner 
(the lady superior who received all of Miss Allcard’s property). There was no pressure placed on Miss 
Allcard, except the pressure of vows and rules. There was no deception practiced on her, no unfair 
advantage taken of her, and the money was used for legitimate purposes of the sisterhood. In effect, 
Allcard v Skinner can be seen as an illustration of the plaintiff based approach. However, ultimately it 
was held that Miss Allcard was under an external influence - the influence of her vows, and it was a 
pressure which she could not resist until it was removed (that is, when she left the sisterhood).24  
 
The House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2)25 has revisited the whole doctrine of 
undue influence. The Lords favoured undue influence as based on the wrongful conduct of the 
defendant. “The principle is not confined to cases of abuse of trust and confidence. It also includes, for 
instance, cases where a vulnerable person has been exploited.”26 The defendant based approach was 
approved in Li Sau Ying v Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd,27 where Lord Scott held that the evidence 
must prove “an abuse by the allegedly dominant party of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the 
                                                 
21 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145, per Lindley LJ, p 177. 
22 Ibid, per Lindley LJ, p 182. 
23 Ibid, per Lindley LJ, p 183. This was cited with approval by Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan 
[1985] 1 All ER 821 p 828, and Slade LJ in Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1992] 4 All ER 955 
p 967. 
24 Ultimately, Miss Allcard’s claim was defeated by her delay in seeking a remedy. 
25 [2001] 4 All ER 449. 
26 Ibid, per Lord Nicholls p 458. L Ho, ‘Undue Influence: When and How it Matters to Banks and Solicitors’ [2002] 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 617, p 623 argued that the House of Lords stopped short of endorsing either of the two 
different theoretical bases of undue influence. 
For other English High Court cases endorsing the defendant based approach see Dunbar Bank plc v Nadeem [1998] 3 All 
ER 876, and Rosenfeld v Ransley [2004] EWHC 2962 (Ch). In Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed the 
defendant sided analysis in Goodman Estate v Geffen 81 DLR (4th) 211, [1991] 2 SCR 353 per Wilson J, para 41. 
27 [2005] 1 HKLRD 106. See discussion below p 77. 
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allegedly subservient party”28 and by the Privy Council in National Commercial Bank (Jamaica) 
Limited v Hew,29 where Lord Millett held that: 
Undue influence is one of the grounds on which equity intervenes to give redress where there has been some 
unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant. It arises whenever one party has acted unconscionably by 
exploiting the influence to direct the conduct of another which he has obtained from the relationship between 
them.30 
 
The doctrine may seem settled in New Zealand, in favour of the defendant sided approach,31 for 
example Brusewitz v Brown,32 and O’Conner v Hart,33 where Lord Brightman held that “a Court of 
equity did not restrain a suit at law on the ground of “unfairness” unless the conscience of the plaintiff 
was in some way affected. This might be because of actual fraud … or constructive fraud … 
traditionally considered under its more common manifestations of undue influence, abuse of 
confidence, unconscionable bargains and frauds on a power.” Similarly in Contractors Bonding v 
Snee34 Richardson J held that there must be “some unfair and improper conduct, some coercion from 
outside …” Implicit in that statement is a rejection of the impaired will concept, because the plaintiff 
still needs to be under an external influence. The approach in Snee was recently cited with approval by 
the Court of Appeal in Hogan v Commercial Factors Limited.35 
 
However, in ASB Bank Ltd v Harlick36 Gault J described the Birks and Chin37 article in favour of a 
plaintiff sided approach as “helpful” and conceded that “the precise bounds of the doctrine of undue 
influence are not easily extracted from the decided cases.”38 Gault J ultimately decided that: 
This case can be decided without the need to settle any more precise test than the relationship must involve such a 
degree of reliance and trust as suggests a real risk that a disadvantageous transaction has not resulted from the kind 
of informed and independent decision to be expected from a person in the position of the party seeking relief but 
rather from the influence the other party to the relationship has in that position.39 
                                                 
28 Li Sau Ying v Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd [2005] 1 HKLRD 106, per Lord Scott, para 34. 
29 [2003] UKPC 51, Privy Council The Court of Appeal of Jamaica. 
30 Ibid, per Lord Millett, para 28. 
31 S Todd, Burrows, Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (2nd ed, 2002), p 375, citing Contractors Bonding Ltd v 
Snee [1992] 2 NZLR 157. 
P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), p 44-5. Finn contends that 
the dominant theme in Australian and English law is the overborne will theory, similarities with duress were drawn. In 
contrast, the dominant theme in the United States, New Zealand and Canada is the protection of one person’s trust and 
confidence in another from possible abuse, “and has thus perceived the law’s purpose in conventional fiduciary terms: 
affecting another’s “will” is merely one way in which an advantage can be taken in a relationship of ascendancy or trust.”  
32 [1923] NZLR 1106. 
33 [1985] 1 NZLR 159, per Lord Brightman, p 171. 
34 [1992] 2 NZLR 157, per Richardson J, p 165, emphasis added. 
35 [2006] 3 NZLR 618. 
36 [1996] 1 NZLR 655. Harlick was cited with approval in Rac v Miliszewski HC WN CP No 293/93 [4 April 1996]. 
37 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995). See discussion on plaintiff sided-analysis below p 8-14. 
38 [1996] 1 NZLR 655, p 658. 
39 Ibid, per Gault J, p 659. 
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Harlick has been cited as endorsing the Birks and Chin line of reasoning.40 However, one cannot regard 
those statements as approval and adoption of the excessive dependence approach. It is more an 
acknowledgment that there are two lines of thought and the law is not entirely settled as to which 
approach is correct.41 By contrast, the Court of Appeal in Carey v Norton42 and the High Court in 
Rabobank New Zealand Limited v Balderston43 have come out in favour of the plaintiff based 
approach. This will be discussed in the next section. 
PLAINTIFF BASED ARGUMENTS 
The derivation of the plaintiff based approach originates in cases that have drawn the distinction 
between undue influence and unconscionability. It is contended that undue influence is based on the 
impaired consent of the plaintiff whereas unconscionability is based on the wrongful exertion of 
pressure by the defendant. An illustration of this is the Canadian case of Morrison v Coast Finance 
Ltd.44 In the case, a widow, age 79 years old was persuaded by two men to borrow money, secure it on 
her house by a mortgage, and to lend it to them for a business venture. She did not have a close 
relationship with the men. One of the men was her tenant, and the other was his friend.  She had no 
means of repaying the money. Her house was her only substantial asset, and she had no independent 
advice. The two men did not repay the money she borrowed. She brought action to have the mortgage 
set aside on the basis of undue influence and unconscionable bargain. In discussing the distinction 
between undue influence and unconscionable bargains it was held that: 
The equitable principles relating to undue influence and relief against unconscionable bargains are closely related, 
but the doctrines are separate and distinct. The finding here against undue influence does not conclude the question 
whether the appellant is entitled to relief against an unconscionable transaction. A plea of undue influence attacks 
the sufficiency of consent; a plea that a bargain is unconscionable invokes relief against an unfair advantage gained 
by an unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against a weaker.45 
 
The trial judge found that there was no undue influence. On appeal it was held by the majority that it 
was “extreme folly”46 for Mrs Morrison to borrow money which she could not repay, and to lend it to 
strangers, with no expectation of reward or profit. Coast Finance Ltd knew the essential facts and 
prepared the relevant documents. It was held that “[f]or them to take advantage of her obvious 
ignorance and inexperience in order to further their respective businesses, raises a presumption of fraud 
                                                 
40 N Richardson, ‘Presumed Undue Influence’ [1996] NZLJ 338, and C Rickett, ‘Equity’ (1996) 7 BCB 142. 
41 M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) NZULR 
509, p 519. 
42 [1998] 1 NZLR 661. 
43 HC Wellington, Civ-2006-485-117, [4 May 2006]. 
44 (1965) 55 DLR (2d) 710. 
45 Ibid, per Davey JA, p 713. 
46 Ibid, per Davey JA, p 714. 
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within the above authorities.”47 The mortgage was set aside without requiring Mrs Morrison to repay 
the money on the basis that the transaction was unconscionable. 
 
Birks and Chin48 are the most prominent advocates of the concept that undue influence is about the 
excessively impaired consent of the plaintiff. By their own admission “[it] is not a view that has many 
supporters.”49 The authors agree with the cases that make a clear distinction between undue influence 
which is plaintiff sided, and unconscionable conduct which is defendant sided.50 They place particular 
reliance on Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio,51 and the judgment of Mason J:52 
Although unconscionable conduct … bears some resemblance to the doctrine of undue influence, there is a 
difference between the two. In the latter the will of the innocent party is not independent and voluntary because it 
is overborne. In the former the will of the innocent party, even if independent and voluntary, is the result of the 
disadvantageous position in which he is placed and of the other party unconscientiously taking advantage of that 
position.53 (Emphasis added) 
 
With respect to the authors, it seems that they have taken Mason J’s comments out of context. Mason J 
clearly states that in the case of undue influence, the will of the innocent party is not independent and 
voluntary because it is overborne. For someone’s will to be overborne, this suggests that there must be 
some external force, more essentially, from the defendant. 
 
Secondly, the authors argue that cases involving the evidential presumption of undue influence rarely 
have anything to do with pressure. Instead the focus should be on the weakness of the plaintiff which in 
turns creates excessive dependence on the defendant that results in “the lack of capacity for self-
management…”54 The authors cite cases where the defendant has done nothing overtly wrong. In 
                                                 
47 Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd (1965) 55 DLR (2d) 710, per Davey JA, p 714. Sheppard JA decided the case on the basis 
that the men were in a fiduciary position in relation to Mrs Morrison and had acted as her agent and fiduciary. It was held 
that there was a breach of fiduciary duty when the men borrowed the money and used it for their own profit rather than in 
the business that they had represented to Mrs Morrison. The defendant companies knowingly participated in the breach of 
trust and were subject to the same liability as the trustee. 
48 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995). 
49 Ibid p 58. 
In support of the plaintiff based view, see also R P Meagher, J D Heydon, and M J Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and 
Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed 2002), chapter 16; P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), 
Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), at p 44-5; and R Flannigan, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’, (1989) 9 OJLS 285. 
Flannigan writes that “no domination or dominating influence need be present. No ‘dishonest persuasion’ or ‘conscious 
abuse of power’ must occur. It is enough if the trust gives rise to ‘influence’. That ordinary and unqualified ability to 
‘influence’ will alone constitute the relationship a fiduciary one” p 303. 
50 Birks and Chin, above n 48 p 59-60. 
51 (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
52 Birks and Chin also cite Deane J’s judgment. R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003) p 472, argues that “Deane J’s 
distinction merely illustrates the flip sides of the exploitation coin; it does not, it seems to me, reveal the foundational 
difference that Birks and Chin want to claim.” 
53 (1983) 151 CLR 447, p 461. 
54 Birks and Chin, above n 48 p 67. 
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particular, they rely on Allcard v Skinner55 where they argue that Miss Allcard’s weakness was her 
impaired capacity. However, Lindley LJ considered that Miss Allcard was under an external pressure, 
which was the pressure of the vows that she had taken, and this constituted the influence on Miss 
Allcard:56 
The undue influence, which Courts of Equity endeavour to defeat is the undue influence of one person over 
another; not the influence of enthusiasm on the enthusiast who is carried away by it, unless indeed such enthusiasm 
is itself the result of external undue influence. 
 
A similar approach was found in a recent Australian case with a spiritual influence, Hartigan v 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc.57 The plaintiff donated her only substantial asset, 
a farm, to the defendant. At the time of the gift, she had two children and was pregnant with her third. 
The plaintiff was not initiated and did not enter into a relationship of devotee with any spiritual master 
or undertake any formal obligations of discipleship. However, she had advice, counselling and 
instruction, in Krishna Consciousness beliefs. This lead to her misunderstanding regarding deprecating 
materialism. Divesting one self of material possessions was not one of the tenets of faith. The correct 
philosophy was that possessions should be utilised in the service of the Lord. Bryson J found that there 
was no deliberate attempt by the defendant or anyone related to the defendant to “get the better of the 
plaintiff, to overbear her or deceive her, or to deprive her of the opportunity of making up her own 
mind. Nobody was insidiously working to make the plaintiff behave contrary to her own interests.”58 
 
However, it was held that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the two 
representatives of the defendant and the plaintiff when discussions began regarding the gift. The 
representatives were under a duty to advise the plaintiff that she had misunderstood one of the tenets of 
faith, and she was not provided with independent legal advice. Those events, coupled with the 
“extremely unworldly improvidence”59 of the gift raised the presumption of undue influence. This 
presumption was not rebutted by the defendants and the gift was set aside. In what amounted to a 
rejection of the impaired will argument, 60 Justice Bryson held that “[i]t may be unconscionable to 
accept and rely on a gift which was fully intended and understood by the donor and originated in the 
                                                 
55 (1887) 36 Ch D 145 at 182-3. 
56 Ibid, per Lindley LJ, at p 183. 
57 [2002] NSWSC 810. 
58 Ibid, per Bryson J, at para 37. 
59 Ibid, per Bryson J, at para 74. The gift had left the plaintiff without any assets to provide for her young children. 
60 P Ridge, ‘The Equitable Doctrine of Undue Influence Considered in the Context of Spiritual Influence and Religious 
Faith: Allcard v Skinner Revisited in Australia’ (2003) 26(1) UNSW Law Journal 66, p 75. 
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donor’s mind, where the intention to make the gift was produced by religious belief.” This is in line 
with the external influence reasoning in Allcard v Skinner.61 
 
In Nel v Kean62 property was transferred to a “group” of like-minded persons, with loose elements of 
spiritualism. Arguments that the group was a cult were rejected by Simon J, as were arguments that the 
relationship between the influencer and the influenced was spiritual leader and follower. However, 
there was evidence that lead to a finding that there was a strong evidential inference of undue influence. 
It was held that there needed to be some implicit criticism of the defendant’s conduct, “[t]here may be 
cases in which the courts will be strongly critical of particular conduct. Other cases will fall to be 
decided simply on the basis that a civil wrong has been proved.”63 
 
Thirdly, Birks and Chin argue that the requirement on the defendant to rebut the presumption of undue 
influence64 by showing that the plaintiff did not lack autonomy indicates a plaintiff based approach. 
The defendant must show that the plaintiff made his or her own judgment emancipated from any 
dependence on the defendant, not by showing “that he had no unconscientious intention to take 
advantage of the other …”65 However this point could easily be made in support of the defendant based 
approach. What needs to be shown before the presumption can be rebutted is that the plaintiff made 
independent judgment free from the influence of the defendant.66 “The problem is not lack of 
understanding but lack of independence.”67 
 
This argument must be viewed in light of Etridge. In Etridge the House of Lords made it clear that the 
presumptions are only evidential presumptions, and “[w]hen a plaintiff succeeds by this route he does 
so because he has succeeded in establishing a case of undue influence.”68 In Lord Clyde’s words:69 
                                                 
61 Khan v Khan [2004] NSWSC 1189 is an illustration of a case that involving a spiritual advisor and follower which did not 
rely on the presumption of undue influence. It was argued successfully on the basis of actual undue influence when the 
Mufti placed pressure on a Moslem woman (Mrs Sadiq) to sign an agreement to sell her share of a property following an 
oral agreement to sell. He was a person of authority, particularly in relation to Islamic law or duty, and seen as capable of 
affecting her prospects in the “after life.” Mrs Sadiq knew that she was not bound to sell until a written agreement had been 
entered into. 
62 [2003] EWHC 190 (QB). 
63 Ibid, per Simon J, para 86. 
64 Using pre-Etridge terms as Birks and Chin used in the article. 
65 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 75.  
66 In Trusts & Guarantee Co v Hart 32 SCR 553, (cited 1902 CarswellOnt 673, Westlaw at 11 October 2006), para 31, 
Davie J in his dissent explained the law. It does not matter whether the donor understood what he or she was doing the 
result is unaffected, the presumption of undue influence still exists. 
67 J A McGhee, Snell’s Equity (31st ed, 2005), para 8-30. 
68 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449 per Lord Nicholls, p 459. 
69 Ibid, per Lord Clyde, p 478. 
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At the end of the day, after trial, there will either be proof of undue influence or that proof will fail, and it will be 
found that there was no undue influence. In the former case, whatever the relationship of the parties and however 
the influence was exerted, there will be found to have been an actual case of undue influence. 
Therefore, if finding that there was no wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant will defeat a claim 
of actual undue influence, then the position should be the same where the plaintiff relies on an 
evidential presumption.70 
 
While arguments can be produced to support the defendant based approach, when it comes to rebutting 
the evidential presumption, it is conceded that this point strongly supports arguments that undue 
influence is not based purely on the conduct of the defendant. If it was, then the defendant may rebut 
the evidential presumption of undue influence by showing that he had done nothing wrong, that he had 
acted with a clear conscience.71 This is not the case. It must also be shown that the plaintiff understood 
the transaction, intended to enter into it, and freely did so.72 
 
Lastly Birks and Chin concede that certain doctrinal facts support the argument that undue influence is 
defendant based, (such as defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s excessive dependence, third parties are 
protected unless they have knowledge, and manifest disadvantage). Birks and Chin simply justify these 
elements as ‘defensible cut-off points’ to ensure that there is not too much restitution given. 
 
It is submitted that the requirement to show manifest disadvantage is more than simply a defensive cut 
off point. As later discussion will show, manifest disadvantage (or a transaction that calls for 
explanation) is not a requirement for actual undue influence because there is evidence of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing. However, when relying on the evidential presumption of undue influence, it 
may be difficult to prove the wrongdoing, and proving a transaction that calls for explanation is the 
mechanism in which to show the wrongfulness of the transaction.73 
 
There are recent cases that support the view that undue influence is plaintiff based. The cases clearly 
establish that to merely show that the defendant acted in good faith, and with a clear conscience is not 
enough to rebut the evidential presumption of undue influence. In Cheese v Thomas74 Mr Cheese was 
an elderly man, and Mr Thomas his great nephew. They agreed to buy a house together so Mr Cheese 
could live in it for the remainder of his life. Mr Cheese provided money towards the purchase price and 
Mr Thomas contributed by providing the balance by way of a mortgage. Mr Thomas soon fell behind in 
                                                 
70 K Scott, ‘Taking the “Undue” Out of Presumed Undue Influence?’ [2003] LMCLQ 145, p 147-148. 
71 See discussion below on rebutting the evidential presumption p 64-73, and p 122-4. 
72 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 12-003. 
73 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home, (2002), p 70. 
74 [1994] 1 All ER 35. 
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mortgage repayments, and when Mr Cheese discovered this, he sought to have the transaction set aside 
on the grounds of undue influence. The Court of Appeal made it clear that Mr Thomas had not behaved 
improperly, or tricked, or took any advantage of his aged uncle. However, this did not preclude them 
from finding that due to Mr Thomas’ younger age and more business experience, he had an actual 
influence over Mr Cheese, and undue influence was to be presumed.75 
 
Hammond v Osborn76 concerned an elderly man Mr Pritler, who gave away almost £300,000 to a 
woman, Mrs Osborn, who had befriended him, and gave him home help. The trial judge held that there 
was no wrongdoing by Mrs Osborn. On appeal the transactions were set aside. The reasons for doing so 
was: that Mrs Osborn failed to draw to Mr Pritler’s attention to the size of the gift, the fact that it 
represented 91.6% of his liquid assets; he would only be left with a small amount to live on (had he 
lived); and there were huge tax implications resulting from the realisation of assets which would have 
used up the residue of the money left with Mr Pritler. The question before the court was whether “the 
gift was made by Mr Pritler only after full, free and informed thought about it.”77 The Court of Appeal 
was focusing on the consent of the plaintiff rather than the wrongdoings of the defendant. However, 
even though Mrs Osborn was found not to have done anything wrong, the transactions were still set 
aside on the basis of undue influence, because Mrs Osborn failed to ensure that Mr Pritler received any 
independent advice about the gift that he was making. 
 
In Carey v Norton78 the New Zealand Court of Appeal decisively rejected the view that undue 
influence was based purely on the improper conduct of the influencer. The case concerned the 
testamentary disposition of Mrs Meehan. She changed her will three weeks before her death on the 
advice of her two brothers. Her previous will had benefited her half sister, and niece. Her revised will 
benefited all her nieces and nephews, with a slightly larger portion given to her half sister and niece (to 
recognise their financial hardship). It was held by Elias J at first instance that the brothers acted with 
the utmost rectitude. This finding was not disturbed by the Court of Appeal. Despite the absence of any 
wrongful conduct by the brothers, undue influence was still found to be exercised. Thomas J held that: 
First, while I accept that the use of the word “benign” is not inappropriate to describe the unavoidable influence of 
persons who proffer advice to a testator relating to the terms of his or her will, I consider that this influence ceases 
to be benign as soon as it becomes “undue” as a matter of law. That point is reached when it can no longer be said 
that the will represents the testator’s independent and informed judgment. Irrespective of the fact the persons 
advising the testator may not be motivated by self-interest, or any other ulterior or baleful consideration, the 
influence is then undue influence and is no longer benign … The question is not whether the person giving the 
                                                 
75 Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 All ER 35 p 39. 
76 [2002] EWCA Civ 885. 
77 Ibid, per Sir Martin Nourse at para 25. 
78 [1998] 1 NZLR 661. 
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advice was innocent or well-meaning (and benign in that sense) but whether the influence exerted prevented the 
testator from exercising an independent and informed judgment when making his or her will.79 
 
Williams J conceded that the case was unusual, because the influence was found to be benign and arose 
from Mrs Meehan’s passivity and deference to her brothers’ advice, coupled with the brothers’ lack of 
insight into what Mrs Meehan sought to achieve with her testamentary dispositions, and the brothers’ 
failure to discuss further options with her. His Honour rejected the argument that there needed to be 
coercion in order to make a finding of undue influence. He held that in this case, influence existed, and 
that it was undue: 
plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate that on the balance of probabilities some person had the power unduly to 
overbear the testator’s will and exercised that power, and that, as a result, the resulting testamentary disposition, 
though valid on its face, was not the free exercise of the testator’s independent will.80 
 
More recently in Rabobank New Zealand Limited v Balderston81 Associate Judge Gendall again 
endorsed the plaintiff based approach. The case concerned a guarantee given by a wife to support her 
husband’s business debts. She was a guarantor in her personal capacity and in her capacity of trustee of 
a trust that held the shares in the company. The relationship of marriage was described as a “relatively 
old fashioned marriage”, with all the business matters left to the husband. Despite the fact that the 
husband did not use any “unacceptable means”, improper pressure or malicious intent to procure his 
wife’s execution of the guarantee, this did not prevent a finding that undue influence was exercised. 
Influence can be undue simply by taking advantage of another’s trust, dependence and vulnerability. 
Associate Judge Gendall used the phrases “excessive dependence” and “extreme loss of autonomy” to 
describe the wife. It was conceded that this was a case of summary judgment, and therefore the 
evidentiary threshold on the defendant was lower.82 
PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS 
In Hammond v Osborn,83 Sir Martin Nourse made clear that to focus the issue on whether there had 
been wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant is one of the “continuing misconceptions”84 
regarding the law of undue influence. Sir Martin Nourse cited Cotton LJ in Allcard v Skinner for the 
proposition that the court interferes not because there has been a wrongful act committed, but on the 
                                                 
79 Carey v Norton [1998] 1 NZLR 661, per Thomas J, p 663. 
80 Ibid, per Williams J, p 673. 
81 HC Wellington, Civ-2006-485-117, [4 May 2006]. 
82 For a critique of the judgment see D Webb, ‘Commercial Law Undue Influence’ [2007] NZLR 387. 
83 [2002] EWCA Civ 885. 
84 Ibid, per Sir Martin Nourse at para 1. 
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grounds of public policy.85 What must be proved is “that the donor’s trust and confidence in the donee 
has not been betrayed or abused.”86 
 
This principle has been seized upon by more recent cases.87 In Niersmans v Pesticcio,88 the respondent, 
Bernard Pesticcio was mentally and physically disadvantaged for the majority of his life. He lived most 
of his life with his mother. His mother inherited a house from her late husband, and gifted the house to 
Bernard. Bernard suffered a serious fall and was admitted to hospital. He was in a coma and suffered 
brain damage. While in hospital, Bernard was visited by one of his sisters’ solicitors and eventually 
gifted his house to his sister Maureen Niersmans. It was this transaction which Bernard sought to set 
aside because it was procured by undue influence. 
 
One of the arguments in support of the appellant was that she had “done nothing wrong”.89 However, 
this argument was held to be an “instance of the “continuing misconceptions.””90 Instead of analysing 
the issue from either a defendant or plaintiff based approach, Lord Justice Mummery relied on the 
ground of public policy:91 
Although undue influence is sometimes described as an "equitable wrong" or even as a species of equitable fraud, 
the basis of the court's intervention is not the commission of a dishonest or wrongful act by the defendant, but that, 
as a matter of public policy …  The court scrutinises the circumstances in which the transaction, under which 
benefits were conferred on the recipient, took place and the nature of the continuing relationship between the 
parties, rather than any specific act or conduct on the part of the recipient. A transaction may be set aside by the 
court, even though the actions and conduct of the person who benefits from it could not be criticised as wrongful. 
 
The presumption arising from the trust and confidence between the parties meant that Bernard did not 
have to show that Maureen actually had influence over him; he did not have to show that she in fact 
exercised undue influence or applied improper pressure on him. It was held that whether or not 
Maureen’s conduct could be described as wrongful was not the issue, the issue was whether or not the 
donor’s trust and confidence in the donee has been betrayed or abused. 
 
Niersmans v Pesticcio was cited with approval in Jennings v Cairns,92 Macklin v Dowsett,93 and 
Randall v Randall.94 In Randall Edward Bartley Jones QC held that “questions such as what more 
                                                 
85 Hammond v Osborn [2002] EWCA Civ 885; per Sir Martin Nourse at para 1. Lord Halisham LC in Inche Noriah v Shaik 
Allie bin Omar [1929] AC 127 also acknowledged the public policy arguments at p 133. 
86 Ibid, per Sir Martin Nourse at para 32. 
87 See also Padgham v Rochelle 2002 WL 31413932 (cited Westlaw at 31 July 2006). 
88 [2004] EWCA Civ 372. 
89 Ibid, per Lord Justice Mummery, para 20. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 [2003] EWCA Civ 1935. 
93 [2004] EWCA Civ 904. 
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could the donee had done, or insistence upon the donee having done nothing wrong, were matters 
which addressed the wrong issue.”95 This was despite the Judge finding that the defendant was “self-
justifying and self-righteous … in short, he had all the hallmarks of a bully.”96 
1. Meaning of Public Policy 
In order to completely understand what is really meant by “public policy” one must return to the 
discussion in Allcard v Skinner. The starting point begins with Cotton LJ. After dividing cases into two 
categories, the first requiring actual influence by the donee, and the second category requiring a 
relationship of influence; his Honour went on and explained that “[i]n the second class of cases the 
Court interferes, not on the ground that any wrongful act has in fact been committed by the donee, but 
on the ground of public policy and to prevent the relations which existed between the parties and the 
influence arising therefrom being abused.”97 This was expanded upon further by Lindley LJ and Bowen 
LJ. The influence one person has over the mind of another is very subtle, and sometimes it is almost 
impossible to prove the actual exercise of influence. It is in these cases that Courts of Equity have made 
an available remedy to persons subjected to such influence.98 The public policy ground is not a fetter on 
the donor’s right to deal with his or her property, “it is a fetter placed upon the conscience of the 
recipient of the gift, and one which arises out of public policy and fair play.”99 In Hammond v Osborn. 
Sir Martin Nourse conceded that what transpired in the case was not fair play. “That is why public 
policy informs the doctrine.”100 
 
Liles v Terry101 was an early case that discussed the public policy basis. The case concerned an elderly 
lady who made an assignment of property in favour of her niece, who was married to the acting 
solicitor. Kay LJ expressed the rule as: 
… a rule of public policy of great importance that, while a person in consequence of a confidential relation 
between them, that other person cannot accept from him a gift of any kind, unless it is shewn to have been made 
with competent independent advice, which I take to mean independent advice of a professional nature.102 
 
Subsequent cases have treated the public policy basis to be analogous to abuse of confidence cases, or a 
breach of a relationship of trust and confidence.103 These relationships have a fiduciary element, and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
94 Randall v Randall [2004] EWHC 2258 (Ch). 
95 Ibid, per Edward Bartley Jones QC, para 39. 
96 Ibid, per Edward Bartley Jones QC, para 55. 
97 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145, per Cotton LJ, p 171. 
98 Ibid, per Lindley LJ, p 183. 
99 Ibid, per Bowen LJ, p 190. 
100 Hammond v Osborn [2002] EWCA Civ 885, para 65. 
101 [1895] 2 QB 679. 
102 Ibid, per Kay LJ, p 685. 
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are designed to protect a class of persons who are at risk of others taking advantage of them.104 Similar 
views were expressed in Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy,105 that the public policy ground is based on the 
premise that once a special relationship is shown to exist, then the benefit that a fiduciary obtains from 
a transaction cannot be retained unless it is shown that fiduciary care has been fulfilled. The public 
policy basis of undue influence has also been explained as necessary to protect certain relationships, 
“or points within relationships,”106 that transcend “mere commercialism.”107 
 
Such a case is Norberg v Wynrib.108 The case involved an elderly doctor, Dr Wynrib, and his patient 
Ms Norberg, who was addicted to painkillers. Dr Wynrib knew of her addiction and suggested a sex-
for-drugs arrangement. Ms Norberg brought an action against Dr Wynrib for sexual assault, negligence, 
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. La Forest J109 held that the sexual assault in this case 
fell under the tort of battery. In discussing the tort of battery, La Forest J also considered the nature of 
consent, consent being a defence to battery, and whether principles of undue influence could be applied 
to negate the consent to the battery. The defence argued that Ms Norberg consented to the battery 
because she wanted the drugs, and she played on Dr Wynrib’s loneliness. It was held that it was 
immaterial to decide whether the basis for relief lies in the inequality of bargaining power,110 or the 
basis that the weaker party to a contract retains the ability to give consent, but the law provides relief 
                                                                                                                                                                       
103 Goldsworthy v Brickell [1987] Ch 378, per Nourse LJ, p 400; Tolhurst v Smith [1994] EMLR 508 (High Court, Chancery 
Division), per Chadwick J, p 533; In Re Craig, Decd. [1971] Ch 95, per Ungoed-Thomas J, p 104; Maguire v Makaronis 
(1997) 144 ALR 729, per Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ, p 738; Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 
per Latham CJ, p 123, and McTiernan J, p 143; and Louth v Diprose (1992) 110 ALR 1, per Brennan J, p 6. 
See also M Halliwell, Equity & Good Conscience in a Contemporary Context (1997), p 57. 
104 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home, (2002), p 89; and P Ridge, ‘Uncertainties 
Surrounding Undue Influence: Its Formulation, Application, and Relationship to Other Doctrines’ [2003] NZ Law Review 
329. 
However, others have argued that breach of fiduciary duty and undue influence are two distinct grounds for relief, P Birks, 
and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 92; P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(1989), p 42-46; and J Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining (1991), at p 179 where he warns against using the fiduciary label in 
the context of undue influence. 
105 [1975] QB 326, per Sir Eric Sachs, p 342. 
106 D Tiplady, ‘The Limits of Undue Influence’ 48 Mod L Rev 579 1985, p 582. 
107 Ibid. 
108 1992 CarswellBC 155, 92 DLR (4th) 449, Supreme Court of Canada. 
109 With Gonthier and Cory JJ concurring. 
110 La Forest J centered his consideration of the doctrine of undue influence on Lord Denning MR’s formulation of 
“inequality of bargaining power” in Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy. The doctrine of inequality of bargaining power has been 
rejected by the House of Lords in Morgan, and has little judicial support in England, G H Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th 
ed 2003), p 421. However, in Canada, the principle has “enjoyed greater esteem and employment”, and seen to be 
interchangeable, or even an updated version of unconscionable bargains, G H L Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada 
(5th ed, 2006), p 324, and 328. 
See also discussion by B M McLachlin ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Doctrines in the Contemporary Common Law 
World: A Canadian Perspective’ in D W M Waters (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1993), p 45; and Campbell v 
Campbell (1990) 83 Nfld & PIER 340. 
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on the basis of public policy. Ultimately it was held that the grounds of public policy negated the legal 
effectiveness of the contract.111 
 
The leading Supreme Court of Canada case of Goodman Estate v Geffen112 is able to provide some 
guidance in this debate. In her discussion on undue influence, Wilson J113 addressed the issue of what 
purpose the doctrine of undue influence serves. She was clearly of the opinion that undue influence was 
designed to curb abuse. However, she further subdivided the classes of cases under the abuse theory 
into two further classes; the first is “that the doctrine of undue influence was meant only to curtail 
abuses of trust or confidence which resulted in significant and measurable disadvantage to the person 
influenced.”114 This was termed “result focused approach.” 115 The second is that “the doctrine of undue 
influence aims not at preventing “bad bargains” but at addressing abuses of trust, confidence for 
power”;116 that is, to “control the process rather than the outcome of transactions.” 117 Given that undue 
influence may apply to a wide variety of transactions; from pure gifts to classic contracts, it was held 
that neither approach fully captured the true purport of undue influence. The decision as to which 
approach to adopt was left open, but in any event, it must be flexible enough to encompass a wide 
variety of transactions. It is the second class that according to Wilson J, encompasses the public policy 
argument. It involves the abuse of the process. This is consistent with the defendant based approach 
which focuses on the mechanics of how the transaction was entered into, or “procedural unfairness”,118 
rather than the fairness of the contractual terms, or any “contractual imbalances.”119 
2. Efficacy of Public Policy 
It is submitted that while the public policy ground may represent an easy and tidy option to judges to 
decide undue influence cases without being drawn into the debate, it creates an unsatisfactory situation 
as far as precedent is concerned. The principle has been described as “vague,”120 and it will allow 
judges to give a remedy where they see fit without recourse to fundamental underlying principles. The 
                                                 
111 McLachlin J (with L’Heureux-Dube J concurring) criticised La Forest J for forcing the case into “the ill-fitting molds of 
contract and tort” (para 96), and for using the contractual doctrine of undue influence to negate the consent that Ms Norberg 
gave. Instead McLachlin J characterized the relationship as fiduciary. 
112 81 DLR (4th) 211, [1991] 2 SCR 353. 
113 With Cory J concurring. 
114 Above n 112, per Wilson J, para 38. 
115 Ibid para 40. La Forest J (with McLachlin J concurring) also declined to choose between the two opposing options, para 
86. 
116 Above n 112, per Wilson J, para 38. 
117 Ibid. 
118 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home, (2002), p 8. 
119 Ibid. 
120 National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821, per Lord Scarman, p 828; Engle v Carswell 1995 
ACWSJ LEXIS 46937, 1995 ACWSJ 632249, 53 ACWS (3d) 1282, (cited Lexis.com at 20 October 2006), per Miller J, p 
*44. 
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danger in failing to adhere to principles will invite judges to simply conclude that undue influence will 
be recognised when present, that is, they will know it when they see it. Tipping J in Bowkett v Action 
Finance Ltd121 held that “even a Court of equity cannot in my respectful view throw up its hands and 
say: I don’t know how to describe the beast but I will tell you when I see one.”122 
 
While public policy arguments have enjoyed a recent resurgence, the approach is not without its critics. 
In National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan123 Lord Scarman considered the public policy arguments 
from Allcard v Skinner but held that in addition to establishing a relationship of influence, there must 
also be evidence that the transaction was wrongful in the sense that one party took advantage of the 
other party. Lord Scarman also criticised Sir Eric Sachs in Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy124 for his 
acceptance of the public policy principle125 without also addressing the issue as to whether the 
transaction was wrongful in the sense that one party must be victimised by the other party.126 This was 
cited with approval in CIBC Mortgages v Pitt.127 More recently, the public policy approach was 
rejected in Nel v Kean.128 
 
In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long129 there was discussion regarding public policy in relation to duress. 
Counsel in the case attempted to argue that if a dominant party threatened to repudiate a pre-existing 
contractual obligation, this amounts to an abuse of a dominant bargaining position, and is contrary to 
public policy, even if economic duress cannot be proved.130 Lord Scarman considered American 
authorities and concluded a rule based on public policy would be unhelpful because it would create 
uncertainty in the law. Bargains negotiated at arms length should be upheld unless a party’s consent is 
vitiated. 
                                                 
121 [1992] 1 NZLR 449, p 457. 
122 This is effectively the present situation with regard to the definition of undue influence. Lord Clyde in Etridge held that 
“‘no Court has ever attempted to define undue influence.’ It is something which can be more easily recognized when found 
that exhaustively analysed in the abstract.” [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Clyde, p 477. David Tiplady describes such an 
approach as an “impressionist attitude”, D Tiplady, ‘The Limits of Undue Influence’ 48 Mod L Rev 579 1985, p 580. 
123 [1985] 1 All ER 821. 
124 [1975] QB 326. 
125 It is submitted that while Lord Scarman’s treatment of the public policy principle is correct, his interpretation of Sir Eric 
Sachs’ approach is not accurate. Sir Eric Sachs cites the public policy discussion from Allcard v Skinner, but he does not 
rely on it. Instead he concludes that “once the special relationship has been shown to exist, no benefit can be retained from 
the transaction unless it has been positively established that the duty of fiduciary care has been entirely fulfilled”, and in his 
opinion, does not depend on a wrongful intention by the defendant, Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326, per Sir Eric 
Sachs, p 342. 
126 National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan, above n 123, per Lord Scarman, p 828, and p 830. This was cited with 
approval in Shotter v Westpac Banking Corporation [1988] 2 NZLR 316 per Wylie J, p 334, and Bowkett v Action Finance 
Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, p 457, per Tipping J, p 457. 
127 [1993] 4 All ER 433, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, p 438. 
128 [2003] EWHC 190 (QB). 
129 [1979] 3 WLR 435. 
130 Ibid, per Lord Scarman, p 632. 
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3. Public Policy Conclusion 
The benefit of utilising the public policy doctrine is that the concept of public policy “is not static”131 
and can be adapted to reflect society’s prevailing values and mores. If the Geffen approach is accepted, 
the public policy doctrine can be conceptualised as a subset within the wider rubric of the defendant 
based approach. This is how the defendant based approach can be reconciled with the public policy 
arguments originating from Allcard v Skinner. Allcard itself was a case concerned with a gift. A gift is, 
by its very nature, disadvantageous to the donor. Miss Allcard’s actions were to her disadvantage. The 
size of the gift required explanation, and there was an obligation on the sisterhood to ensure that Miss 
Allcard received independent advice and was freed from the influence of her vows when the gift was 
made. Therefore, one must conclude in the situation of gifts, the wrong has been committed, or 
alternatively, to restrict public policy arguments only to gifts. 
 
Support for the argument that public policy is a subset of the defendant based approach is evident in 
Mutual Finance Ltd v John Wetton & Sons Ltd,132 where Porter J was faced with the issue of drawing 
the distinction between acceptable forms of coercion and persuasion, and unlawful coercion and 
persuasion. In an attempt to avoid specifically stating the level or type of pressure required, he opted 
instead to rely on public policy. He held that contracts may be invalid because its substance or purpose 
may be contrary to public policy. In a similar vein, he held that contracts may be “invalid because it is 
contrary to public policy in respect of the coercive method of its procurement.”133 Therefore, despite 
relying on public policy, there is still an element of coercion on the part of the defendant. 
 
There is academic support for the view that public policy and the defendant based approach are related. 
Bigwood argues that public policy and victimisation are not incompatible with one another. Public 
policy is in effect the exemplification of victimisation. “It is against public policy to victimize the very 
person whose interests one is duty bound loyally to serve and protect.”134 Ultimately Bigwood 
considers that public policy is not “the operative reason for exculpation in this area”:135 
… although ‘public policy’ explains the ‘presumptive’ effect given to D’s wrongdoing in this context, the 
exculpatory nature of relief is ultimately founded on bilateral transactional considerations, namely, D’s actual 
(which includes ‘inferred’) exploitation of the special opportunities (to influence or persuade) that he enjoyed in 
virtue of his ‘fiduciary’ control over P’s will or decision-making in the transaction in question.136 
                                                 
131 Chamberlains v Sun Poi Lai [2006] NZSC 70, SC 19/2005, per Elias CJ, para 2. 
132 [1937] 2 KB 389. 
133 Ibid, per Porter J, p 394-5. 
134 Bigwood, R, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 391. 
135 Ibid p 401. 
136 Ibid. 
 21
If public policy is accepted to be the operative reason for the basis of undue influence, then the post-
Etridge requirement of a transaction that calls for explanation would become superfluous, because it 
would be against public policy to unduly influence a weaker person even if the transaction did not call 
for an explanation. Commentators have argued that this would “bring the rationale of undue influence 
into line with that of other vitiating factors in the formation of contracts”,137 such as duress, 
misrepresentation138 and abuse of confidence.139 However, it is submitted that such a result is 
undesirable as duress and misrepresentation requires proof of wrongdoing from the defendant, whereas 
arguments based on public policy attempt to circumvent the issue.140 In undue influence terms, the 
more suspicious the transaction, and the greater the disadvantage, are evidence supporting the exercise 
of influence.141 Secondly the abuse of confidence doctrine is a very narrow doctrine, applying only to a 
limited number of situations. Undue influence applies to wide range of transactions,142 and it would be 
undesirable to open the flood gates. 
RECONCILING THE AUTHORITIES 
Precedent and academic opinion favour the defendant based approach. However, it fails to address the 
undeniable tension between the cases that rely on the impaired consent approach. Common sense also 
supports the defendant based approach. If the plaintiff sided analysis is adopted, then this can create the 
novel situation where a plaintiff may avoid a transaction even when the defendant has done nothing 
wrong and may be completely ignorant of the influence he or she exercises over the plaintiff. The 
defendant’s conduct (or misconduct) must be linked143 in some way to the “[plaintiff’s] plight.”144 
Bigwood argues that all involuntary agreements145 have a common thread running through them – they 
all involve objectionable forms of advantage taking or exploitation.146 
                                                 
137 M Oldham, ‘‘Neither a borrower nor a lender be’ – the life of O’Brien’ (1995) 7 Child and Family LQ 104, p 109. 
138 Oldham, above n 137; M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home, (2002), p 89. 
139 Oldham, above n 137. 
140 With regard to manifest disadvantage, Lord Hobhouse in Etridge held that the concept was evidential. It is relevant to 
determine whether any issue of abuse could be raised, and to determine whether or not abuse had occurred, p 482. 
141 Goodman Estate v Geffen 81 DLR (4th) 211, [1991] 2 SCR 353 and Brandon v Brandon 2001 WL 454384 (Ont SCJ), 
[2001] OJ No 2986200, (cited CarswellOnt 2688, Westlaw). 
142 Goodman Estate v Geffen 81 DLR (4th) 211, [1991] 2 SCR 353, per Wilson J. 
143 See also M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 
18(4) NZULR 509, p 519. 
144 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 475. Bigwood goes on to argue that if undue influence is wholly plaintiff 
sided, it affords too much weight to the plaintiff’s bargaining impairment while affording too little weight to the defendant’s 
contractual freedom and expectation. 
145 Bigwood subdivides involuntary agreements into two categories: the first is defects in the promisor, that is ignorance, 
mistake, incapacity, drunkenness; and the second is defects brought on by the promisee, that is, fraud and force. R Bigwood, 
‘Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?’ (1996) 16 Oxford J Legal Stud 503, p 507. 
146 Bigwood, ibid. 
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This begs the question of how to deal with the cases that support the plaintiff sided analysis. How 
should they be reconciled with the defendant sided analysis? Goff and Jones argue that the defendant 
should be deemed in equity to be a wrongdoer, or in other words, “their actions are characterised in 
equity as wrongful.”147 In effect, the assumption is that abuse has occurred.148 
 
It is submitted that the cases can be reconciled by treating them as either cases of passive 
exploitation,149 failure to ensure that the plaintiff was independently advised, or failing to ensure that 
the plaintiff knew exactly what he or she was doing. Failing to do this can constitute evidence of the 
wrongful conduct necessary to support the finding of undue influence.150 “Passive exploitation, while 
seemingly less ‘wicked’, is no less ‘exploitation’, hence no less ‘wrongdoing’ in the eye of equity.”151 
 
Scott152 argues that if Cheese v Thomas was to be decided today based on current precedent, (that is in 
light of Etridge) it would be decided differently. However, she suggests Cheese v Thomas and Etridge 
are reconcilable, because it could be argued that Mr Thomas failed to ensure that Mr Cheese was 
independently advised, and this is evidence of the wrongful conduct necessary to conclude that there 
was undue influence.153 Similarly in Niersmans v Pesticcio the role of the solicitor was found wanting, 
and the advice given insufficient to allow Bernard to make his own independent decision. In relation to 
Hammond, Todd154 argues that abuse can occur in circumstances where the defendant has failed to give 
information or ensure that the plaintiff was properly informed about the transaction. Therefore, Mrs 
Osborn’s failure to provide Mr Pritler with advice and information could be construed as an abuse of 
her position of influence. In a later article,155 Scott argues that this broad approach changes the 
obligation on the defendant, from a “negative obligation” to refrain from the wrongful conduct to a 
“positive obligation” to ensure that the plaintiff has independent advice.156 
                                                 
147 Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (6th ed 2002), at para 11-002. 
148 P Ridge, ‘The Equitable Doctrine of Undue Influence Considered in the Context of Spiritual Influence and Religious 
Faith: Allcard v Skinner Revisited in Australia’ (2003) 26(1) UNSW Law Journal 66, p 74. 
149 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 465. 
150 See also In re Brocklehurst’s Estate [1978] Ch 14, p 41. Bridge LJ gave his view on Cotton J’s statement in Allcard. His 
Honour did not interpret the passage to suggest that undue influence may exist in a case where the conduct of the donee is 
not open to criticism. Instead, he took the opposite view, “in which positive wrongful conduct is proved affirmatively by 
evidence with those in which an abuse, which may no doubt consist either of a positive act or an omission to act, is 
presumed unless the donee proves affirmatively that he has acted with propriety throughout.” 
151 Bigwood, above n 149 p 474. 
152 K N Scott, ‘Evolving Equity and the Presumption of Undue Influence’ (2002) 18 JCL 15, 2002 JCL LEXIS 15 (cited 
Lexis.com at 10 February 2006) p 12. 
153 Ibid, p 14. 
154 S Todd, Burrows, Finn and Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 358-9. 
155 K Scott, ‘Taking the “Undue” Out of Presumed Undue Influence?’ [2003] LMCLQ 145. 
156 Ibid, p 150. This can be contrasted with a proposed “narrow approach”, p 149. This involves treating actual undue 
influence and class 2B cases as situations of wrongful conduct. Due to the fiduciary characteristics of class 2A, this would 
see an imposition of a fiduciary obligation to ensure that the plaintiff made “full, free and informed decision”. Scott 
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CONCLUSION 
The debate between the philosophical bases of undue influence will continue, despite the weight of 
authority in favour of the defendant based approach.157 The analyses all centre on detailed breakdowns 
of judgments and the words that judges used. The academics who engage in this conduct warn against 
the practice.158 Despite all the arguments raised by the academics, they too realise that their arguments 
are interrelated. Bigwood159 concedes that any distinction between the debate of impaired consent or 
wicked exploitation is superficial, and that the concepts are “inextricably linked.”160 Birks and Chin 
describe dependence and influence as “two sides of the same coin.”161 Bigwood describes it as 
“flipsides of the exploitation coin,”162and that: 
The practical fact, therefore, is that the question of whether P gave a valid consent (under the plaintiff-sided 
version of relational undue influence) is virtually indistinguishable from the question of whether D (knowingly) 
used his special influence over P to (actively) obtain or (passively) receive the impugned benefit.163 
 
Even though Etridge is interpreted to favour the defendant based approach, Lord Nicholls in his 
description of undue influence conceded that there are indeed two sides to the doctrine:164 
Several expressions have been used in an endeavour to encapsulate the essence [of undue influence]: trust and 
confidence, reliance, dependence or vulnerability on the one hand and ascendancy, domination or control on the 
other. None of these descriptions is perfect. None is all embracing. Each has its proper place.165 
The American case of Odorizzi v Bloomfield School District166 also acknowledges that the concepts are 
interlinked. In the case, Fleming J held that the elements of undue influence consisted of a combination 
of elements: the “susceptibility in the servient person and the excessive pressure by the dominating 
                                                                                                                                                                       
concedes that this approach is not without its difficulties. Firstly, cases such as Hammond cannot be reconciled under this 
approach as the relationship between Mr Pritler and Mrs Osborn was not fiduciary in nature. Secondly there will be 
difficulty in identifying fiduciary relationships.  
157 P Birks, ‘Undue Influence as Wrongful Exploitation’ LQR 2004, 120 (JAN), 34-37, p 36. In this article, Birks welcomes 
the decision in Hammond in support of his arguments and claims “[t]hat the door has not finally banged shut.” 
158 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 78 and 86 and R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 470. Phang argues that: “… whilst it 
is perfectly logical to analyse given situations from the respective standpoints of the parties concerned, insofar as all the 
doctrines [undue influence, common law duress, and unconscionability] are concerned, one has to look at the perspectives 
or standpoints of all the parties to the given transaction.” A Phang, ‘Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ 
[1995] JBL 552, p 569. 
159 R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?’ (1996) 16 Oxford J Legal Stud 503. 
160 Ibid p 504. 
161 P Birks, and N Y Chin, above n 158 p 86. 
162 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 472. 
163 Ibid p 478. 
164 See L Ho, ‘Undue Influence: When and How It Matters to Banks and Solicitors’ [2002] Sing J Legal Stud 617; F R 
Burns, ‘Undue Influence Inter Vivos and the Elderly’ 26 Melbourne ULR 499; and F R Burns, ‘The elderly and undue 
influence inter vivos’ 23 Legal Stud 251 2003. These authors maintain that Etridge does not provide any definitive 
statement as to whether undue influence is plaintiff or defendant based. 
165 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls, p 458. N Enonchong, Duress, Undue 
Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 7-007 cites Etridge as supporting both the “complainant-sided and 
defendant-sided” approach, and argues that both elements must be present. This approach to establishing undue influence 
was applied by William Young J in Hogan v Commercial Factors Limited [2006] 3 NZLR 618. 
166 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 54 Cal.Rptr. 533, District Court of Appeal, California. 
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person.”167 More recently in New Zealand Willy J cited Birks and Chin with approval in McNicholl v 
Ter Veer.168 He acknowledged that there needed to be some degree of reduced autonomy on the part of 
the influenced party, and a corresponding degree of control or ascendancy on the part of the stronger 
party. 
 
Given the latest authorities on this issue, it appears that Judges are reluctant to be drawn into the 
philosophical debate, and are content to rely on public policy. Conceptually public policy is part of the 
defendant based approach. Use of words such as ‘wicked exploitation’169 and ‘wrongdoings’ should be 
abandoned as this often confuses the issue and clouds the focus of inquiry. While in the majority of 
cases the defendant has engaged in some sort of wrongdoing, in other cases the defendant has often 
done nothing explicitly wrong, but has simply passively accepted the benefits conferred to him or her 
by the plaintiff. This is enough to support a claim of undue influence, but the conduct cannot be 
regarded as “wicked.” In other situations, the defendant may have done nothing wrong, and may have 
even acted with good intentions, but this does not mean that the defendant did not exercise an influence 
over the plaintiff.  
 
Ultimately, the best approach is to “avoid epithets”170 altogether, however if a term is required, then the 
conduct should be described as unconscientious;171 or, in a longer form, (so as to not confuse it with the 
doctrine of unconscionability), conduct by the defendant exercised without a clear conscience. This 
would encompass passive exploitation cases such as Hammond v Osborn. While Mrs Osborn was 
described as having done nothing wrong, her conduct could not be described as wholly honest. After 
Mr Pritler’s death, she tried to “cover up both her involvement in Mr Pritler’s affairs and the gift he had 
made to her.”172 Similarly in Padgham v Rochelle & Searle173 the son who was found to have exercised 
undue influence on his father was uneasy and embarrassed about the agreement he entered into. The 
agreement was clearly acting on his conscience after his father’s death.
                                                 
167 Odorizzi v Bloomfield School District 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 54 Cal.Rptr. 533, per Fleming J, p 131. 
168 [2001] DCR 168. 
169 R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?’ (1996) 16 Oxford J Legal Stud 503. 
Exploitation may not appear ‘wicked’ in any sense of the word, it may simply be a passive exploitation, p 512. 
170 Nel v Kean [2003] EWHC 190 (QB), per Simon J, para 86. 
171 Richardson J in Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee [1992] 2 NZLR 157, at p 165 also talked about the stronger party 
gaining an unfair advantage by the unconscientious use of power. Similarly, Dixon J in Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 
113, at p 134 described the basis of undue influence as “the prevention of an unconscientious use of any special capacity or 
opportunity that may exist or arise of affecting the alienor’s will or freedom of judgment in reference to such matter.” 
However, W M C Gummow J, ‘Equity: too successful?’ (2003) 77 ALJ 30 writes that the terms “unconscionable” and 
“unconscientious” are overused in equity cases. 
172 [2002] EWCA Civ 885, per Martin Nourse, para 21. 
173 2002 WL 31413932 (cited Westlaw at 31 July 2006). See discussion below p 63. 
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At the risk of appearing to sit on the fence, it may be unnecessary or undesirable to reconcile the two 
approaches.174 It can be accepted that undue influence is a doctrine that encompasses both themes: it 
“respond[s] to vices which occur in relationships in which an ascendancy or influence is acquired, and 
dependence or trust conceded.”175 Simply because the defendant based approach can account for the 
majority of cases does not mean that the plaintiff based approach should be discounted. This is 
particularly so when one considers the methods utilised to rebut the evidential presumption of undue 
influence. It is this uniqueness to the doctrine of undue influence that may indicate that it should not be 
merged with any other doctrines, such as duress or unconscionability. 
                                                 
174 See also discussion by P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), at 
p 45. 
175 Ibid. 
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THE CONCEPT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
The concept of undue influence is well established. It is: 
… the gaining of an unfair advantage by an unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against a weaker in 
the form of some unfair and improper conduct, some coercion from outside, some overreaching, some form of 
cheating, and generally, though not always, some personal advantage obtained by the stronger party.176 
Although the general concept is well established, pinning down a definition of undue influence or the 
precise limits of the court’s jurisdiction is much more difficult. In the oft cited passage from Lord 
Scarman in National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan177 “[t]his is the world of doctrine, not of neat and 
tidy rules.” 
 
The starting point for any discussion on undue influence must begin with Allcard v Skinner.178 
Following Allcard significant developments in the law of undue influence came in Barclays Bank Plc v 
O’Brien179 and the requirement to show that there is manifest disadvantage to the weaker party.180 The 
most recent development came in the House of Lords decision, Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 
2).181 
THE PRE-ETRIDGE CLASSES OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
The two forms of undue influence can be traced back to Allcard v Skinner.182 In Allcard, Cotton LJ 
held that undue influence could be established by proving that “the gift was the result of influence 
expressly used by the donee”,183 or, where the relations between the donor and donee was such as to 
raise a presumption that the donee had influence over the donor.184 The two forms became more 
commonly known as actual undue influence and presumed undue influence. In a broad sense, the 
distinction between the two forms of influence was that in the case of actual undue influence, 
something was “done to twist the mind of the donor.”185 In the case of presumed undue influence, the 
influence derives from the “relationship between two persons where one has acquired over another a 
measure of influence, or ascendancy, of which the ascendant person then takes unfair advantage.”186 
                                                 
176 Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee [1992] 2 NZLR 157, p 165. 
177 [1985] 1 All ER 821, per Lord Scarman, p 831. 
178 (1885) 36 Ch D 145. 
179 [1993] 4 All ER 417. 
180 S Todd, Burrows, Finn and Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 351. 
181 [2001] 4 All ER 449. 
182 (1885) 36 Ch D 145. 
183 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145, per Cotton LJ, at p 171. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Daniel v Drew [2005] EWCA Civ 507, per Ward LJ, para 31. 
186 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls, p 458. 
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Presumed undue influence was developed to plug an “evidential gap”. There were situations where, due 
to the relationship between the parties, there was a level of dependency and ascendancy present. Unfair 
advantage was gained by one person over another, without any overt acts of persuasion.187 In Allcard v 
Skinner it was held that in these cases the burden is placed on the donee to prove that she has not 
abused her position and to show that the gift was not brought about by any undue influence on her 
part.188 
 
Traditionally “presumed” undue influence was further subdivided into “classes.” In Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA v Aboody189 Slade LJ adopted the classification class 1 for actual undue 
influence, and class 2 for presumed undue influence.190 Class 2 was further subdivided into class 2A for 
“well-established categories of relationships,”191 where the relationship gave rise to the presumption. 
However, a “logical extrapolation”192 was made that there should be class 2B to cover those cases that 
did not fall into class 2A, but where it was proved that one party had in fact reposed trust and 
confidence in the other.193 Slade LJ made it clear that the presumption was merely a ‘tool’ to be used to 
overcome evidential difficulties.194 It was conceded that the difference between class 1 and class 2B 
was slender. 
 
Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien195 adopted the classification laid down in Aboody.196 With regard to 
“Class 2” it was held to be unnecessary to produce evidence that actual undue influence was exerted. 
The complainant need only show that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the 
parties so that it was fair to presume that the wrongdoer abused the relationship and that procured the 
transaction. The burden then shifted to the wrongdoer to prove that the complainant entered into the 
impugned transaction freely. 
 
The relationship of trust and confidence was established in one of two ways. The first was by showing 
a relationship within “class 2A”, relationships where the law presumed that undue influence had been 
exercised. These were:197 trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, parent and child, religious 
                                                 
187 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 9-002. 
188 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145, per Lindley LJ p 181.  
189 [1992] 4 All ER 955. 
190 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1992] 4 All ER 955 per Slade LJ p 964. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Hobhouse p 482-483. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Above n 189, p 964. 
195 [1993] 4 All ER 417. 
196 Above n 189. 
197 S Todd, Burrows, Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand, (3rd ed 2007), p 351-2. 
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adviser and disciple, doctor and patient, and solicitor and client.198 These relationships established an 
irrebuttable presumption of a relationship of trust and confidence.199 There was no presumption 
between husband and wife,200 employer over employee, or child over parent. 
 
The second route was to prove a relationship where the complainant generally reposed trust and 
confidence in the wrongdoer. Upon proof of such a relationship the presumption that undue influence 
had been exercised was established.201 Unless there was evidence disproving the undue influence, the 
complainant would succeed by merely proving the relationship, “without having to prove that the 
wrongdoer exerted actual undue influence or otherwise abused such trust and confidence.”202 This was 
labelled “class 2B”. 
1. The Presumption of What? 
The phrase “presumption of undue influence” itself contains an inherent ambiguity in that “it can mean 
either that such influence is presumed to exist or that it is presumed to be exercised.”203 Over time this 
led to a misconception over the nature of the presumption of undue influence. In relation to class 2A, 
the misconception was that there were specific types of relationships that automatically gave rise to a 
presumption of undue influence. That is, proving the relationship gave rise to the presumption that one 
party had influence over another and that undue influence had been exercised.204 This misconception is 
illustrated in cases such as Aboody and O’Brien. 
                                                 
198 A presumption in favour of engaged couples has been raised in a number of cases, see Louth v Diprose (1992) 110 ALR 
1, per Brennan J, p 7; and Goodman Estate v Geffen 81 DLR (4th) 211, [1991] 2 SCR 353, per Wilson J, para 29. However, 
the value of this presumption has been doubted, and justified as reflecting the values of society in earlier times, see Engle v 
Carswell 1995 ACWSJ LEXIS 46937, 1995 ACWSJ 632249, 53 ACWS (3d) 1282, (cited Lexis.com at 20 October 2006), 
per Miller J, para **95; and P Vout, (ed and Current Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia 
(2006), para 35.8:31. 
The difficulty of recognising a presumption in engaged couples is illustrated in Bradley v Crittenden [1932] SCR 552, 
[1932] 3 DLR 193 (cited 1932 CarswellAlta 75 Westlaw at 11 October 2006) it was held by a majority of 3/2 that a 
presumption of undue influence does not extend to relationships of pure friendship, even if it is one of deep affection, and 
when one reposes trust and confidence in the other (that is, a relationship akin to an engaged couple). The minority relied on 
public policy grounds and held that a presumption was raised. The donor and donee were not formally engaged, but the 
donor was greatly in love with the donee and wished to make her his wife. The lack of formal engagement was not material. 
199 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [1998] 4 All ER 705 (Court of Appeal), per Stuart-Smith LJ, para 6. 
200 More recently in Engle v Carswell above n 198, Miller J held that as there is no presumption of influence between 
husband and wife, there should be no presumption where the relationship is a “common law” one, p *50. 
201 G H Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th ed 2003), p 414-5. 
202 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, p 423. 
203 Treitel, above n 201, p 409. 
204 N Enonchong, ‘Presumed Undue Influence: Continuing Misconceptions’ LQR 2005, 121 (Jan), 29-33, p 29; N 
Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 10-004. 
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In relation to class 2B, the misconception was that proof of the de facto existence of a relationship of 
trust and confidence raised the presumption of undue influence. If there was no evidence to disprove 
the undue influence, then the complainant succeeded, without having to prove that actual undue 
influence was exercised, or that there had been any abuse of the trust and confidence reposed.205 
 
The misconception that the law had developed into was illustrated by Stuart-Smith LJ, in the Court of 
Appeal in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2)206 where his Honour held that actual undue 
influence and presumed undue influence are distinct alternatives to each other, and that it was incorrect 
to conceptualise the difference between the classes as merely a difference “by which the exercise of 
undue influence is proved.”207 It was held that Mr Etridge did not exercise actual undue influence on 
Mrs Etridge, yet there was presumed undue influence within class 2B.208 This was purely based on the 
fact that Mrs Etridge reposed trust and confidence in Mr Etridge as she would sign anything put in front 
of her by her husband, without reading or questioning it. There was no consideration as to whether that 
trust and confidence was abused in any way.209 
 
A further example was Dailey v Dailey.210 Dailey was heard at the Court of Appeal before Etridge was 
decided and at the Privy Council after Etridge was decided. The case concerned Mr and Mrs Dailey 
who were in divorce proceedings. Mrs Dailey transferred matrimonial property from their joint names, 
into Mr Dailey’s sole name for the consideration of $100,000. She later claimed that she did so because 
of the undue influence of her husband. The trial judge held that no undue influence was exercised in 
relation to the transfer of the property. This was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal 
applied O’Brien and held that a relationship of trust and confidence had been proved, and therefore, 
there was a presumption of undue influence. Proof of the relationship was taken as proof that the 
relationship was abused. As Mr Dailey could not prove that the transaction was at arms length, and that 
she had independent advice, he failed to rebut the presumption. This finding was reversed by the Privy  
                                                 
205 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, p 423. 
206 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) Court of Appeal [1998] 4 All ER 705. See also D Sim, ‘Burden of Proof in 
Undue Influence: Common Law and Codes on Collision Course’, 2003 EvPro 7(221) (cited Lexis.com at 10 February 
2006), also analysed the pre-Etridge law as falling into three categories of undue influence. 
207 [1998] 4 All ER 705, per Stuart-Smith LJ, p 711-712. 
208 This approach was also followed in National Westminster Bank plc v Gill [1988] 4 All ER 705. 
209 See also National Westminster Bank plc v Gill [1988] 4 All ER 705, this was one of the cases that formed the eight 
appeals in Etridge. It was held that the claim of actual undue influence failed, yet the case under the presumption of undue 
influence under class 2B succeeded. 
210 2003 WL 22187642, [2003] UKPC 65. 
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Council, which applied Etridge principles. It was held that the evidence showed that before the 
marriage broke down, there was a sound working partnership between the parties, and that Mrs Dailey 
was not so compliant to Mr Dailey that she could not bring an independent mind to transactions. 
2. Manifest Disadvantage 
(a) History 
Proof that the defendant had an influence over the plaintiff was insufficient in itself to succeed in 
proving undue influence. Manifest disadvantage had to be shown. The origins of manifest disadvantage 
can be traced back to Allcard v Skinner211 where Lindley LJ considered the size of the gift. In the case 
of small gifts, even if a confidential relationship exists between the parties, actual undue influence must 
be proved. In the case of larger gifts that cannot “be reasonably accounted for on the ground of 
friendship, relationship, charity, or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act, the burden is 
upon the donee to support the gift.”212 Therefore, if an unaccountable gift could be shown, the burden 
would shift to the donee to prove emancipation of the donor from the influence. 
 
It was Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan213 that coined the phrase “manifest 
disadvantage”. His Lordship held that there was no reported authority where a transaction was set aside 
that was not manifestly disadvantageous to the person influenced.214 The concept was not limited to 
gifts, but was held to apply to inequitable agreements, ‘immoderate or irrational’ transactions and sales 
at undervalue.215 It was held that the disadvantage must be serious enough to require evidence to rebut 
the presumption that the transaction was procured by the exercise of undue influence. Morgan has been 
criticised for extending the requirement for unfair advantage into manifest disadvantage,216 and for 
relying on Poosathurai v Kannappa Chettiar.217 Poosathurai was a case based on s16 of the Indian 
Contracts Act 1872, which statutorily required manifest disadvantage.218 Subsequent authorities have 
been criticised for relying on Morgan because the comments in Morgan are strictly obiter.219 
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Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody220 took the requirement for manifest 
disadvantage even further, and held that manifest disadvantage should be proved even in cases of actual 
undue influence. In the case it was held that Mrs Aboody was subjected to the actual undue influence 
of Mr Aboody. However, she could not show that the transactions were to her manifest disadvantage, 
so her appeal failed. The requirement to prove manifest disadvantage in cases of actual and presumed 
undue influence was adopted into New Zealand by the Court of Appeal in Contractors Bonding Ltd v 
Snee.221 
 
The requirement to prove manifest disadvantage in cases of actual undue influence was later overruled 
by CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt.222 It was held unnecessary to prove manifest disadvantage in cases of 
actual undue influence. If actual undue influence was proved, then the plaintiff was entitled to have the 
transaction set aside as of right, since actual undue influence is a species of fraud. Pitt also signalled 
that the concept of manifest disadvantage would have to be reconsidered in the future, especially in 
relation to abuse of confidence cases.223 
(b) Meaning of Manifest Disadvantage 
What is the meaning of manifest disadvantage? Lord Scarman in Morgan did not give a definition of 
manifest disadvantage but described it as “a disadvantage sufficiently serious to require evidence to 
rebut the presumption that in the circumstances of the relationship between the parties it was procured 
by the exercise of undue influence.”224 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Practice’ 10 SAcLJ 1 (1998), p 42; A Phang, and H Tjio, ‘The Uncertain Boundaries of Undue Influence’ (2002) 2 (May) 
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223 Ibid, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, p 439. 
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Slade LJ in Aboody endorsed the meaning used by the trial judge:225 
I regard “victimization” (the word used only by Lindley LJ) and “unfair advantage” (the words used by Lord 
Scarman) to be examples of the creation of a disadvantage and I would hold that a disadvantage would be a 
manifest disadvantage if it would have been obvious as such to any independent and reasonable persons who 
considered the transaction at the time with knowledge of all the relevant facts. 
Slade LJ went on to add that the beneficial and detrimental features of the transaction needed to be 
weighed up, and that manifest disadvantage must be obvious. The question was to be answered by 
balancing “two factors, namely (a) the seriousness of the risk of enforcement to the giver in practical 
terms, and (b) the benefits gained by the giver in accepting the risk.”226 
 
In the case of a gift, manifest disadvantage was not difficult to establish.227 In other cases it was much 
more difficult. Slade LJ described a hypothetical case: 
…of an old lady induced by her solicitor under strong pressure to sell him a large and inconvenient family home at 
full market value. Manifest disadvantage might be difficult to demonstrate in such a case. But, as a matter of 
principle, should she be left without any remedy?228 
His Honour felt that the answer to that question from a solicitor/client relationship was that she would 
have no remedy under the law of undue influence. However, a remedy would be available under abuse 
of confidence doctrine. The position of a person relying on the abuse of confidence line of authority 
was considered by His Honour to be much stronger than one who relied on undue influence.229 
 
It is submitted that Slade LJ’s view placed a purely monetary definition on manifest disadvantage. If 
the house had sentimental value to the old woman, then the transaction would be to her manifest 
disadvantage because she would not have sold the house had the pressure not been applied to her. Even 
if the weaker party received adequate consideration, she may have wanted to retain the property.230 
 
In Cheese v Thomas231 the Court of Appeal took a more “relaxed”232 attitude to manifest disadvantage 
and took into account other factors beyond the monetary element. In assessing whether the transaction 
was manifestly disadvantageous to Mr Cheese, Sir Donald Nicholls VC held that the drawbacks 
outweighed the benefits. The drawbacks were that: all his capital was tied up in the house, he could not 
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choose to live elsewhere, he could not compel Mr Thomas to sell the house or return his money, and he 
would be in financial jeopardy if the mortgage payments were not made.233 
(c) Problems With Manifest Disadvantage 
The requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate manifest disadvantage came under heavy criticism.234 One 
of the main criticisms of manifest disadvantage was determining the degree of disadvantage required to 
constitute “manifest”.235 In Barclays Bank plc v Coleman236 Nourse LJ criticised the fact that the 
authorities on this matter “have now got into a very unsatisfactory state, the concept of manifest 
disadvantage [was] elusive and often difficult to apply to the facts of individual cases.”237 He felt that it 
was judicial courtesy that prevented Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pitt from dispensing with manifest 
disadvantage in cases of presumed undue influence in addition to actual undue influence. 
 
In any event, Nourse LJ had to concede that establishing manifest disadvantage was a requirement, but 
in effect he lowered the threshold. Manifest disadvantage must be a disadvantage, and it must be “clear 
and obvious. But that does not mean that it must be large or even medium-sized. Provided it is clear 
and obvious and more than de minimis the disadvantage may be small.”238 The fact that the wife had 
undertaken a greater financial risk than she could have known was held to be to her manifest 
disadvantage. Barclays Bank v Coleman set the stage for reconsideration of the requirement of manifest 
disadvantage in Etridge. 
 
Despite the criticisms of manifest disadvantage as a necessary element in proving undue influence, it 
does have some place in the law. Stuart-Smith LJ239 held that establishing manifest disadvantage had 
dual significance: “(i) it assists the complainant in establishing her claim against the wrongdoer in a 
case of presumed undue influence; and (ii) it is relevant to the way in which the transaction appears to a 
third party and thus assists her in establishing that the third party had constructive notice of the 
impropriety.”240 
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THE ETRIDGE CASE 
In Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2)241 the House of Lords decision re-examined the doctrine of 
undue influence. Etridge was a combined appeal of eight cases. Seven of the cases involved wives 
charging their interests in the family home to secure the business debts of their spouses. The wives 
contended that the guarantee was signed under the undue influence of their husbands. The eighth case 
was concerned with a wife suing the solicitor who advised her before she entered into the guarantee. 
 
Lord Nicholls delivered the leading speech with which Lords Bingham, Clyde, Hobhouse and Scott 
expressly agreed. Lord Nicholls reiterated the starting point for any analysis was the two forms of 
unacceptable conduct: the first was overt acts of improper pressure or coercion; and the second arose 
out of a relationship between two parties where one acquired an influence or ascendancy over the other, 
and then unfair advantage was taken by the stronger party.242 His Lordship recognised that the law 
needed to protect these types of “relationship” cases, even when there was no evidence of overt acts of 
persuasive conduct. The types of relationships referred to were held to be infinitely various, and could 
not be listed exhaustively. Instead, the question should be “whether one party has reposed trust and 
confidence in the other.”243 
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Lord Nicholls then went further, and discussed the burden of proof and presumptions of undue 
influence. He held that the question is one of fact, and the burden of proof rests on the person who 
claims to have been wronged. The complainant must prove that trust and confidence was placed “in the 
other party in relation to the management of the complainant’s financial affairs.”244 Alternatively, the 
plaintiff may prove a certain type of relationship which the law adopts a “sternly protective attitude” 
towards. These relationships were in a special class, previously referred to as class 2A. In these cases 
the law “presumes, irrebuttably, that one party had influence over the other. The complainant need not 
prove he actually reposed trust and confidence in the other party. It is sufficient for him to prove the 
existence of the type of relationship.”245 Lord Nicholls noted that in the past, this process became 
conventionally known as “one in which a presumption of undue influence arises.”246 However, if a 
plaintiff succeeds by this route, it is because the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing a case of undue 
influence: 
The court has drawn appropriate inferences of fact upon a balanced consideration of the whole of the evidence at 
the end of a trial which the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff. The use, in the course of the trial, of the 
forensic tool of a shift in the evidential burden of proof should not be permitted to obscure the overall position. 
These cases are the equitable counterpart of common law cases where the principle of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. 
There is a rebuttable evidential presumption of undue influence.247 
Lord Nicholls held that this evidential presumption of undue influence must be distinguished from the 
irrebuttable presumption of influence. “The irrebuttable presumption relates to the existence of the 
influence, the rebuttable evidential presumption to its exercise.”248 
 
The second requirement to raise the evidential presumption of undue influence is a transaction that 
calls for explanation.  Lord Nicholls discussed many of the criticisms of manifest disadvantage as an 
element in proving undue influence. It was a label that was difficult to apply, and had given rise to 
misunderstanding. He thought that the label was being understood and applied in a way which did not 
accord with the meaning intended by its creator, Lord Scarman.249 In straightforward cases, such as a 
sale at gross undervalue, or a large gift, it was easy to apply. However, in the case of a wife who 
guaranteed her husband’s business debts, the answer was not so easy. In a “narrow sense” the 
transaction was to the manifest disadvantage of the wife. She had undertaken a serious financial 
obligation, and received nothing personally.250 In a wider sense she would benefit from the transaction, 
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as “the fortunes of husband and wife are bound up together.”251 If the husband’s business was 
successful, then she would benefit financially from that. 
 
Lord Nicholls held that the requirement of manifest disadvantage makes good sense. Otherwise 
Christmas gifts given by children to their parents could be called into question. Agreements between 
clients and their solicitors or patients and their doctors to be paid reasonable fees may also be 
questioned.252 Further, the nature of the doctrine of undue influence meant that questions of undue 
influence would not normally arise if the transaction is “innocuous,” or to the advantage of the 
plaintiff.253 Despite the role manifest disadvantage has played,254 it should not be used as a “divining 
rod” to detect whether a transaction was procured by undue influence or not. It was simply a 
description of a transaction which could not be explained by reference to the ordinary motives by 
which people are accustomed to act.255 
 
As a consequence, the label “manifest disadvantage” was discarded and instead the test of “a 
transaction that calls for explanation” was adopted. This test was intended to follow more closely the 
test laid down in Allcard and then adopted in Morgan. In Allcard v Skinner a questionable transaction 
was one that “cannot be reasonably accounted for on the ground of friendship, relationship, charity or 
other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act”. The test extracted from Morgan was that “it must 
constitute a disadvantage sufficiently serious to require evidence to rebut the presumption that in the 
circumstances of the parties’ relationship, it was procured by the exercise of undue influence.”256 Lord 
Nicholls reinforced Pitt and held that proving a transaction that calls for explanation is not necessary 
for cases of actual pressure.257 
 
The remaining members of the House, expressed agreement with Lord Nicholls, but each took a 
slightly different approach. Lord Clyde acknowledged the difficulty in defining undue influence. He 
was critical of the use of the terms actual undue influence and presumed undue influence. In particular, 
presumed undue influence was unclear in its meaning. Did it mean the “the existence of an influence or 
of its quality being undue”?258 The attempt to build up classes or categories has lead to confusion; and 
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the confusion was aggravated when the names used to identify the classes do not correspond to their 
actual meaning. He also doubted the benefit of further subdividing presumed undue influence into 
subcategories. “All these classifications … add mystery rather than illumination.”259 Lord Clyde held 
that: 
At the end of the day, after trial, there will either be proof of undue influence or that proof will fail, and it will be 
found that there was no undue influence. In the former case, whatever the relationship of the parties and however 
the influence was exerted, there will be found to have been an actual case of undue influence. In the latter there 
will be none.260 
 
Lord Scott took a similar approach. His Lordship specifically criticised the class 2B classification.261 
The mere existence of the relationship did not mean that that relationship had been abused. He went 
further and questioned whether the class 2B classification should have even existed: 
the judge must decide on the totality of the evidence before the court whether or not the allegation of undue 
influence has been proved. In an appropriate case the presumption may carry the complainant home. But it makes 
no sense to find, on the one hand, that there was no undue influence but, on the other hand, that the presumption 
applies. If the presumption does, after all the evidence has been heard, still apply, then a finding of undue influence 
is justified. If, on the other hand, the judge, having heard the evidence, concludes that there was no undue 
influence, the presumption stands rebutted. A finding of actual undue influence and a finding that there is a 
presumption of undue influence are not alternatives to one another. The presumption is, I repeat, an evidential 
presumption. If it applies, and the evidence is not sufficient to rebut it, an allegation of undue influence 
succeeds.262 
The paradox of pleading in the alternative actual undue influence and “presumed” undue influence is 
that on the one hand, the plaintiff would need to argue that his or her will had been overborne by the 
influencer, and on the other hand, the plaintiff will have to contend that he or she placed trust and 
confidence in the influencer. The two contentions are at odds with each other.263 
 
Lord Scott held that the weight of the evidential rebuttable presumption would vary from case to case. 
It would depend on the nature of the relationship between the parties and on the nature of the 
transaction. Correspondingly, the type and weight of evidence required to rebut the presumption 
depends on the weight of the presumption. Whether the complainant received independent advice from 
a third party is relevant and is weighed up with all the other evidence. The importance of such advice 
depends on the circumstances of the case. In the normal course of events, independent advice is 
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sufficient to give the complainant sufficient understanding of the transaction. However, there are 
exceptional cases where a person may understand the proposed transaction, yet still be acting under the 
undue influence of another. 
 
Lord Hobhouse also criticised the use of the terminology of “presumed undue influence”: 
It is a fallacy to argue from the terminology normally used, ‘presumed undue influence’, to the position, not of 
presuming that one party reposed trust and confidence in the other, but of presuming that an abuse of that 
relationship has occurred; factual inference, yes, one the issue has been properly raised, but not a presumption.264 
Lord Hobhouse criticised the “language of presumption”265 used in Aboody and O’Brien, because it 
was more likely to confuse rather than assist. Class 2B presumption was rejected because it was 
considered not to be a useful forensic tool. 
 
Despite the differences in the judgments, Lord Nicholls’ judgment is regarded “as the leading 
exposition of the law of undue influence.”266 However, whether or not it is regarded as such in practice 
will be examined further. Despite the differences, the intention of the House of Lords was to clarify the 
law on undue influence. The case establishes that “there is only one cause of action of undue influence, 
although there are two means of proving it.”267 Further, that the presumption of undue influence is not a 
substitute for finding that undue influence has been proved: it is merely a step in making such a 
finding.268 
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ACTUAL UNDUE INFLUENCE 
To succeed in pleading actual undue influence, the person who alleges it must prove that the 
“wrongdoer exerted undue influence on the complainant to enter into the particular transaction.”269 It is 
the exercise of pressure that indicates similarities between actual undue influence and duress.270 Actual 
undue influence is established by proving: 
(a) that the other party to the transaction (or someone who induced the transaction for his own benefit) had the 
capacity to influence the complainant; (b) that the influence was exercised; (c) that its exercise was undue; (d) that 
its exercise brought about the transaction. 271 
 
In Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2)272 Lord Hobhouse held: 
Actual undue influence presents no relevant problem. It is an equitable wrong committed by the dominant party 
against the other which makes it unconscionable for the dominant party to enforce his legal rights against the other. 
It is typically some express conduct overbearing the other party’s will … Actual undue influence does not depend 
upon some pre-existing relationship between the two parties though it is most commonly associated with and 
derives from such a relationship. He who alleges actual undue influence must prove it. 
 
The nature of actual undue influence was described by Lord Hobhouse as straight-forward. However, 
the difficulty is determining the type of pressure, and the level of pressure required to prove actual 
undue influence. One must make the distinction between acceptable influence which one encounters in 
everyday commercial and family life, and unacceptable influence which warrants the intervention of 
equity. The difficulty is compounded when one considers duress. What is the difference in the pressure 
required to prove actual undue influence as compared with duress. By lay definition alone, “pressure” 
is a stronger act than “influence”. To influence a person is a more subtle persuasion than pressure.273 
The nature of the doctrine has been described as “unfair persuasion rather than coercion.” 274 
 
The similarities between actual undue influence and duress are apparent in some cases. Contractors 
Bonding Ltd v Snee275 involved a widow, Mrs Snee who gave a mortgage and guarantee to secure the 
business debts of her son Mr Savage. It was found by Gallen J that Mrs Snee was mentally impaired 
because of her alcoholism and did not understand the documents that she was signing. He also found 
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that Mrs Snee had strong ties to her family and would have agreed to any proposal put forward by any 
family member, even if it was not to her advantage. It was held that Mr Savage procured the execution 
of the documents by his mother on the basis of actual undue influence.276 
 
In Farmers’ Co-operative Executors & Trustees Ltd v Perks277 the relationship that existed between the 
husband and wife was one of long term violence and abuse. They lived on an isolated farm, their 
nearest neighbour several miles away. It was the combination of those factors that allowed the 
defendant to exercise “considerable influence and dominion”278 over this wife and children. The 
defendant was later convicted of murdering his wife. Before she died, she had transferred to the 
defendant her interest in a farming property jointly owned by the couple. Duggan J found that the 
evidence raised the presumption of undue influence, and the presumption had not been rebutted.279 
However, Duggan J held that the evidence went further and it established a case of actual undue 
influence. 
1. Impairment of Free Will 
The issue of how much influence is too much influence has been expressed as “pressure or persuasion 
which overcomes the will without convincing the reason.”280 Therefore, to constitute actual undue 
influence, the plaintiff must have entered into the transaction because the will to resist had been worn 
down, not because he or she was convinced, however reluctantly that the course of action was the right 
one. For example, in Bank of Scotland v Bennett281 Mrs Bennett executed the legal charge not because 
she was convinced that it was the right thing to do, but because her resistance had been worn down by 
use of insulting language, allegations of disloyalty, and a fear that her marriage would be in jeopardy. 
Similarly in Daniel v Drew282 it was held that the “donor may be led but she must not be driven.”283 
                                                 
276 The independent advice given by the solicitor was not sufficient to remove the influence the son had over the mother. 
However, the guarantee and mortgage was enforced because the financier did not have actual or constructive knowledge of 
the undue influence, and Mr Savage could not be construed as an agent of the financier. 
277 (1989) 52 SASR 399. 
278 Ibid, per Duggan J, p 409. 
279 It was not established that the wife had received any legal advice prior to the transaction. 
280 Bank of Scotland v Bennett (1999) 77 P & CR 447, per Chadwick LJ, *459 citing the trial judge’s comments. See also N 
Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 8-004. 
281 (1999) 77 P & CR 447. This case was one of the appeals to the House of Lords in Etridge. 
282 [2005] EWCA Civ 507. 
283 Ibid, per Ward LJ, para 36. 
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Williams v Bayley284 considered what is meant by undue pressure.285 The case involved a son, who 
forged his father’s signature on bills and promissory notes drawn at the bank. When the bank 
discovered that the signatures were forgeries, pressure was put on the father to take responsibility for 
the debt. Lord Cranworth LC made the distinction between legitimate pressure and illegitimate 
pressure. If the bank had simply informed the father that they would reserve their legal entitlement 
against the father and son, to sue for the debt, then this would be legitimate pressure. However, the 
bank placed pressure on the father to take responsibility for the son’s debt, or the bank would have 
prosecuted the son for forgery, and had him transported for life. This amounted to pressure that was not 
legal and the father would not be acting with freedom to create a valid transaction. Williams v Bayley 
was cited with approval in Public Service Employees Credit Union Co-Operative Ltd v Campion.286 
Campion had similar facts to Williams v Bayley, and it was held that such undue pressure constitutes 
undue influence, but was not enough to constitute duress. 
 
Williams v Bayley was also cited with approval in an early New Zealand case on undue pressure, Banks 
v The Cheltenham Co-operative Dairy Company (Limited).287 In Banks the relationship between the 
plaintiff (Mr Banks, who undertook the obligation to pay) and the person who misappropriated the 
funds (Mr Ross) was more remote that in Williams v Bayley. Mr Banks was the brother in law of Mr 
Ross. However it was held that Mr Banks and his mother were “brought to book in a state of terror” 
that Mr Ross would be prosecuted. It was held that due to the pressure, Mr Banks was not a free agent 
when he repaid the amounts, and the payment was recovered. 
 
Guidance can also be found in an American authority Odorizzi v Bloomfield School District.288 The 
plaintiff Odorizzi was a school teacher who wanted to rescind his resignation on the grounds of undue 
influence. He submitted his resignation after he had been arrested on criminal charges of homosexual 
activity which were subsequently dismissed. The resignation was procured by school officials 
immediately after Odorizzi had been arrested, questioned by the police, booked, and released on bail. 
He had not slept for 40 hours, and complained he was under severe mental and emotional strain. It was 
held by Fleming J that: 
… overpersuasion is generally accompanied by certain characteristics which tend to create a pattern. The pattern 
usually involves several of the following elements: (1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate 
                                                 
284 (1866) LR 1 HL 200. 
285 Lord Denning MR in Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326, cited Williams v Bayley as a case that illustrated the 
category of “undue pressure”. Lord Denning considered that the category of undue pressure was separate from duress and 
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286 (1984) 56 ACTR 39. 
287 (1910) 29 NZLR 979. 
288 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966). 
 44
time, (2) consummation of the transaction in an unusual place, (3) insistent demand that the business be finished at 
once, (4) extreme emphasis on untoward consequences of delay, (5) the use of multiple persuaders by the dominant 
side against a single servient party, (6) absence of third-party advisers to the servient party, (7) statements that 
there is no time to consult financial advisers or attorneys. If a number of these elements are simultaneously present, 
the persuasion may be characterized as excessive…289 
 
In terms of the difference between acceptable pressure and unacceptable influence, Fleming J gave an 
example of a woman who buys a dress on impulse. If she later regrets that transaction because the dress 
was less fashionable that she thought, she cannot avoid the transaction on the ground of undue 
influence, even if the saleswoman “used all her wiles to close the sale.”290 Fleming J likened “[t]he 
difference between legitimate persuasion and excessive pressure, like the difference between seduction 
and rape.”291 
 
An illustration of how the elements from Odorizzi can be applied292 is the case of Daniel v Drew.293 In 
the case, an aged aunt alleged that her nephew, Mr Daniel, procured her resignation from a family trust 
by the exercise of actual undue influence. Mr Daniel chose to see his aunt at her house, visiting with his 
mother because his aunt would have refused to see him on his own. When the deed of resignation was 
signed, Mr Daniel bypassed his aunt’s son and solicitors, and sought her signature himself. She was 
alone, and Mr Daniel brought a witness along for her signature. He knew that she disliked 
confrontation and was afraid of him, and he threatened her with court action if she did not sign. It was 
held that Mr Daniel exercised undue influence on his aunt. 
 
Similarly, in Rac v Miliszewski,294 the transaction was “done hurriedly in an unaccustomed way in the 
midst of the dentist’s busy professional day.”295 The dentist was interrupted and was asked urgently to 
sign documents. The documents included a mortgage and guarantee to secure the debts of the dentist’s 
                                                 
289 Odorizzi v Bloomfield School District 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 54 Cal.Rptr. 533, per Fleming J, p 133. 
290 Ibid p 132. 
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brother. It was accepted by Greig J that the dentist was aware that he was signing legal documents, but 
was unaware of the details because he was relying on his brother, who was a solicitor. The process of 
execution of the documents, coupled with misleading information from the brother about the 
transaction lead Greig J to the conclusion that actual undue influence was exercised. 
 
The question of how much pressure is enough to constitute undue influence would also depend on the 
constitution of the complainant. This would include looking at the personalities of the parties, and 
whether there were any particular vulnerabilities, age, physical or mental illness.296 Therefore in Daniel 
v Drew the threat of court action for an elderly, vulnerable aunt, who was unversed in business from a 
younger, insensitive, forceful and disrespectful nephew, amounted to improper pressure. 
 
Submission to domination can also be “self-willed”.297 In Sutton v Mishcon De Reya and Gawor & 
Co298 Mr Staal wanted to be a “slave” to Mr Sutton. This involved transferring to Mr Sutton a 
considerable amount of his assets, and entering into a cohabitation agreement. It was held that Mr 
Staal’s subjection to Mr Sutton’s domination could have been self-willed. However, if the actual 
domination was apparent to Mr Sutton, then the agreement would be unenforceable “however much 
independent legal advice he might have had.”299 Allcard v Skinner was also an example of self-willed 
domination. It was recognised by Lindley LJ that the submission to the vows and rules of the sisterhood 
was undertaken voluntarily, and without pressure.300 
 
Therefore, the pressure required to constitute actual undue influence is not as excessive as required by 
duress. However, this raises the question of whether no pressure, or excessive submissiveness is 
sufficient to constitute actual undue influence. 
2. Indirect Pressure 
Indirect pressure can be enough to constitute the pressure required for actual undue influence.301 This is 
a crucial distinction between the doctrine of undue influence and duress. As far as indirect pressure is 
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concerned, this can be further subdivided into cases of excessive submissiveness, and concealment of 
material facts.”302 
 
Bank of Montreal v Stuart303 was a case of a wife suffering from extreme submissiveness towards her 
husband. This resulted in her acting as surety to various banks, to secure her husband’s business debts. 
Her husband’s more solvent business associates were unwilling to provide the guarantees. The result of 
the transactions was that Mrs. Stuart surrendered to the bank all her estate, and was left without any 
means of her own. It was held that the husband exercised undue influence on his wife. This was despite 
the fact that under cross-examination she declared that she was not acting under the undue influence of 
her husband, and that he did not put any pressure on her. She went further to say that “she acted of her 
own free will to relieve her husband in his distress.”304 However, this was interpreted by Lord 
Macnaughten as an illustration of “how deeprooted and how lasting the influence of her husband 
was.”305 The influence one has over another can be subtle, yet so great that there is no apparent 
evidence of pressure. It was also held that the solicitor who advised the wife took unfair advantage of 
her. The solicitor in the case acted for the wife, husband and the bank. He was also a director, secretary, 
shareholder and creditor of the company.306 He knew the financial position of the company, and was 
unwilling to risk his own money. It was held that since the bank entrusted the completion of the 
transaction in the solicitor’s hands, it was answerable for his actions. 
 
Birks and Chin307 have criticised the decision in Bank of Montreal v Stuart because it did not 
specifically address the issue of whether excessive submissiveness is sufficient in itself without any 
outward evidence of abuse.308 However, the case does recognise that in terms of excessive 
submissiveness, the complainant’s free will can be dominated where the relationship between the 
complainant and wrongdoer is such that the complainant simply does what the wrongdoer tells the 
complainant to do, without any outward appearance of abuse.309 This may be due to a fear of the 
“perceived consequences of refusing to do what the defendant requested.”310 
                                                 
302 F R Burns, ‘Undue Influence Inter Vivos and the Elderly’ 26 Melbourne ULR 499; and N Enonchong, Duress, Undue 
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The second type of indirect pressure takes the form of concealment of material facts. The effect of 
failing to disclose all material facts to the plaintiff impairs his or her autonomy and free will, because it 
prevents the plaintiff from making a fully informed decision. In Turnbull v Duval311 it was held by 
Lord Lindley that what is required is pressure and concealment of material facts (as opposed to 
pressure and lack of independent advice). It would appear that concealment alone is not enough. 
 
However, in Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA v Aboody312 Slade LJ held that deliberate 
concealment of the risks involved in the transaction can amount to actual undue influence. In the case, 
Mr Aboody chose to say nothing about the risks, rather than misrepresent them. There is suggestion in 
Aboody, although it is not elaborated on, that concealment of material facts coupled with an 
“invitation”313 that the wife enter into the transaction is enough to constitute pressure that amounts to 
undue influence.314 
 
Dunbar Bank plc v Nadeem315 discussed obiter the issue of extreme submissiveness and concealment 
of material facts.316 It was held that “neither coercion, or pressure, nor deliberate concealment is a 
necessary element in a case of actual undue influence.”317 The domination in the case was likened to 
the actual domination, or complete domination. Therefore, there can be a case of actual undue influence 
without any pressure because the influence one person has over another is simply so strong, no pressure 
or deliberate concealment is necessary. The situation was aptly described as “although the pen may 
have been the pen of Mrs Nadeem, the mind was the mind of Mr Nadeem.”318 In Tufton v Sperni319 
Jenkins LJ320 and Morris LJ321 expressed the question as to whether the plaintiff’s mind was “a mere 
channel through which the” will or wishes of the defendant flowed. 
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Examples of deliberate concealment cases include Nicholl v Ryder322 where the contents of a 
management contract were deliberately concealed. Mr Nicholl was dyslexic, abusing drugs, and 
“freaked out by paperwork.” It was known by the prospective managers that Mr Nicholl would be high 
on cannabis when recording, and that was when they sought execution of the management contract 
without disclosing the contents. Greene King plc v Stanley323 where the son did not tell his elderly 
parents that he had failed to raise the money elsewhere, he was many months in default, and had been 
served with specific performance proceedings. He also did not make it clear that it was unlikely that the 
loan would be repaid quickly. UCB Corporate Services Ltd v Williams324 where it was held that the 
husband influenced his wife by failing to disclose matters that would have enabled her to make an 
informed decision. 
 
There is some overlap between undue influence from the concealment of material facts and fraudulent 
misrepresentation,325 for example, in UCB Group Ltd v Hedworth326 undue influence and 
misrepresentation were pleaded in the alternative. In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Finlan327 
it was held that misrepresentation was a part of undue influence, in addition to being a separate 
ground.328 
3. Causation 
To be successful in claiming undue influence, it must be shown that the undue influence caused the 
plaintiff to enter into the transaction. The causation issue is illustrated in Couch v Branch Investments 
(1969) Ltd329 where Mrs Couch did not enter the contract because of the threats made by the finance 
company; she did so because of pressure from her husband. Therefore arguments of undue influence 
and duress were rejected. 
 
The difficulty with this issue is to determine how much of a causative factor the influence was. In 
Barton v Armstrong330 there were threats of violence, and threats to have Mr Barton murdered. 
However, this was not the only reason why the agreement was entered into by Mr Barton. He also 
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wanted to remove Mr Armstrong from the company. It was held that the threats and unlawful pressure 
need not be the sole reason for signing the documents; it only needs to contribute to the decision to 
sign.331 
 
Aboody and UCB Corporate Services Ltd v Williams332 considered the question of whether a victim of 
undue influence is entitled as of right to have the transaction set aside, or whether the victim needs to 
go further and show that in the absence of the wrongdoing, the victim would not have entered the 
transactions.333 Aboody held in favour of the latter.334 
 
In UCB v Williams, Jonathan Parker LJ considered the divergence between Aboody and Pitt. In Pitt it 
was held that a victim of undue influence is entitled to have the transaction set aside as of right, which 
was taken to mean “regardless of other considerations.”335 Jonathan Parker LJ preferred the approach 
taken in Pitt. Therefore, it was held that it was unnecessary for the complainant to prove that he or she 
would not have entered into the transaction if there had been no undue influence.336 The approach in 
UCB v Williams was approved in UCB Group Ltd v Hedworth.337 
 
It is submitted that the correct approach is that undue influence should be a cause of the reason to enter 
into the transaction, and that it is unnecessary to go on to prove that if it had not been for the influence, 
the complainant would not have entered into the transaction. The difficulty with adopting this approach 
as far as New Zealand authority is concerned, is that Aboody was cited with approval in Contractors 
Bonding Ltd v Snee.338 There has been no New Zealand case citing UCB Corporate Services Limited v 
Williams and therefore, no discussion regarding the divergence of approaches, and which approach is 
correct. 
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THE EVIDENTIAL PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
In Etridge Lord Nicholls held that the second route to establish undue influence is to utilise the 
evidential presumption of undue influence. The burden of proof lies with the person who claims to 
have been wronged. The evidential presumption of undue influence arises where it is proved that there 
was a relationship of trust and confidence coupled with a transaction that calls for explanation. Proof of 
those facts establishes that there is prima facie evidence that the transaction was procured by undue 
influence. The evidential burden then shifts to the stronger party to counter the inference drawn that he 
or she exercised undue influence on the weaker party. 
 
A shift in the evidential burden does not involve shifting the legal burden of proof. The difference 
between the legal burden and evidential burden is that: 
The evidential burden has been defined as the obligation to show, if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient 
evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. The legal burden, “burden of 
proof”, “probative” or “persuasive” burden has been defined as the obligation of a party to meet the requirement of 
a rule of law that a fact in issue must be proved or disproved.339 
The burden of proof in an undue influence case always lies with the person alleging undue influence. 
This can be achieved by proof of actual abuse of influence, or by proof of a relationship of trust and 
confidence coupled with a transaction that calls for explanation. Proof via the latter route is in effect 
raising the equitable counterpart of res ipsa loquitur which literally means “the event speaks for 
itself.”340 Therefore, in lieu of further evidence of abuse of the relationship of trust and confidence, the 
matter will be presumed.341 The finding of the presumed fact then casts the provisional or evidential 
burden onto the opponent of the presumed fact: “in other words the party proving the basic fact is likely 
to win on the issue to which the presumed fact relates in the absence of evidence to the contrary 
adduced by the other.”342 
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This issue was discussed recently by Glazebrook J in Accident Compensation Corporation v 
Ambros:343 
… the term burden of proof has been used in two quite distinct senses … The first is a reference to the legal 
burden. The legal burden is what must ultimately be proven by a person in order to win the case. Equally, it can 
refer to the evidential burden. The term evidential burden is, in turn, used to refer to two quite distinct notions. In 
the first sense, it means the burden of adducing evidence on an issue on pain of having the trial Judge determine 
the issue in favour of the opponent. The second sense in which the phrase is used refers to the burden resting upon 
a party who appears to be at risk of losing on a given issue at a particular point in a trial. This merely involves a 
tactical evaluation of who is winning at a particular point which can shift depending upon the trial dynamics. This 
is often referred to as the tactical burden. 
1. Relationship of Trust and Confidence 
The relationship of trust and confidence can be proved by an established relationship, recognised by 
law, that is: trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, parent and child, religious adviser and 
disciple, doctor and patient, and solicitor and client.344 Once the relationship has been proved, the law 
presumes irrebuttably that a relationship of influence exists between the parties. Secondly, the 
relationship of influence can be proved on the facts of the case. What needs to be proved is “a 
relationship of “trust and confidence, reliance, dependence or vulnerability on [one side] and 
ascendancy, domination or control on [the other side]” as a result of which” the vulnerable party was 
disposed to agree with the course of action proposed by the dominant party and the relationship was 
exploited by the dominant party.345 In terms of the evidential presumption, it is not a “conditioned state 
of dependence.”346 What is “undue” about the influence is not its existence but its use. It is the abuse of 
trust that is critical. 
 
In Macklin v Dowsett347 Auld LJ held that in some circumstances it may be appropriate to work from 
the transaction, and the inexplicability of it, and find a relationship of ascendancy and dependency.348 
In terms of principle, this approach is fundamentally flawed. One cannot start from the conclusion and 
then work backwards in order to find the relationship to justify the conclusion. If one were to approach 
cases in such a fashion, then it would be easier to find the relationship of ascendancy and dependency. 
This approach was criticised by Jenkins LJ in Tufton v Sperni.349 It was held that it would be wrong to 
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work backwards from an unconscionable bargain, and attempt to construct a fiduciary relationship 
between those parties in order to set the transaction aside. 
 
In identifying what types of relationships give rise to trust and confidence, Todd writes that “many of 
the cases involve taking advantage of those who are young and impressionable, or elderly, or under 
some degree of physical or mental incapacity.”350 The crucial question to be answered is “what 
measure of confidence and trust suffices to put the donee in a position to exert undue influence.”351 The 
distinguishing characteristics that give rise to the measure of trust and confidence are “a duty on the 
donee to advise the donor, or a position of actual or potential dominance of the donee over the 
donor.”352 In all undue influence cases, either one or both of those characteristics are present. When 
identifying relationships, lists are particularly unhelpful. Relationships that give rise to trust and 
confidence “cannot be listed exhaustively. Relationships are infinitely various … the question is 
whether one party has reposed sufficient trust and confidence in the other, rather than whether the 
relationship between the parties belongs to a particular type.”353 
 
In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch354 a relationship of trust and confidence sufficient to 
raise the presumption of influence had developed between an employee and her employer. The 
employee not only worked during the day (which sometimes finished at 10pm) but she babysat in the 
evenings, visited the family on weekends, and for holidays in Italy. The employer was 10 years older 
than the employee. She regarded him as a successful business man, and trusted him. In Re Craig, 
Decd355 the relationship was again one of employer and employee, but the employee was in the 
position of dominance of her elderly and dependent employer. 
 
There are an increasing number of cases involving the elderly.356 This changing demographic with a 
growing population of elderly, and a large portion of their wealth tied up in residential property raises 
                                                 
350 S Todd, Burrows Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 356. See pages 356-7 for examples. 
351 In re Brocklehurst’s Estate [1978] Ch 14, per Bridge LJ, p 42. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls, p 458. 
354 [1997] 1 All ER 144. 
355 [1971] Ch 95. 
356 See also Avon Finance Co Ltd v Bridger [1985] 2 All ER 281; Greene King plc v Stanley [2001] EWCA Civ 1966; 
Humphreys v Humphreys [2004] EWHC 2201; Popowski v Popowski [2004] EWHC 668; In re Estate of James Allen 
Hendrix 134 WashApp 1007, (cited 2006 WL 2048240, Westlaw), (Wash.App. Div. 1); and Janson v Janson [2007] 
NSWSC 1344. 
 53
the importance of undue influence in this category.357 In Niersmans v Pesticcio358 Mummery LJ gave 
his observation to this trend: 
With the increase in home ownership and the rising value of residential property more people have more property 
to dispose of in their lifetime and on death and more people expect to benefit substantially from inheritance. As 
people live longer, the inheritors have to wait longer. There is, however, the unwelcome prospect that the longer 
the wait, the greater the risk that even a modest estate will be seriously diminished by the high cost of care in the 
old age or infirmity of the home owner, and by the impact of inheritance tax on death. The elderly and infirm in 
need of full time residential care are vulnerable to suggestions that they should dispose of the home to which they 
are unlikely to return. In my view, these social trends are already leading to a renewed interest in the law governing 
the validity of life time dispositions of houses, both in and outside the family circle, by the elderly and the infirm. 
 
In Vale v Armstrong359 an elderly uncle, Mr Vale transferred to his great nephew, Mr Armstrong, his 
house at a discounted value in return for the right to live in his home, free of rent, mortgage payments, 
expenses or maintenance. The transaction was entered into not long after the death of Mrs Vale. It was 
held that Mr Vale was in shock after the death of his wife, and the legal and financial matters were 
normally dealt with by the wife. The right to occupy the property for the remainder of Mr Vale’s life 
was never recorded in any agreement. One year later, Mr Armstrong requested that Mr Vale vacate the 
house. Although the Judge found that Mr Vale was not “stupid or entirely incapable”,360 it would have 
been a struggle for him to understand the transaction. Therefore, he had to rely on Mr Armstrong to do 
what was best for him. A relationship of trust and confidence was established. 
 
In Aldridge v Turner361 a relationship of trust and confidence arose, when an increasingly incapacitated 
father relied on his son and daughter-in-law for his daily care and financial management. In Lee v 
Damesh Holdings Ltd362 a relationship of trust and confidence was established between an elderly 
widow who had no business experience and her son when she mortgaged her house to support her son’s 
business debts. She was particularly vulnerable to her son’s influence following her husband’s death. 
This coupled with her age, health and lack of business experience meant that she simply did what he 
told her to.363 
                                                 
357 See discussion in F R Burns, ‘Elders and Testamentary Undue Influence in Australia’ (2005) 28(1) UNSWLJ 145; F R 
Burns, ‘Undue Influence Inter Vivos and the Elderly’ 26 Melbourne ULR 499; and F R Burns, ‘The elderly and undue 
influence inter vivos’ 23 Legal Stud 251 2003. 
358 [2004] EWCA Civ 372, per Mummery LJ,  para 4. 
359 [2004] EWHC 1160. See discussion below p 68 and 82. 
360 Ibid, per Evans-Lombe J, para 42. 
361 [2004] EWHC 2768. 
362 [2003] 2 NZLR 422. See discussion below p 69. 
363 The decision in Lee v Damesh Holdings was appealed to the Court of Appeal: CA 77/03 [30 September 2003]. It was 
held that the High Court judgment should be set aside and the case remitted to the High Court because the case proceeded 
on the narrow pleadings that if Wilkinson v ASB Bank [1998] 1 NZLR 674 applied, Mrs Lee could not succeed, whereas if 
Etridge represents the law in New Zealand, Mrs Lee should succeed. The disparity between the process detailed in Etridge 
and Wilkinson v ASB Bank related to the issue of whether the financier was put on notice regarding Trevor’s exercise of 
undue influence on his mother, not to issues of establishing the presence of undue influence. 
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The relationship of trust and confidence need not be between an elderly person and a younger person. 
Ganderton v Behre364 was a case that involved two elderly people. The plaintiff, Mrs Ganderton was 
aged 88. The defendant, Mr Behre was aged 74. Mr Behre was one of the tenants in one of Mrs 
Ganderton’s rental properties. Over the years trust and confidence developed between Mrs Ganderton 
and Mr Behre, and their finances became inextricably linked. As Mrs Ganderton aged and her medical 
conditions became more complicated, her dependence on Mr Behre increased. As this dependence 
grew, so did the financial pressure that Mr Behre placed on Mrs Ganderton. It was held that there was a 
relationship of trust, that some of the transactions entered into were highly unusual, and therefore, 
undue influence was exercised in relation to those transactions. 
 
The relationship of trust and confidence can arise from the interaction in a single transaction. In 
Investors Compensation Scheme Limited v West Bromwich Building Society365 a relationship of trust 
and confidence arose between elderly investors and the financial adviser responsible for the 
promulgation of an equity release mortgage scheme. 
 
Not every relationship of an elderly person with a younger person is necessarily one of trust, 
confidence and dependence. In Re Brocklehurst’s Estate366 the relationship between the elderly man 
and younger companion was that of dominance by the elderly gentleman. Therefore, when the elderly 
man granted a 99 year lease of unrestricted shooting rights over his estate, it was held that there was no 
relationship of trust and confidence. 
 
Another interesting social trend is the increase of different cultures in western societies. The different 
cultures introduce different expectations regarding family and social interactions and relationships. The 
consideration of the cultural factors may mean that the relationship of trust and confidence is more 
easily established. However, cases of this nature should not be given any special treatment; the 
elements of undue influence still need to be established. In Appeal by Ngahuia Tawhai367 one of the 
issues on appeal was whether the trial judge had been correct in taking judicial note of certain Maori 
beliefs in respect of Maori land, and applying those beliefs to the case. It was held that the “nature and 
effect of the transaction needs to be established.”368 While the Court may be entitled to take judicial 
notice of tikanga or custom, the assumption should not be made that everyone adheres or ascribes to 
                                                 
364 HC ROT CIV 2004-463-000614 [23 September 2005]. 
365 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep PN 496. 
366 [1978] Ch 14. 
367 [1998] NZAR 459 (Maori Appellate Court). 
368 Ibid, per Smith J, p 466. 
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that custom. The Court should judge each case on the evidence before it.369 Similarly in Alirezai v 
Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited370 there was a close friendship between borrower 
and surety based on shared cultural and religious values. The appellant was Iranian, and lived his life 
by Islamic beliefs. He felt obligated to financially help his friend, because his friend had helped him 
financially in the past. It was held that adherence to Muslim faith and Iranian customs may have 
explained the appellant’s feeling of moral obligation to guarantee his friend’s debt. There was a 
relationship of trust and friendship. However, it did not create a special relationship that would 
distinguish it from an ordinary guarantee situation. 
 
Women in other cultures may be less emancipated than those in the west.371 Allegations of undue 
influence become further complicated with issues of extreme submissiveness due to cultural issues, 
intermixed with western values. In Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Compulsory 
Liquidation) v Hussain372 Hart J had to weigh up the evidence of a conservative Islamic woman. She 
gave evidence that she was totally dominated by her husband, who subjected her to physical and 
emotional humiliation. She was expected to undertake a traditional Moslem role of raising children and 
looking after the home. Opposing counsel contended that the evidence to establish her as a typical 
conservative Moslem wife were at odds with her western values. She had studied four years at Harvard, 
her marriage was not arranged, and she took the initiative to purchase their latest matrimonial property 
(which was against her husband’s wishes). However, Hart J held that he did not believe that Mrs 
Hussain would craft such a story, thus the cultural factors that Mrs Hussain was brought up with 
overshadowed the western cultural factors she came into contact with later in life.373 
 
In Barclays Bank v Coleman374 Mrs Coleman was a Hasidic Jew. Despite growing up in the United 
States, she was brought up in a Hasidic community and she was expected “to accept a position of 
subservience and obedience to the wishes of her husband.”375 Lord Scott found that it would have been 
                                                 
369 Appeal by Ngahuia Tawhai [1998] NZAR 459, per Smith J, p 469. On the issue of undue influence, it was referred back 
to the lower court for rehearing. 
370 [2004] QCA 6, [2004] Q ConvR 54-601, (cited 2004 WL 227507, Westlaw at 10 February 2006). 
371 In Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1992] 4 All ER 955 Mrs Aboody was an Iraqi Jew. In 
accordance with her upbringing, she left all business matters to her husband. She was a co-director and secretary of the 
family business, but was not involved in any of the day to day running of the business. She would simply sign documents 
when presented to her by her husband. The trial judge found that Mr Aboody exercised undue influence over Mrs Aboody, 
and this was not challenged on appeal. However, as Mrs Aboody could not show that the transactions were to her manifest 
disadvantage, her appeal failed. 
372 1999 WL 1425708 High Court, Chancery Division (cited Westlaw at 30 January 2008). 
373 However, the case against the bank failed as the bank did not have constructive notice of any irregularities with the 
execution of the documents. 
374 [2001] 4 All ER 449. 
375 Ibid, per Lord Scott, p 524. 
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difficult for her to question her husband’s business or financial decisions. He held that a presumption of 
undue influence arose out of the relationship not because Mrs Coleman was disinclined to second-guess 
her husband, but because she felt obliged not to do so. Lord Hobhouse held that this was a case of 
actual undue influence. 
 
The difficulty in some cases is that the relationship between the parties may be considered in two 
different categories, and which one takes precedence needs to be decided. In Bar-Mordecai v 
Hillston,376 the case concerned the transfer of property from an elderly woman, Mrs Hillston, to her 
doctor, Dr Bar-Mordecai. Dr Bar-Mordecai was the treating physician to Mrs Hillston’s deceased 
husband, and to Mrs Hillston herself up until her death. Mrs Hillston was a lawyer, intelligent, and an 
experienced business person. She was 36 years older than Dr Bar-Mordecai. It was held that the doctor-
patient relationship raised the presumption of influence. This was despite the fact that Dr Bar-Mordecai 
tried to argue that the parties were in a de facto relationship, there being no presumption between 
“husbands” and “wives”. It was held that the doctor-patient presumption outweighed the possibility of 
a de facto couple argument. The fact that a doctor-patient relationship becomes sexual means that there 
is a heightened need for security.377 Similarly in Markham v Karsten378 the parties cohabited in a de 
facto relationship. However, Mrs Karsten also acted as Mr Markham’s solicitor. The case was an 
appeal from a bankruptcy order. The Registrar who heard the bankruptcy order held that the relevant 
relationship was the domestic relationship and that the solicitor, client relationship was irrelevant. On 
appeal, Briggs J held that the relationship between a solicitor and client should not be irrelevant 
“merely because they are also in another well-recognised relationship in which influence, or the 
reposing of trust and confidence, may arise. On the contrary … the influence which is presumed to 
exist between solicitor and client may be strengthened if they are also in a marriage or domestic partner 
relationship.”379 It was held that there was a triable issue as to whether undue influence existed in 
relation to the execution of documents where Mr Markham acknowledged that he owed Mrs Karsten 
money and that he held a property on trust for her. 
 
It is questionable whether mutual trust and confidence is sufficient to raise the evidential presumption 
of undue influence. In Nel v Kean380 it was held that it was insufficient. However, Enonchong argues 
that Etridge did not establish a general principle that mutual trust and confidence is insufficient. The 
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essential fact is finding that there is a relationship of trust and confidence. Mutuality of trust and 
confidence does not alter the fact that trust and confidence exists, “for even in a relationship where trust 
and confidence is mutual, one party may acquire a greater degree of influence over the other.”381 It is 
submitted that both views must be incorporated to correctly apply the principle of undue influence. On 
the one hand, Nel v Kean is in a sense correct, because of the general nature of undue influence. One 
must prove that the other party has gained an ascendancy over the other. However, Enonchong is also 
in a sense correct, because it is the abuse of that trust and confidence (which may be mutual) which 
brings into play the equitable principles. 
2. A Transaction That Calls For Explanation 
The second element that needs to be proved before the evidential presumption of undue influence can 
be raised is a transaction that calls for explanation. The fact that a transaction may be unusual does not 
make it one that calls for explanation. The explanation goes “towards the possible exercise of undue 
influence.”382 If a transaction is one that calls for explanation, then the explanation should be 
considered before the evidential presumption can be raised.383 If a sufficient explanation is given, the 
evidential presumption does not arise. 
 
The test of a transaction that calls for explanation is an objective test. The analysis is fact specific,384 
and to be analysed as between the two parties.385 In determining whether a transaction is one that calls 
for explanation, “the question is whether, on the facts of the particular transaction and in light of the 
parties’ relationship, the transaction can be explained by ordinary motives,”386 or explained in “terms 
other than those of undue influence.”387 In Etridge Lord Nicholls held that the relative advantages and 
disadvantages are relevant, “the greater the disadvantage to the vulnerable person, the more cogent 
must be the explanation.”388 In order to determine whether a transaction is one that calls for 
explanation, the transaction must be viewed as a whole. The House of Lords formulated the test to 
closely resemble the tests from Allcard v Skinner and Morgan.389 It may be recalled that in Allcard v 
                                                 
381 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 10-040. 
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Skinner a questionable transaction was one that “cannot be reasonably accounted for on the ground of 
friendship, relationship, charity or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act”. The test 
extracted from Morgan was that “it must constitute a disadvantage sufficiently serious to require 
evidence to rebut the presumption that in the circumstances of the parties’ relationship, it was procured 
by the exercise of undue influence.”390 
 
However, the tests derived from Allcard and Morgan differ in focus. The test that arises from Morgan 
focuses on the relative advantages and disadvantages of the transaction. There may be a tendency to 
revert back to applying the test of manifest disadvantage. Further, the test from Morgan is somewhat 
circular in reasoning, because in order to prove undue influence, the transaction must be “explicable 
only on the basis that undue influence had been exercised to procure it”.391 On the other hand, the 
Allcard v Skinner test focuses on what can be justified as an acceptable transaction between the two 
parties to the transaction, and thus leads to questions as to whether the transaction can be explained or 
not. The relative advantage or disadvantage is simply an element to be considered. 
 
In Chater v Mortgage Agency Services Number Two Limited392 a distinction was drawn between the 
tests in Morgan and Etridge. The Morgan test was considered a “higher test”, but the Etridge test was 
preferred.393 In Clarke v Marlborough Fine Art (London) Limited394 it was held that Etridge had 
succeeded in restoring the position to that stated in Allcard v Skinner.395 
 
The shift in Etridge from a test of manifest disadvantage to a transaction that calls for explanation has 
been criticised by some commentators. Ho argues that the new label “simply restates the conclusion of 
the analysis, whereas the old one of “manifest disadvantage” focuses attention on the essential criterion 
                                                                                                                                                                       
which can be readily explicable. Morgan went further by creating a prerequisite of manifest disadvantage, which extended 
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390 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls p 461. See R Bigwood, ‘Undue 
Influence in the House of Lords: Principles and Proof’ (2002) 65 (3) MLR 435, p 449-50, where Bigwood argues that this 
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392 [2003] EWCA Civ 490. 
393 Chater v Mortgage Agency Services Number Two Limited [2003] EWCA Civ 490, per Scott Baker LJ, para 30. 
394 [2002] EWHC 11. 
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that leads to the conclusion.”396 It was argued that the new label will not offer any useful guidance to 
the courts, as it encounters the same issues of vagueness as manifest disadvantage. The decision of a 
wife to guarantee her husband’s business debts may be inexplicable on the basis of the marriage bond, 
but also may be explicable because the wife will derive a financial benefit from her husband’s business 
success. 
 
By contrast, Scott argues that the benefit of the new test is that it is not “inherently limited to 
financially disadvantageous transactions.”397 This means that non-financial factors may be taken into 
account when assessing a transaction. One may recall the discussion earlier of the elderly lady who 
sells her house to her solicitor for full market value. The fact that the house had sentimental value to the 
woman would be taken into account when assessing the inexplicability of the transaction, but not in a 
narrow test of manifest disadvantage. “In this sense, the test of inexplicability is in fact wider than that 
of manifest disadvantage.”398 
 
The crucial question is whether the new test is a genuine change of approach or is merely cosmetic.399 
In theory, there is a difference between the concepts of manifest disadvantage and a transaction that 
calls for explanation. A transaction may benefit the influenced party, yet still call for an explanation. 
Similarly, a large gift between parties where there is a relationship of trust and confidence may, in 
certain circumstances, not call for an explanation.400 In the pre-Etridge case of Steeples v Lea401 Millett 
LJ used the terms manifest disadvantage and a transaction that calls for explanation interchangeably. In 
this case, a transaction where a receptionist was providing security for her employer’s debts was not 
something she would have been expected to do, and therefore was a transaction that called for 
explanation. 
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The test of a transaction that calls for explanation is comprised of two facets: the relative advantages 
and disadvantages; and an inexplicable transaction based on the relationship between the two parties. 
The problem with post-Etridge cases applying the test of a transaction that calls for explanation is that 
the majority have focused on only one of those facets.402 
 
To correctly apply the test of a transaction that calls for explanation, the alignment needs to follow 
closely the test from Allcard v Skinner: ordinary motives of ordinary persons in that relationship. 
Chater v Mortgage Agency Services Number Two Limited403 held that a parent guaranteeing the 
business debts of one of their children is not normally a transaction that calls for explanation. “Capital 
is frequently passed on from one generation to the next. It is perfectly normal for a parent to wish to 
help a child financially. Many parents put money into their child’s business.”404 However, in Chater the 
specific features in the case that called for explanation were: it was a 25 year mortgage for a woman of 
61; the true purpose of the loan was not stated on the loan application; the house was transferred from 
the mother’s sole name into the joint names of mother and son; and the mother had put the whole 
equity in her home at risk, even though she had a daughter which she intended to benefit equally in the 
event of her death. Similar considerations were applied in Abbey National Bank plc v Stringer405 where 
an elderly, illiterate mother, with only limited spoken English, guaranteed her son’s business debts. 
Lloyd LJ applied the concept of disadvantage and inexplicability of the transaction interchangeably. In 
Lee v Damesh Holdings Ltd406 the transaction was also one that called for explanation. Mrs Lee failed 
to understand the transaction, she ran the risk of losing her Queenstown property, and the transaction 
was from the outset high risk. 
 
In Simon v Westpac Banking Corporation407 it was held that the plaintiff failed to adduce enough 
evidence to prove the existence of undue influence. There was not a greater element of trust and 
confidence by the parents to their daughter than was normally expected between parents and adult 
children. It was further held that there was nothing unusual about the transaction: it is not unusual for a 
parent to help their children in their business ventures. 
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In Leeder v Stevens408 the relationship between the parties was one of married man and mistress. The 
relationship lasted over a number of years and at the time of the transaction the parties considered that 
the relationship would continue indefinitely. Ms Leeder’s sole asset was her house. Mr Stevens paid off 
the mortgage, and paid for the maintenance, insurance and some improvements on the house. In return 
he received a half interest in the house. It was held that there was a relationship of trust and confidence. 
It was a long term relationship, and was to continue into the indefinite future. As far as the test of a 
transaction that calls for explanation, Leeder applies both facets of the test. Initially Jacob LJ appeared 
to revert back to questioning whether the transaction was “manifestly disadvantageous” to Ms Leeder. 
She gave away half her house for a small investment of capital. However, the Judge went further and 
held in terms of the relationship between the parties “[i]t was a transaction which cried out for 
explanation other than going beyond merely a loving relationship.”409 
 
The fact specific analysis of a transaction that calls for explanation gives more flexibility to a court to 
judge the relationship between the parties.410 An example is Anneveld v Robinson.411 The case 
concerned an action between an unmarried couple, Miss Anneveld and Mr Robinson. They had a 
daughter together. The couple purchased a property in their joint names with the intention to develop it 
and use it as a family home. However, Miss Anneveld met another woman on the internet, and Mr 
Robinson alleged they began a lesbian relationship, which Miss Anneveld denied. In any event, it was 
recognised that the relationship had reached a crisis point. Mr Robinson felt that Miss Anneveld needed 
to prove her feelings and commitment to him, and he proposed that she transfer her half of the property 
into their daughter’s name. If the relationship survived, then Miss Anneveld’s name would be 
reinstated on the title. When Miss Anneveld signed the transfer, she was reliant on Mr Robinson’s 
representations, and her half of the property was transferred not to her daughter, but to Mr Robinson. 
Further, the mortgage that she was responsible for was also removed.  
 
It was held that Miss Anneveld failed to establish undue influence. Given the personalities of the 
parties and their relationship, it was held that this was not a transaction that called for explanation, and 
could be accounted for by the motives of an ordinary person in that relationship.412 Further, it was held 
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that the absence of independent advice would not have affected Miss Anneveld’s decision to enter into 
the agreement to sign her share of the property into her daughter’s name. Batcup DJ conceded that 
independent advice would have affected the way the documents were drawn up (that is the property 
would be transferred to the daughter rather than Mr Robinson). However, it was held that whether or 
not Mr Robinson was trying to cheat Miss Anneveld was another issue. It was held that he did not cheat 
her out of anything (apart from the “dream” of the family property) because at the time, her interest in 
the property was valueless. The property was extremely run-down, and the large proportion of the work 
developing the property was personally undertaken by Mr Robinson. At the same time, she was 
relieved of all her liabilities to the bank. Therefore, she had not really lost anything. Miss Anneveld’s 
contention was that her half share remained hers. Mr Robinson’s contention was that the transfer was 
valid, and Miss Anneveld had no interest in the property. In conclusion, the Judge held that as undue 
influence was not established, the original intention that half the property be held on trust for the 
daughter was upheld. 
 
In Attorney-General for England and Wales v R413 a soldier, R, was a member of the United Kingdom 
SAS forces. He was required to sign a confidentiality agreement to “prevent unauthorised 
disclosure”414 following publication of books and the making of films concerning operations of the 
SAS. If he did not sign the confidentiality agreement he would be unable to stay in the regiment and 
would be required to return to unit. Involuntary return to unit was regarded as a penalty. R signed the 
confidentiality agreement without any independent advice, but the agreement was accompanied by an 
explanatory memorandum which consisted of frequently asked questions. He felt that he had to sign the 
agreement if he wanted to remain in the SAS. However, he changed his mind less than two weeks later 
and applied for a premature voluntary release. Later, he wanted to write a book about his experiences. 
The Attorney-General commenced proceedings claiming an injunction to stop the publication, damages 
and an account of profits. In his defence, R claimed inter alia that the agreement was signed under 
undue influence. 
 
With regard to the question of undue influence, the Privy Council cited Etridge and held that the 
military hierarchy, strong regimental pride and personal admiration for the commanding officer gave 
rise to a relationship of influence. However, the nature of the transaction, namely signing the 
confidentiality agreement did not “give rise to an inference that it was obtained by an unfair 
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exploitation of that relationship”,415 that is, given the nature of serving in the SAS, it was not a 
transaction that called for explanation. It was held that the absence of legal advice did not affect the 
fairness of the transaction. 
 
Padgham v Rochelle416 illustrates how the test from Etridge is in substance different from manifest 
disadvantage, and has lowered the threshold to find undue influence.417 The case concerned an elderly 
farmer who had become dependent on his son for his day to day care. He granted his son an agricultural 
tenancy over land and buildings on a property he purported to leave to two of his grandchildren in his 
will. The effect of a valid grant of tenancy would reduce the value to the grandchildren in the event of a 
sale. The son was also given a right of pre-emption to purchase the property in the will. It was held that 
the tenancy agreement was a transaction that called for explanation. It was not a gift which could be 
accounted for on the grounds of ordinary motives, given the conflict between a tenancy agreement and 
the father’s will. The claim of undue influence succeeded because the father did not receive any 
independent advice. It is submitted that if the old test of manifest disadvantage had been applied, the 
outcome of the case might be different. The father received a benefit from the transaction. He was 
looked after in his old age. Without his son’s help, he would have needed to move into an old peoples’ 
home. The son had worked on the land since he was 10 years old and full time since he was 15. If the 
advantages and disadvantages were weighed up, given the history between the parties, it would be open 
to conclude that the transaction was not manifestly disadvantageous to the father. It is interesting to 
note that it was held by Henderson QC that the agreement was highly advantageous to the son but had 
no advantages to the father. However, it was not manifestly disadvantageous to the father. 
 
The test of a transaction that calls for explanation also introduces a subjective element, because of the 
focus on what is or is not readily explicable by the relationship of the parties. The subjective element 
looks at what would be a normal transaction specifically between the two parties concerned.418 
Therefore, if one person was overcome by religious faith, and wished to donate all of his or her 
property to the church, then this may be considered an explicable transaction given the relationship of 
                                                 
415 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2004] 2 NZLR 577, per Lord Hoffmann, p 584-585. 
416 2002 WL 31413932 (cited Westlaw at 31 July 2006). 
417 This is despite the view of Scott, in ‘Evolving Equity and the Presumption of Undue Influence’ (2002) 18 JCL 15, 2002 
JCL LEXIS 15 (cited Lexis.com at 10 February 2006), where she argues that the House of Lords intended to raise the 
threshold for establishing the evidential presumption of undue influence, p 22. However, her justification for this conclusion 
may be limited to raising the evidential presumption in husband-wife guarantee situations. 
In Rutherford v Bank of New Zealand HC Wellington, Civ-2006-485-1345, [5 February 2007] Associate Judge Gendall held 
at para 47 that Etridge has raised the threshold for presumed undue influence because more was required than simply a 
relationship of trust and confidence. However, it is respectfully submitted that Judge Gendall has omitted from the analysis 
the previous requirement of proving manifest disadvantage. 
418 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 11-015. 
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the parties, that is, of spiritual leader and follower. Difficulties may also arise in cases involving 
fundamentalist cultural beliefs. A more balanced approach may be to follow the suggestion of Ridge419 
and to apply an objective test that follows closely the test derived from Allcard v Skinner: a gift that 
cannot “reasonably accounted for on the ground of friendship, relationship, charity, or other ordinary 
motives on which ordinary men act”,420 with particular emphasis on “ordinary motives” of “ordinary 
men”. 
 
Therefore, cases have adopted the test of a transaction that calls for explanation, and illustrate that the 
test of a transaction that calls for explanation is wider than manifest disadvantage.421 To ensure that the 
true test from Etridge is applied, it is particularly important that both facets to the test are applied. 
Reverting back to the old test of manifest disadvantage, or simply weighing up the relative advantages 
and disadvantages should be avoided. 
REBUTTING THE EVIDENTIAL PRESUMPTION 
1. General Principles 
The effect of successfully establishing the evidential presumption is that it shifts the onus from the 
influenced party to the dominant party to rebut the presumption. The weight of the presumption varies 
from case to case, and “will depend both on the particular nature of the relationship and on the 
particular nature of the impugned transaction.”422 The corollary of that is that “the type and weight of 
evidence needed to rebut the presumption will obviously depend upon the weight of the presumption 
itself.”423 Similarly, Dixon J in Johnson v Buttress424 held that the influence that grows from different 
relationships varies in kind and degree. Therefore, the facts required to prove that the donor was freed 
from the influence will correspondingly differ.425 Lord Scott in Etridge gave the example of Allcard v 
Skinner. The presumption raised in Allcard would have been a very heavy one, and strong evidence 
would have been required to rebut it, given the nature of the influence – religion. Lord Scott doubted if 
independent advice would have sufficed, unless there was also proof that Miss Allcard would have 
been free to act on the advice given to her. 
                                                 
419 P Ridge, ‘The Equitable Doctrine of Undue Influence Considered in the Context of Spiritual Influence and Religious 
Faith: Allcard v Skinner Revisited in Australia’ (2003) 26(1) UNSW Law Journal 66. 
420 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145, per Lindley LJ, p 185. 
421 See also P S Atiyah and S A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction of the Law of Contract (6th ed 2005), p 286. 
422 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Scott, p 500. 
423 Ibid. 
424 (1936) 56 CLR 113. 
425 Ibid p 134. 
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In order to rebut the evidential presumption of undue influence, one must first return to the principles in 
Allcard v Skinner. The defendant must show that: 
… in fact the gift was the spontaneous act of the donor acting under circumstances which enable him to exercise an 
independent will and which justifies the Court in holding that the gift was the result of a free exercise of the 
donor’s will.426 
In Allcard, the rule that Miss Allcard could not seek the advice of any extern counted against the 
defendant, because Miss Allcard could not obtain independent advice if she wished for it.427 In 
Brandon v Brandon,428 it was held that when considering whether the presumption is rebutted, it is 
relevant to find the source of the impugned decision, “as well as the nature and degree of the benefit 
bestowed upon the donee and the nature of the entire transaction including the donee’s special 
perspective and goals.”429 
 
The presumption is not rebutted by establishing that the plaintiff knew and understood what he or she 
was doing, but it must be established that he or she was free from the influence of the defendant. In the 
oft cited passage from Huguenin v Baseley,430 Lord Eldon LC expressed the question as “not whether 
she knew what she was doing, had done, or proposed to do, but how the intention was produced.”431 
The onus is on the donee to show “that the donor either was emancipated, or was placed, by the 
possession of independent advice, in a position equivalent to emancipation.”432 It is not enough to 
establish understanding of the transactions. It must be shown that the donee took no advantage of the 
donor, and that the gifts were an independent and well understood act of a person “in a position to 
exercise a free judgment based on information as full as that of the donee”433 
 
The passage from Lord Eldon can be construed as taking a defendant based approach to undue 
influence: the donor must be emancipated from the influence of the donee, in other words, the 
influenced party must be freed from any influence or wrongdoing of the stronger party. However, this 
reflects only one side of the question. If a purely defendant based approach is adopted, then merely 
proving that the influencing party has done nothing wrong should suffice to rebut the evidential 
                                                 
426 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 ChD 145, per Cotton LJ, p 171.  
427 Ibid, per Lindley LJ, p 184 and per Bowen LJ, p 190. 
428 2001 WL 454384 (Ont SCJ), [2001] OJ No 2986200, (cited CarswellOnt 2688, Westlaw). 
429 Ibid, per Howden J, para 54. 
430 [1803-13] All ER Rep 1, per Lord Eldon LC p 13 
431 This was cited with approval in Banco Exterior International v Mann [1995] 1 All ER 936, per Hobhouse LJ p 946; and 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) (CA) [1998] 4 All ER 705, per Stuart-Smith LJ p 714. 
432 Powell v Powell (1899) [1900] 1 Ch 243, per Farwell J, p 246. 
433 Bar-Mordecai v Hillston [2004] NSWCA 65, per the Court, comprising Mason P, Tobias JA and Davies AJA, para 167. 
See also comments of Millett LJ in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, p 156. 
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presumption.434 As the following cases show, this is not entirely correct. Issues of rebuttal centre on the 
apparent consent of the weaker party. Was free will exercised? Was sufficient independent advice 
provided? Was the weaker party a sufficiently informed and educated person such that the influence 
exercised, or the lack of independent advice provided immaterial? These issues reinforce the 
conclusion that undue influence encompasses both defendant and plaintiff based aspects. 
2. Independent Advice 
The most prominent way to ensure that the plaintiff exercised his or her own free will is the provision 
of independent legal advice.435 However, in Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie bin Omar436 it was held that 
independent advice is not the only way in which the presumption can be rebutted. Their Lordships also 
held that it is not necessary to show that the advice, if given would be followed.437 In Etridge it was 
held that: 
In the normal course, advice from a solicitor or other outside advisor can be expected to bring home to a 
complainant a proper understanding of what he or she is about to do. But a person may understand fully the 
implications of a proposed transaction, for instance, a substantial gift, and yet still be acting under the undue 
influence of another. Proof of outside advice does not, of itself, necessarily show that the subsequent completion of 
the transaction was free from the exercise of undue influence. Whether it will be proper to infer that outside advice 
had an emancipating effect, so that the transaction was not brought about by the exercise of undue influence, is a 
question of fact to be decided having regard to all the evidence in the case.438 
Therefore notwithstanding receiving independent advice, a person can be under undue influence.439 
 
In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch440 Millett J held that independent advice “is neither 
always necessary nor always sufficient. It is not a panacea. The result does not depend mechanically on 
the presence or absence of legal advice.”441 His Honour went further and explained the intended effect 
of legal advice: 
                                                 
434 See also discussion above p 12-14 on cases where it was established that the defendant had done nothing wrong, 
however undue influence was still established: Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 All ER 35; Hammond v Osborn [2002] EWCA 
Civ 885; Carey v Norton [1998] 1 NZLR 661; and Rabobank New Zealand Limited v Balderston HC Wellington, Civ-2006-
485-117, [4 May 2006]. 
435 See Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, per Latham CJ, p 120; Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) (CA) [1998] 
4 All ER 705, per Stuart-Smith LJ p 714. 
436 [1929] AC 127, per Lord Halisham LC, p 135-136. 
437 In Powell v Powell (1899) [1900] 1 Ch 243 it was held that it is not enough that independent advice is give, but that 
advice must be acted upon. This was rejected in Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723. 
438 [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls, p 460. 
439 See Harrison v Harrison [2004] NZFLR 832, per Fogarty J, p 863. In Ganderton v Behre HC ROT CIV 2004-463-
000614 [23 September 2005] it was held that following Etridge a person may receive independent advice, be fully aware of 
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advice was insufficient to remove that taint of undue influence was the fact that the solicitor was merely drafting the 
agreements that reflected the position that the parties had already agreed to themselves. This is far removed from the 
situation where the solicitor negotiates on behalf of the client. 
440 [1997] 1 All ER 144. 
441 Ibid, per Millett LJ, p 155-6. 
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It is not sufficient that the solicitor has satisfied himself that the complainant understands the legal effect of the 
transaction and intends to enter into it. That may be a protection against mistake or misrepresentation; it is no 
protection against undue influence … Accordingly, the presumption cannot be rebutted by evidence that the 
complainant understood what she was doing and intended to do it. The alleged wrongdoer can rebut the 
presumption only by showing that the complainant was either free from any undue influence on his part or had 
been placed, by the receipt of independent advice, in an equivalent position. That involves showing that she was 
advised as to the propriety of the transaction by an adviser fully informed of all the material facts.442 
 
In MacKenzie v Royal Bank443 Lord Atkin discussed the timing of independent advice. To be of value, 
it must be given before the transaction is entered into. If the advice is given after the event, then the 
party is already bound, and the point of view, or the mind set of the adviser and the client take on a 
different position. The advice is given under completely different circumstances.444 
 
The adviser need not be a lawyer (although it is commonly so). It can be another professional or 
expert.445 If a lawyer is involved, the solicitor’s retainer is relevant.446 In many situations, financial 
advice may also be required. This is especially where the financial viability of a business is called into 
question.447 In Wadlow v Samuel (p.k.a. Seal)448 it was acknowledged that Seal had received 
independent advice from his new manager, Mr Cavallo who was not a lawyer, but an industry expert. 
3. Inadequate Independent Advice 
In order for any independent advice to be sufficient “the adviser must be fully informed of all the 
material facts … [and] the advice that is given must in fact be meaningful”.449 The solicitor must advise 
on the unusual provisions of the agreement.450 The duty of the solicitor is “to protect the donor against 
himself, and not merely against the personal influence of the donee.” 451 Independent advice in the 
context of an adult, who is competent to form an opinion, means “that the advice shall be removed 
entirely from the suspected atmosphere; and that from the clear language of an independent mind, they 
should know precisely what they are doing.”452 
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There are many examples of clients, receiving independent advice, which was not sufficient to remove 
the taint of undue influence.453 In Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie bin Omar,454 the lawyer advising the 
appellant did not appreciate that she was parting with virtually all her property, and failed to advise her 
that she could have benefited her nephew in a more prudent way, without any risk to herself during her 
lifetime. In Brandon v Brandon,455 Mr Brandon left an island to his wife, Mrs Brandon as to 50%, and 
25% to each son on his death. Mrs Brandon later created an arrangement whereby she benefited one 
son and his family to the exclusion of the other son as to her 50% share of the island. The excluded son 
alleged undue influence. It was held that the solicitor appreciated that undue influence could have been 
an issue at the time the documents were executed. Therefore, simply explaining the effect of the 
documents was not enough. The solicitor failed to understand that the source of the influence was her 
son. The influencing son controlled information passed to her: he handled her mail, and read letters to 
her. The solicitor failed to establish who was paying the legal bills, inquire into her present and future 
financial position, and advise her of the consequences and the inequity of her disposition.456 
 
If the solicitor is unfamiliar with the client, then the need to take time to get to know the client’s 
background, and the surrounding circumstances to the transaction cannot be overemphasized. In Vale v 
Armstrong457 an elderly man, Mr Vale, transferred his home to his great nephew. The lawyer failed to 
spend the time to talk to Mr Vale about wider issues, to get to know him, and understand his 
relationship with Mr Armstrong. Although he explained the transaction, he did not advise Mr Vale to 
enter into a contract to protect his right to occupy the property for his life and, that such a document 
was capable of registration, nor did he advise Mr Vale that there were alternatives to the proposed 
transaction that would also achieve the objective sought. The legal advice given was found wanting.458 
In Brusewitz v Brown459 the solicitor knew nothing about the transaction until he interviewed Mr 
Brusewitz. The transaction was a transfer from Mr Brusewitz to Mr Brown of his mortgage, (which 
represented his whole estate) in consideration for an annuity. The mortgage was due to be repaid in 
another four years. Mr Brusewitz died four months after entering into the transaction. The solicitor was 
employed by Mr Brown. He did not make inquiries about Mr Brusewitz’s health (he was dying of 
cirrhosis of the liver), the standing of Mr Brown as grantor of an unsecured annuity, and the value of 
                                                 
453 See for example Contractors Bonding v Snee [1992] 2 NZLR 157. 
454 [1929] AC 127. 
455 2001 WL 454384 (Ont SCJ), [2001] OJ No 2986200, (cited CarswellOnt 2688, Westlaw). The decision was approved in 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Brandon v Brandon 6 ETR (3d) 210, (cited 2003 CarswellOnt 4828, Westlaw). 
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457 [2004] EWHC 1160. 
458 See above p 53 and below p 82 for further facts and discussion on the case. 
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the annuity in relation to the value of the mortgage transferred. It was held that the solicitor was not in 
a position to give informed advice and the transaction was set aside on the grounds of undue influence. 
 
In Lee v Damesh Holdings Ltd,460 Mrs Lee was taken to see a solicitor to whom she was unfamiliar. 
She was advised not to enter into the transaction, but did so despite the advice given. The events 
leading up to the signing of the mortgage moved quickly and the consultation with the solicitor was 
hurried. Further, her son, Trevor (the dominant party) was present for most of the interview. The 
solicitor had limited opportunity to investigate the transaction, and did not have complete information 
regarding the deal, other than it was a “financial transaction.” These elements meant that the 
independent legal advice did not remove the undue influence. Similarly in Contractors Bonding Ltd v 
Snee461 the interposition of the solicitor did not remove the undue influence of the son. The solicitor did 
not have adequate opportunity to investigate the transaction, and did not have sufficient financial 
information about the business in order to advise his client fully. In a recent case of Gemmell v 
Harlow462 the independent advice received by a de facto wife before she signed an agreement 
governing the division of property with her de facto husband was insufficient. The solicitors advising 
the de facto wife were unable to ascertain what assets were involved and what the assets were worth. 
The independent advice given was held to be “no better than a formality.”463 
4. Effect of a Conflict of Interest 
The adviser must be independent of the influencing party. In Powell v Powell464  it was held that the 
solicitor “must be independent of the donee in fact, and not merely in name, and this he cannot be if he 
is solicitor for both” the donor and donee.465 The difficulty in some cases is that the solicitor acts for 
more than one party. The question becomes, how independent must the advice be in order to remove 
the taint of undue influence? In Etridge Lord Nicholls observed that this question cannot be answered 
by reference to reported decisions. The answer lies in balancing the factors in the case. As a general 
rule “independent advice would suggest that the solicitor should not be acting in the same transaction 
for the person who, if there is any undue influence, is the source of that influence.”466 In some cases the 
solicitor can act for both the influenced party and the influencer where the solicitor is satisfied that the 
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best interests of the influenced party can be satisfied and there are no conflicts of duty or interest. 
However, in other cases the solicitor cannot act for both the influenced party and the influencer. The 
solicitor may consider the influencer the main client and rank the interests of the influenced party lower 
on his or her scale of priorities. Further, the influenced party may feel inhibited in discussions with the 
solicitor. Lord Scott seems to suggest that if there is suspected undue influence or impropriety between 
two people, then a solicitor cannot properly advise the influenced party. Advice from a solicitor 
independent of the dominant party needs to be sought.467 
 
National Westminster Bank Plc v Breeds468 concerned independent advice given to a wife who 
mortgaged her home and gave a guarantee to support her husband’s business. The solicitor who advised 
Mrs Breeds was also acting for the husband, the borrowing company, and was the company secretary. 
He was also actively involved with obtaining finances, and company affairs. It was held by the trial 
judge that Mr Breeds had exerted undue influence on Mrs Breeds, and the “independent” advice 
received from the solicitor was insufficient to dispel the undue influence that Mr Breeds exercised over 
his wife.469 It was held that a solicitor should not act for two clients where there is a real risk that there 
may be a conflict of interest between them. The independence required of a solicitor means that the 
ability to give advice without fear that the party would not enter into the transaction needs to be 
retained. The client must understand that any terms of the transaction are negotiable. Any conflicts of 
interest are generally for the solicitor to resolve.470 
 
In Mahoney v Purnell471 the solicitor acted for the buyer and seller of shares, and the company in which 
those shares were held. The seller alleged the buyer had exercised undue influence over him. It was 
held that the presumption of undue influence had been proved. In terms of rebutting the presumption, it 
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469 Ibid, per Collins J, para 74. 
470 Ibid para 73. 
See discussion on Bank of Montreal v Stuart [1911] AC 120 above p 46. In the case, the solicitor who acted on all or most 
of the transactions acted for the wife, the husband who was exerting the undue influence, and the bank. He was also a 
director, secretary, shareholder and creditor of the company. It was held that the solicitor was not in a position to act fairly 
and to competently advise the wife, and certainly not in a position to remove any allegations of undue influence. The 
solicitor was so inextricably involved in the transaction that it was found that not only the husband took unfair advantage of 
Mrs Stuart’s confidence, but the solicitor did also. The proper course of action would be to advise the husband that his wife 
needed to be separately advised. 
In Newell v Tarrant [1911] AC 120 the solicitor acted for both husband and wife, and also as the banker in respect of 
lending. Mr Newell ignored the conflict of interest and treated the husband and wife as if they were one person. Mr Newell 
also omitted to advise the wife to seek independent legal advice. In applying Etridge it was held that the transaction could 
be impugned on the basis of undue influence. 
471 [1996] 3 All ER 61. 
 71
was held that the seller did not in fact receive independent advice, and the finding of undue influence 
was not rebutted. 
 
In Clark Boyce v Mouat472 it was held that a solicitor can act for parties with conflicting interests if the 
solicitor had the informed consent of both parties. What is meant by informed consent is that each party 
knows that the solicitor is in a position of conflict which may result in the solicitor being unable to 
disclose knowledge, or to give advice which may conflict with the interests of the other party. If both 
parties are content with that basis, then the solicitor can proceed to act. It is submitted that such an 
approach may be appropriate in general cases, but inappropriate in undue influence cases. If a person 
was under the influence of another, then whether they have a sufficient independent frame of mind in 
order to decide whether or not another adviser is needed is doubtful. The influence of the dominant 
party may adversely affect their ability to make an appropriate decision about entering into the 
proposed transaction as well as whether another solicitor needs to be retained. 
5. Lack of Independent Advice is Not Fatal 
If the complainant did not receive any independent advice, it is difficult to rebut the presumption.473 
However, a lack of independent advice is not fatal. The absence of legal advice is not decisive in any 
case of undue influence. In other words, it may not be unfair exploitation of one party to a transaction if 
independent legal advice is absent.474 In Gold v Rosenberg475 Sopinka J held that whether or not 
someone requires independent advice depends on two factors: do they understand the transaction that is 
proposed to them, and are they free to decide in accordance with their own will. If both of these factors 
are answered in the positive, then independent advice is not required, and any lack thereof is not fatal to 
the enforcement of the transaction. The focus here in essence, is on whether the plaintiff’s ability to 
consent to the transaction is in any way impaired, by any influence exercised by the defendant. 
 
This is illustrated in a number of cases. In Bank of Montreal v Courtney476 the wife, Mrs Courtney had 
completed one year of university and obtained a legal secretarial diploma. She worked as a secretary 
for 10 years. It was held that she had a good educational background and appreciation of financial and 
business matters. Mrs Courtney borrowed various amounts of money from the bank as co-borrower 
with her husband and as principal borrower, with her husband as guarantor. When the bank sought 
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repayment of the loans, the wife claimed that she was harassed by her husband to sign the loans, and 
that she was given no independent legal advice. It was held that she had a sophisticated understanding 
of financial matters, and any influence exercised on her by her husband did not constitute undue 
influence. The lack of independent advice was not fatal to the enforcement of the loan transaction. 
 
In Bank of Montreal v Duguid477 the defendant wife was a real estate agent. She was a co-signer of a 
loan with her husband, which her husband used for a tax-driven real estate investment. When the 
husband became bankrupt, the bank sought to enforce the loan against Mrs Duguid. She argued that she 
did not receive any independent legal or financial advice, and Mr Duguid had exercised undue 
influence over her to procure her to sign. The majority held that Mrs Duguid had failed to establish a 
case of actual or presumed undue influence. The features of the evidence that suggested that there was 
no presumption of undue influence also pointed to rebutting any presumption that may have arisen. Mrs 
Duguid was a real estate agent. She would have known the risks of her husband’s investments and the 
significance in being a co-signor to his promissory note. Independent advice was not necessary. 
 
In Attorney-General for England and Wales v R478 a soldier signed a confidentiality contract without 
independent legal advice. On the facts of this case, it was not unfair exploitation of the soldier when he 
did not receive independent legal advice. He understood the contract, (which an explanatory 
memorandum was provided). At most, any legal advice would have caused him to reflect as to whether 
he should sign, but he could have made that decision without legal advice. Lord Scott dissented and 
held that if the Ministry of Defence wished to impose obligations on its soldiers after they leave the 
armed services, then they must make independent advice available to the soldiers.479 
 
Independent advice is not the only means to rebut the presumption.480 Any evidence that shows 
informed and free exercise of will on the part of the weaker party will suffice.481 In Bank of Montreal v 
Duguid482 it was held that other circumstances such as “commercial knowledge, experience, general 
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482 185 DLR (4th) 458, 5 BLR (3d) 1, (cited 2000 CarswellOnt 1306, Westlaw). 
 73
sophistication or independence”483 may be enough. Other circumstances may include education, and 
“any previous dealings in the type of transaction in question.”484  
 
Therefore, from the discussion above, issues on rebutting the presumption and the provision of 
independent advice do not only focus on the conduct of the defendant. The consent of the plaintiff, and 
whether that consent is impaired, or whether the independent advice was sufficient to restore the 
plaintiff’s ability to give consent are factors. Otherwise, the defendant could discharge their duty, and 
ensure a clear conscience simply by ensuring that the plaintiff received independent advice, without 
any consideration as to the effect of the advice on the plaintiff. This again, highlights the tension 
between the defendant and plaintiff based approaches. It serves to illustrate and reinforce that both 
elements are present in any undue influence case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The intention of the House of Lords in Etridge was to clarify and dispel some of the misconceptions in 
the law. It is the treatment of Etridge by the courts, and the interpretation given to it by the 
commentators, that show in some cases Etridge has not been interpreted and applied as the House of 
Lords intended. 
THE “PRESUMPTION” OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
A continuing source of confusion is the treatment of the “presumption” of undue influence. Goff and 
Jones485 still contend that Etridge has retained the “irrebuttable presumption of undue influence” where 
“there are certain relationships where the law irrebuttably presumes undue influence”,486 (emphasis 
added). Etridge clarifies the position that there is an irrebuttable presumption of influence, and a 
rebuttable evidential presumption of undue influence. The irrebuttable presumption of influence is a 
tool in establishing one of the two requirements to raise the evidential presumption of undue 
influence.487 
 
With regard to terminology, post-Etridge decisions still utilise the terms “actual undue influence” and 
“presumed undue influence” as a short hand to distinguish the two classes. However, it must be 
understood that reference to “presumed undue influence” is reference to the evidential presumption.488 
In many post-Etridge cases, despite citing Etridge and analysing Lord Nicholls’ speech, it seems that 
the point that Lord Nicholls was making has been entirely misinterpreted.489 Those cases perpetuated 
the misconception of the old law that particular relationships give rise to a presumption of undue 
influence, that is “the relationship by itself gives rise to a presumption not only that one party had 
influence over another but that undue influence had been exercised.”490 
                                                 
485 Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (6th ed 2002), at 11-006. 
486 Ibid. 
487 N Enonchong, ‘Presumed Undue Influence: Continuing Misconceptions’ LQR 2005, 121 (Jan), 29-33, p 32. 
488 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 7-009. 
489 See for example Niersmans v Pesticcio [2004] EWCA Civ 372 and Randall v Randall [2004] EWHC 2258 (Ch). 
490 Enonchong, above n 487, p 29; and above n 488, para 10-005. 
For an example see Eftimovski v Faris 23 RPR (4th) 184, 48 BLR (3d) 93, (cited 2004 CarswellOnt 3351, Westlaw), the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Canada seems to have confused a presumption of undue influence and the evidential 
presumption. Cameron J began his discussion on undue influence by looking at the old presumptions and classifications 
from Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417, Bank of Montreal v Duguid 185 DLR (4th) 458, 5 BLR (3d) 1, 
(cited 2000 CarswellOnt 1306, Westlaw), and Goodman Estate v Geffen 81 DLR (4th) 211, [1991] 2 SCR 353: “the 
presumption of undue influence will arise in circumstances where there is a relationship of trust and confidence of such a 
nature that it is fair to infer the dominant party abused that relationship in procuring the impugned transaction.” (para 81). 
Cameron J then goes on to cite Etridge and CIBC Mortgage Corp v Rowatt 2002 CarswellOnt 3586, 220 DLR (4th) 139 and 
discusses the rebuttable evidential presumption of undue influence, without fully appreciating the misconception 
highlighted by Etridge that proof of a relationship of trust and confidence is not proof that the influence was abused. 
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In a further confusion regarding the interaction of pre-Etridge and post-Etridge presumption of undue 
influence, Ridge argues491 that following Etridge, there are two formulations of undue influence in case 
law. The first is the “traditional” formulation from Aboody that treats presumed undue influence as an 
application of fiduciary law, and actual undue influence as coterminous with duress. The second 
formulation derived from Etridge regards “presumed undue influence” as an evidential tool for proving 
actual undue influence.492 Similarly McCamus493 writes that Etridge has created a further category of 
undue influence. He adopted the Aboody classification of undue influence, Type 1 for actual undue 
influence, and Type 2A and 2B. However, he asserts that Etridge has created another category, which 
he calls Type 3, “non-presumptive relational undue influence”.494 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the law on undue influence cannot be conceptualised in this way. The 
effect of the “presumption of undue influence” from pre-Etridge cases such as Aboody should be 
understood in light of Etridge, that all cases of undue influence are cases of actual undue influence. 
There are simply two ways of proving it. 
CLASS 2B 
A further issue that has provided ready fodder for debate is whether “class 2B” has survived Etridge.495 
The basis for this is Lord Nicholls’ judgment, where he does not make any express reference to class 
2A and 2B cases. However he does make a distinction in a case where a weaker party has to prove that 
trust and confidence was placed in another person; and cases where it need not be proved, because the 
law presumes irrebuttably that there was influence. “This distinction appears to resemble the substance 
(though not the nomenclature) of the distinction between class 2A and class 2B cases”496 and therefore 
it is thought that Lord Nicholls supports the retention of class 2A and 2B. The question is raised, as to 
how this should be reconciled with the judgments of Lords Hobhouse, Scott and Clyde, who all 
doubted the continued survival of “class 2B”. 
 
                                                 
491 P Ridge, ‘Uncertainties Surrounding Undue Influence: Its Formulation, Application, and Relationship to Other 
Doctrines’ [2003] NZ Law Review 329. 
492 Ibid, p 331-3. Ridge argues that the two different approaches will give different results. She writes that the Etridge 
formulation is more difficult to satisfy because it is directed solely at proof of wrongdoing. However, in the pre-Etridge 
formulation, reliance can be made on fiduciary principles, which is more likely to favour the weaker party. 
493 J D McCamus, Essentials of Canadian Law The Law of Contracts (2005), p 383. 
494 Ibid. 
495 See A Craig, ‘Evidential Presumptions’ [2002] NLJ, (cited Lexis.com at 10 February 2006); F R Burns, ‘Elders and 
Testamentary Undue Influence in Australia’ (2005) 28(1) UNSWLR 145. 
496 G H Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th ed 2003), p 415. 
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Treitel argues that you can reconcile this by looking at the context of Etridge as a husband/wife 
guarantee case. In the situation of a husband/wife guarantee, the “class 2B presumption” is 
inappropriate because there is an explanation for the transaction other than the fact that it was procured 
by undue influence. Therefore, Treitel concludes “that the distinction between the two classes of 
presumptions survives, but with significant modifications: first, that the class 2A presumption is no 
longer that undue influence is taken to have been exercised; and secondly, that the class 2B 
presumption will not normally (i.e. “in the ordinary course”) apply between spouses or parties in 
closely analogous relationships.”497 
 
With respect, it is submitted that Treitel’s interpretation of Etridge is too narrow. A better way to 
reconcile the judgments is that implicit in Lord Nicholls judgment is a rejection of the old 
“presumption” of undue influence and hence the class 2B presumption. While Lord Nicholls does not 
specifically discuss the classes 2A and 2B in his judgment, he does talk about relationships that give 
rise to a measure of influence (class 2A). He then goes on to discuss the fact that relationships are 
infinitely various, and in some cases “the question is whether one party has reposed sufficient trust and 
confidence in the other, rather than whether the relationship between the parties belongs to a particular 
type”498 (class 2B). Lord Nicholls was at pains to make a clear distinction between the “presumption” 
of undue influence, and the evidential presumption of undue influence, which is a forensic exercise. 
Therefore the distinction between class 2A and class 2B are not needed, as they are simply two 
different ways to prove the relationship of trust and confidence. It is conceded that 2A is easier to prove 
than 2B; however, the relationships encompassed in 2A have been recognised as special. It was 
intended to protect certain relationships that the law regards as worthy of extra protection.499 
 
In Li Sau Ying v Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd500 Lord Scott, sitting in the Court of Final Appeal in 
Hong Kong, reiterated the comments made by the Lords in Etridge, in particular the use of the 
expression “presumed undue influence”, and, deprecated its use in connection with Class 2B cases.501 
                                                 
497 G H Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th ed 2003), p 417. 
498 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls, p 458. 
499 Ibid, per Lord Nicholls, p 460. Lord Nicholls discusses the attitude of the courts in this area. There are certain 
relationships that the law takes a sternly protective attitude towards. The relationships are typically one where one party 
acquires influence over another who is dependent and vulnerable. In addition, substantial gifts from persons in the 
vulnerable position are not normally expected. 
500 [2005] 1 HKLRD 106 (Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong). Re Choi Siu Lui, Ex P Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd 
[2005] HKEC 1475, 2005 WL 1997437 cited Li Sau Ying v Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd with approval, but did not 
apply the new principles extracted from Etridge. 
501 [2005] 1 HKLRD 106, per Lord Scott, p 119. 
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Use of the old “presumptions” detracted from the real issue of deciding whether the evidence justified 
finding that the impugned transaction was procured by undue influence. 
 
Despite the apparent divergence in the individual judgements by the Law Lords, in practice, this has 
not caused any great difficulty amongst judges (unlike the academics). The majority of the cases post-
Etridge have treated Lord Nicholls’ judgment as commanding the unqualified support of the House, 
and thus have proceeded to extract the ratio decidendi from Lord Nicholls’ judgment, without 
attempting to reconcile the debate as to whether or not class 2B has survived Etridge.502 
REPLACEMENT TRANSACTIONS 
One issue that did not arise in Etridge was the situation where a transaction replaces a previous 
transaction. In some cases the undue influence was exerted from the outset, at the initial transaction, 
but not at the time of the replacement transaction. The issue that is raised is, whether the undue 
influence continues to taint the second transaction.503 Alternatively, the original transaction may be 
unaffected by undue influence, but the replacement transaction is. The issue becomes, whether the first 
transaction ‘immunises’ the second? 
 
In Yorkshire Bank v Tinsley,504 mortgages were executed by Mrs Tinsley to secure Mr Tinsley’s 
business debts. The initial mortgages were executed while Mr Tinsley exercised undue influence over 
his wife. The bank had constructive notice of the undue influence, and took no steps to ensure that Mrs 
Tinsley entered into those mortgages freely. The mortgages were, therefore, voidable as against the 
bank. Those mortgages were later replaced by another mortgage on a different property, as part of 
divorce proceedings to secure Mr Tinsley’s current and future liabilities. The question before the Court 
of Appeal was whether the undue influence exercised on the earlier mortgages could be “transferred” to 
the replacement mortgage. It was held that it could: 
It would be natural to expect that if, without more, an obligation incurred between two or three parties is legally 
ineffective in any way, any new obligation arising out of the release of such earlier obligation would be legally 
ineffective in a similar way. It may not be easy to find authority for such a broad proposition but, in principle 
‘nothing will come of nothing’ as King Lear observed. As far as void contracts are concerned there can be little 
question that that must be the law … and, if it is a condition of the recission or release of the original void or 
voidable bargain that the parties enter into a new bargain, that new bargain must be as open to attack as the old 
one.505 
                                                 
502 McGregor v Michael Taylor & Co [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 468; Padgham v Rochelle & Searle 2002 WL 31413932 (cited 
Westlaw at 31 July 2006); GMAC Commercial Credit Development Limited v Sandhu [2004] EWHC 716; Vale v Armstrong 
[2004] EWHC 1160; Wadlow v Samuel (p.k.a. Seal) [2006] EWHC 1492; Dailey v Dailey 2003 WL 22187642, [2003] 
UKPC 65; Leeder v Stevens [2005] EWCA Civ 50; White v State Bank of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 241. 
503 See discussion by G Andrews, and R Millett, Law of Guarantees (4th ed 2005), p 190. 
504 [2004] 3 All ER 463. Longmore LJ at p 468 acknowledged that this case was the first of its kind. 
505 Ibid, per Longmore LJ, p 468-9. 
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The factual context of the new contract must be materially similar to that of the old contract. In effect 
the second contract must be a true substitute for the first. Therefore on the facts of the case, the two 
mortgages were inseparably connected, and the replacement mortgage was also affected with undue 
influence.506 
 
In Wadlow v Samuel (p.k.a. Seal)507 the case concerned the recording artist Seal and his former 
manager Mr Wadlow. Mr Wadlow claimed that he was owed commission under an agreement between 
the parties. The agreement had replaced an earlier agreement which had been signed under undue 
influence. It was held that the replacement agreement not only replaced the agreement tainted by undue 
influence, but also another untainted agreement. The replacement agreement (under which Mr Wadlow 
claimed the right to be paid a commission) was not signed under undue influence, and the validity had 
never been questioned. Therefore it was held that Tinsley could be distinguished because the factual 
context of the replacement agreement and the original agreements were fundamentally different, and 
the replacement agreement could not be construed as a replacement for the agreement tainted with 
undue influence.508 
 
In Rutherford v Bank of New Zealand509 similar issues were examined. The case concerned the 
execution of replacement mortgages on a property. The wife alleged that undue influence was exerted 
when the replacement mortgage was signed. The bank attempted to argue that since there were no 
allegations of undue influence with respect to the original mortgage, “executing a new mortgage ought 
not mean that the plaintiff has a cause of action she would otherwise not have had.”510 This was 
rejected by Gendall J. It was held that with each new security, the obligations on the parties are the 
same. In this case, there was an obligation on the bank to ensure that the plaintiff received adequate 
advice. This was not given, so there was a finding of undue influence that tainted a replacement 
transaction, even though the original transaction was untainted. 
                                                 
506 It was also held that if the bank had notice of the exercise of undue influence in the original contract, then that notice 
continues to the second contract. This was not considered to be an extension of the doctrine of constructive notice. 
However, if the second contract is made with a different lender, then the new lender cannot be deemed to be aware of 
matters that the first lender is aware of. 
507 [2006] EWHC 1492. 
508 See also North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd: The Atlantic Baron [1978] 3 All ER 1170, where 
Mocatta J held that if a threat that constitutes duress taints a contract, and the contract led to a further contract which was 
made for good consideration, then the new contract would be voidable by reason of economic duress. 
509 HC Wellington, Civ-2006-485-1345, [5 February 2007]. 
510 Ibid, per Associate Judge Gendall, para 53. 
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TRANSACTION THAT CALLS FOR EXPLANATION 
Reconciling Lord Scott’s judgment with that of Lord Nicholls as to the requirement for a transaction 
that calls for explanation has provided debate among the Lords themselves. Lord Nicholls held that the 
evidential presumption is raised by a relationship of trust and confidence, coupled with a transaction 
that calls for explanation. This can be contrasted with Lord Scott’s comments. He held that the 
presumption arises with proof of the relationship “coupled with whatever evidence is for the time being 
available”511, and later, he held that the presumption “arises if the nature of the relationship between 
two parties coupled with the nature of the transaction between them”512 justifies the finding of undue 
influence. It could be interpreted that Lord Scott suggests that something other than a transaction that 
calls for explanation may suffice to raise the evidential presumption. The conclusion one must draw at 
this point is that Lord Nicholls’ judgment received the unqualified support of the House. Therefore, one 
must prove a transaction that calls for explanation. Further, the requirement of a transaction that calls 
for explanation can be construed to encompass the factors raised by Lord Scott. 
 
The issue was further considered in Attorney-General for England and Wales v R.513 Lord Scott 
dissented on the question of undue influence. He again reiterated that the factors required to raise the 
evidential presumption was “the relationship between the parties to a contract coupled with the nature 
of the contract and, sometimes, the circumstances in which consent”514 was obtained. His Lordship 
held that it was the relationship between the appellant and his senior officers and the circumstances in 
which the contract came to be signed that “produced a classic “relationship” case in which undue 
influence should be presumed.”515 The circumstances surrounding the signing of the confidentiality 
agreement, namely the absence of any independent legal advice was sufficient to raise the evidential 
presumption. Lord Scott was alone in his dissent. The argument that something other than a transaction 
that calls for explanation was sufficient was rejected by the majority in the case. 
 
Difficulty has also arisen with the application of the test of a transaction that calls for explanation. It 
may be recalled that the test of a transaction that calls for explanation extracted from Etridge means 
“that the transaction is not readily explicable by the relationship of the parties.”516 The test of a 
transaction that calls for explanation is comprised of two facets: the relative advantages and 
                                                 
511 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Scott, p 503. 
512 Ibid, p 513. 
513 [2003] 2 NZLR 577. 
514 Ibid, per Lord Scott, p 587. 
515 Ibid, p 589. 
516 Above n 511, per Lord Nicholls, p 460. 
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disadvantages; and an inexplicable transaction based on the relationship between the two parties. The 
problem with post-Etridge cases applying the test of a transaction that calls for explanation is that some 
have focused on only one of those facets,517 and have succumbed to reverting back to the concept of 
manifest disadvantage. 
 
The cases that have applied the relative advantage and disadvantage facet have in effect reverted back 
to applying the test of manifest disadvantage, for example, National Commercial Bank (Jamaica) 
Limited v Hew,518 Humphreys v Humphreys,519 and Dailey v Dailey.520 In Macklin v Dowsett521 it was 
held that the judge in the trial case was incorrect when he applied the test of manifest disadvantage to 
the second limb of the Etridge test. Auld LJ described the practice of using the description “manifest 
disadvantage” as a form of shorthand for the inexplicability of the transaction as “dangerous.”522 
However, Auld LJ in effect weighed up the respective advantages and disadvantages. In any event it 
was held that the transaction was to the manifest disadvantage of the influenced party, and it was also 
inexplicable.523 
 
The weighing up of the factors necessary to establish undue influence means that in some cases, certain 
elements may have a more substantial role to play than in other cases. It is submitted that if this process 
is coupled with consideration of the parties’ relationship, then the test is properly applied. In Bowkett v 
Action Finance Ltd524 Tipping J discussed this approach in respect of unconscionability: 
For example, the inadequacy of consideration may be so startling as to justify a presumption of procedural 
impropriety and the more startling the inadequacy the less substantial the disability may need to be. By contrast if 
the disability is grave then a lesser inadequacy of consideration may suffice. In the end all the material 
considerations must be weighed …”525 
 
                                                 
517 See also K N Scott, ‘Evolving Equity and the Presumption of Undue Influence’ (2002) 18 JCL 15, 2002 JCL LEXIS 15 
(cited Lexis.com at 10 February 2006) where the author focused on only one aspect of the test. 
518 [2003] UKPC 51. 
519 [2004] EWHC 2201. Rimer J used the terminology from Etridge however in effect, he applied the test of a manifest 
disadvantage. 
520 2003 WL 22187642, [2003] UKPC 65. Lord Hope held that in transactions for full value actual undue influence must be 
proved. This is again applying the old concept of a monetary value of manifest disadvantage. A transaction may be for full 
value yet still call for an explanation. 
521 [2004] EWCA Civ 904. 
522 Ibid, per Auld LJ, para 17. 
523 In Popowski v Popowski [2004] EWHC 668 the advantages and disadvantages of the transaction were weighed up. 
Similarly N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 11-012-13 writes that the size 
of the disadvantage is relevant. If it is large, it is more likely that it is a transaction that calls for explanation. If it is not 
substantial, then it is unlikely that it will call for an explanation. 
524 [1992] 1 NZLR 449. 
525 Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, per Tipping J, p 461. 
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Vale v Armstrong526 is illustrative of the reversion back to manifest disadvantage. Vale was a case 
concerned with the transfer of a house from an elderly man to his great nephew, and since not a 
“difficult case,” (that is the difficulty in determining whether a guarantee is to manifest disadvantage to 
the wife in the husband/wife guarantee situations) Evans-Lombe J used the phrase manifest 
disadvantage as shorthand for a transaction that calls for explanation. It was held that the disadvantages 
to Mr Vale were threefold. Firstly, his continued occupation of the property was not secure. Secondly, 
the house was Mr Vale’s only asset. If, due to illness or incapacity, he may have needed to move, he 
would have no finances to make such a move. Thirdly, the success of the transaction was dependent on 
cooperation between Mr Vale and Mr Armstrong. The absence of any written agreement to record the 
arrangement was relevant on this point. It was held that it would have been possible to effect the 
transaction without a “manifest disadvantage” to Mr Vale. However, this was not done. Therefore, the 
evidential presumption was raised, and the burden shifted to the defendant to prove otherwise. 
 
The practice of reverting to a test of manifest disadvantage, or even using it as a label for the second 
limb of Etridge is unhelpful and may cause confusion. To do so, means that Etridge has failed to make 
a meaningful change in the law. In National Westminster Bank Plc v Waite527 Havelock-Allan J clearly 
points out that “manifest disadvantage is not the test. A transaction may have caused manifest 
disadvantage but nevertheless be explicable by the nature of the relationship between the parties and 
therefore call for no explanation or not appear untoward when the nature of that relationship is properly 
taken into account.”528  
CONCLUSION 
From the discussion in the previous chapter, it can be seen that the House of Lords in Etridge has 
succeeded in making a meaningful clarification to the law on undue influence. The only source of 
continuing confusion is how judges (typically in the lower courts) and academics view and apply the 
principles from the case. 
                                                 
526 [2004] EWHC 1160. See discussion above p 53 and 68. 
527 [2006] EWHC 1287. 
528 Ibid, per Havelock-Allan J, para 37. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Duress is a doctrine that is closely related to actual undue influence. Duress allows an agreement to be 
set aside “where the consent of the complainant has been procured by illegitimate pressure”.529 
Originally, the doctrine of duress was limited to threats of physical violence to the person,530 or to 
someone close to that person.531 Developments in the common law have resulted in expansion of the 
concept of duress to allow other forms of duress that do not involve physical violence, such as 
economic duress, and hence there is overlap between duress and undue influence.532 The continued 
survival of the two doctrines depends on there being differences between duress and undue influence. 
Later discussion will show that there is also an overlap with duress and unconscionability. 
 
The difficulty with a concept such as duress is that many contracts are entered into as a result of some 
pressure. Pressure is a natural part of the bargaining process.533 The law must make a distinction 
between pressure that is acceptable, and pressure which is unacceptable. In Universe Tankships Inc of 
Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation534 Lord Scarman held that that there are “two 
elements in the wrong of duress: (1) pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim; and 
(2) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted. There must be pressure the practical effect of which is 
compulsion or the absence of choice.”535 In effect, there are two independent tests for duress, and both 
must be satisfied before relief is granted. However, this is not to say that the tests are unrelated. The 
two elements are linked.536 “Illegitimate pressure may amount to duress even if there is a practical 
choice, but the absence of practical choice may suggest the pressure is illegitimate.”537 The requirement 
that both the tests be satisfied before a claim of duress can succeed, discredits538 Birks and Chin’s 
                                                 
529 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 2-001. 
530 G H Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th ed 2003), p 408. 
531 Engle v Carswell 1995 ACWSJ LEXIS 46937, 1995 ACWSJ 632249, 53 ACWS (3d) 1282, (cited Lexis.com at 20 
October 2006), per Miller J, para **70. 
532 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls, p 457. 
533 See discussion by Tipping J in Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, para 62. 
534 [1983] 1 AC 366. 
535 Ibid, per Lord Scarman, p 400. 
A Wertheimer, Coercion (1987), conceptualises the elements of duress into a two pronged theory, the Choice Prong, (that 
the plaintiff had no choice but to do what the defendant proposed), and the Proposal Prong, (the defendant’s proposal was 
wrongful). Both of the prongs must be satisfied in order to establish duress. 
536 S Todd, Burrows, Finn and Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 348. 
537 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, per Tipping J, para 62. 
538 Enonchong, above n 529, para 2-002. See also P S Atiyah and S A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction of the Law of Contract 
(6th ed 2005), p 272-8. The rule that threats made by a third party must be known by the person seeking to enforce the 
contract also discredits the impaired consent theory of duress. 
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theory that (in addition to undue influence) duress is based on the defective consent of the plaintiff 
alone,539 and not also the illegitimacy of the defendant’s conduct. 
 
The Court of Appeal endorsed the approach in Universe Tankships in Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v 
Attorney General.540 Hammond J summarised the elements of the law of duress in New Zealand: 
First, there must be a threat or pressure. Secondly, that threat or pressure must be improper. Thirdly, the victim’s 
will must have been overborne by the improper pressure so that his or her free will and judgment have been 
displaced. Fourthly, the threat or pressure must actually induce the victim’s manifestation of assent. Fifthly, the 
threat or pressure must be sufficiently grave to justify the assent from the victim, in the sense that it left the victim 
no reasonable alternative. Sixthly, duress renders the resulting agreement voidable at the instance of the victim. 
This may be addressed either by raising duress as a defence to an action, or affirmatively, by applying timeously to 
a Court for avoidance of the agreement. Seventhly, the victim may be precluded from avoiding the agreement by 
affirmation.541 
More recently in Gemmell v Harlow542 Keane J confirmed that the law on duress in New Zealand and 
England were “nearly, if not completely identical.”543 
ILLEGITIMATE PRESSURE 
The traditional concept of duress involved physical threats to the person. The process of determining 
whether there was illegitimate pressure was clear. In the case of a threat to commit an unlawful act 
such as a crime or a tort, the threat was usually sufficient to constitute illegitimate pressure.544 
However, not all threats of unlawful action may amount to duress. There are difficulties surrounding 
the definition and boundary of what “unlawful” means.545 
                                                 
539 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 88, 95. 
540 (2004) 2 NZCCLR 187, [2004] BCL 835. 
541 Ibid, per Hammond J, para 98. Hammond J’s judgment has been scathingly criticised for confusing the law of duress in 
New Zealand by its repetition of some elements of duress and for including features which are not elements of duress; see R 
Bigwood ‘When Exegesis Becomes Excess: The Newborn Problematics of Contractual Duress Law in New Zealand’, JCL 
21(3) Nov 2005, 208. It is respectfully submitted that while some of the criticism of Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd are well 
argued, it is unlikely that the Court of Appeal intended to revise and restate the law on duress in New Zealand. There was 
very limited discussion of the leading cases in Pharmacy Care. If Hammond J intended to depart from the law which New 
Zealand has followed for over a decade, then there would be more extensive consideration and discussion of the existing 
law and the reasons for departure. Instead, Pharmacy Care should be read in conjunction with existing authorities. Its 
summary of the seven elements should be construed as a summary of the law relating to duress. 
542 HC AK CIV 2005-404-002993 [4 July 2006]. 
543 Ibid, per Keane J, para 48. 
544 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 3-001; A Wertheimer, Coercion 
(1987), p 39; and R Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ 46 U Toronto LJ 201, p 214. 
545 Whether conduct amounts to “unlawful means” is not always clear cut. Economic duress was identified at one of the 
emerging areas of “unlawfulness”. See M Bedggood and J Hughes, ‘Interference with Business Relations: The Common 
Law” in S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4th ed 2005). See also N Seddon, ‘Compulsion In Commercial 
Dealings’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution (1990), p 150, where Seddon writes that “a threat to commit a tort or to 
break a contract is not of itself unacceptable.” 
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To determine whether the type of pressure being exerted is illegitimate, a two stage inquiry can be 
employed. The first question is to look at the nature of the pressure,546 and the second question “is to 
look at the nature of the demand which the pressure is applied to support.”547 This mirrors the 
comments made in Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v The Attorney General where it was held that “the 
particular threat will be illegitimate because what is threatened is in and of itself a legal wrong, or 
because the threat is wrongful, or because it is contrary to public policy”,548 and Haines v Carter, 
where it was held that “the illegitimacy of the pressure may lie in the illegality of the actions threatened 
or, alternatively, may be associated with the illegitimacy of the particular threats in the context in 
which they were made.”549 
1. Threats of Unlawful Conduct 
The difficulty distinguishing a lawful threat from an unlawful threat is evident in the context of 
commercial dealings. In all aspects of business dealings there is normally an element of pressure, and it 
is more likely than not that one party will be in a stronger bargaining position than another. The threat 
not to do future business with another party does not constitute duress because parties are entitled to 
choose who they do business and contract with.550 Similarly, the threat to break a contract is a difficult 
question. While non-performance of a contract is per se unlawful, there is always a right to break a 
contract, especially to cut ones losses. Therefore, the focus should be on the nature of the demand that 
the pressure was applied to support.551  
 
To determine whether illegitimate pressure has been exerted, a number of factors may be taken into 
account: 
These include whether there has been an actual or threatened breach of contract; whether the person allegedly 
exerting the pressure has acted in good or bad faith; whether the victim had any realistic practical alternative but to 
submit to the pressure; whether the victim protested at the time; and whether he affirmed and sought to rely on the 
contract. These are all relevant factors. Illegitimate pressure must be distinguished from the rough and tumble of 
the pressures of normal commercial bargaining.552 
Cases have recognised that a threat to break a contract can constitute an illegitimate threat sufficient to 
amount to economic duress in a purely commercial context. This has produced inconsistent results. 
                                                 
546 Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366, per Lord 
Scarman, p 401, held that in many cases this inquiry will be decisive. 
547 Ibid. 
548 (2004) 2 NZCCLR 187, [2004] BCL 835, per Hammond J, para 91. 
549 [2001] 2 NZLR 167, per Young J, p 189. 
550 Smith v William Charlick Limited (1924) 34 CLR 38. 
551 Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ 46 U Toronto LJ 201, p 243-5. 
552 DSND Subsea Limited v Petroleum Geo Services ASA 2000 WL 1741490, [2000] BLR 530, per Dyson J, para 131. 
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In North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd: The Atlantic Baron553 there was a 
contract to build a ship with the price to be paid in five instalments. After the first instalment was paid, 
the US dollar suffered a sharp devaluation, and the defendant shipbuilders demanded a 10 per cent 
increase for the remaining four instalments. They threatened to terminate the contract if payment was 
not made. The ship’s owner (the plaintiff) was aware that there was no legal basis for the demand. 
Subsequent to the demand, the plaintiff reached an advantageous agreement with a client to charter the 
ship, and was motivated to pay the increase. Payment was made. Subsequently, the plaintiff sought 
repayment of the increased amounts. It was held by Mocatta J that a threat to break a contract was 
sufficient pressure to constitute economic duress. If the threat led to a further contract which was made 
for good consideration, then the new contract would be voidable by reason of economic duress. It was 
held that the pressure in this case constituted economic duress; however, due to the delay of 8 months 
before the commencement of arbitration, the plaintiff had affirmed the contract. 
 
The threat to break a contract and a lack of practical alternatives554 available to the defendant in Atlas 
Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd555 established duress. The plaintiff misquoted the 
rate by which they would carry the defendant’s goods. A contract was entered into reflecting that rate. 
The plaintiff refused to carry the defendant’s load unless a higher charge was paid. The defendant had 
no choice but to agree to the higher charge: they were a small company who needed to deliver a large 
order, which was crucial to their commercial survival. It would have been difficult, if not impossible to 
organise an alternative carrier. All of this was known by the plaintiff. Tucker J held that the new 
agreement was signed unwillingly and under compulsion. The pressure was illegitimate, and vitiated 
the defendant’s consent to the agreement. 
                                                 
553 [1978] 3 All ER 1170. 
554 See also TA Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd (1956) 56 SR (NSW) 323 there was a 
contract for the supply of galvanized iron of French origin. Due to the intervention of the French Government, the price of 
the iron increased. The supplier demanded the increase from the buyer. The buyer urgently required the iron to carry out its 
own commitments, and if the increase was not agreed to, no iron would have been delivered. It was held that the actions of 
the supplier amounted to a level of compulsion sufficient to establish duress. 
Newfoundland and Labrador Drilling Ltd v Miller 31 ACWS (3d) 393 (cited 1992 ACWSJ LEXIS 29732, Lexis.com at 9 
October 2007) (Newfoundland Supreme Court) additional payments paid to return stranded equipment was held to be paid 
under economic duress. The plaintiffs were anxious not to have their equipment stranded for the winter, and were unable to 
secure services of another barge to transport their equipment. 
Modular Windows of Canada v Command Construction 27 ACWS (2d) 439, (cited 1984 ACWSJ LEXIS 31546 Lexis.com 
at 9 October 2007) (Ontario High Court of Justice) there was additional payments made under a contract to supply 
windows. There was no additional performance under the contract to justify the extra payment. The defendant felt that he 
was effectively “over the barrel” with regard to the need to obtain the windows. It was held that there were no practical 
alternatives open to the defendant. If the project was incomplete, the defendant would have been liable to a greater 
magnitude than the additional amount demanded by the plaintiff. It was held that the defence of economic duress had been 
established. An appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissed at 37 ACWS (2d) 431 (cited 1986 ACWSJ LEXIS 
36484, Lexis.com at 9 October 2007). 
555 [1989] 1 All ER 641. 
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There has been difficulty reconciling cases that recognise that a threat to breach a contract constitutes 
an unlawful threat with Williams v Roffey Bros and Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.556 The case concerned a 
contract to refurbish a block of flats. The defendant subcontracted work to the plaintiff. After the 
contract was signed, and work began, the plaintiff found he was in financial difficulties because the 
price of the subcontract was too low, and the workmen had been insufficiently supervised. A meeting 
was called, and the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff an additional amount, because they did not 
want to incur penalties under the main contract. It was recognised that there were incentives for both 
parties to ensure that the subcontract was completed on time. 
 
It was held by Glidewell LJ that: 
(i) if A has entered into a contract with B to do work for, or to supply goods or services to, B in return for payment 
by B and (ii) at some stage before A has completely performed his obligations under the contract B has reason to 
doubt whether A will, or will be able to, complete his side of the bargain and (iii) B thereupon promises A an 
additional payment in return for A’s promise to perform his contractual obligations on time and (iv) as a result of 
giving his promise B obtains in practice a benefit, or obviates a disbenefit, and (v) B’s promise is not given as a 
result of economic duress or fraud on the part of A, then (vi) the benefit to B is capable of being consideration for 
B’s promise, so that the promise will be legally binding.557 (emphasis added) 
It was held that this was not a case of economic duress. Therefore, the agreement was binding. 
However, exactly why the demand for the extra money did not constitute duress was not elaborated 
upon.558 
 
The approach in Williams v Roffey Bros is similar to that in DSND Subsea Limited v Petroleum Geo 
Services ASA.559 The pressure in DSND did not amount to illegitimate pressure because it was held to 
be reasonable behaviour by a contractor acting bona fide in a difficult situation. The contract did not 
contain a provision for the situation that occurred in the case, and the contractor was justified to refuse 
to go offshore (resulting in a breach of contract) until it was assured that insurance was in place to 
cover the risks. However, if the contractor had said that they would not resume work until the 
compensation issue was resolved, then this would have amounted to illegitimate pressure. In deciding 
whether duress was exerted, Dyson J looked at specific facts of the case: there was an amicable 
atmosphere between the parties, they went out for dinner together; and there was no hint or any 
reference to duress in any of the documents, written correspondence, internal memoranda, or diary 
entries. 
                                                 
556 [1990] 1 All ER 512. 
557 Williams v Roffey Bros and Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 512, per Glidewell LJ, p 521-522. 
558 There are cases with similar fact scenarios to Williams v Roffey Bros, that is, a contract for work to be performed, 
demand by one party for additional payment, there are external pressures on the other party to complete the contract to 
ensure other contractual commitments are met, and business is not disrupted. That fact scenario amounted to duress in a 
number of cases, see B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419; and Vantage 
Navigation Corporation v Suhail and Saud Bahwan Building Materials LLC, (The “Alev”) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 138. 
559 2000 WL 1741490, [2000] BLR 530. 
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The decision of Williams v Roffey Bros creates an interesting issue of how it can be reconciled with 
cases before it. Indeed, in Williams itself, Glidewill J did not elaborate on what specific elements of the 
case that lead him to conclude that economic duress had not been established. Todd argues that this 
creates an unclear and difficult distinction in the law: “a contracting party who fears he or she may be 
unable to carry out a contract and who seeks to renegotiate the terms should be careful not to threaten 
to break it. The other party must voluntarily agree to a variation rather than give way to unlawful 
pressure.”560 Similarly, Seddon and Ellinghaus suggest that a “shrewd contractor should be attentive to 
how he or she makes the suggestion that more money is needed to finish the job.”561 
 
Smith562 writes that the justification of the cases lies in the distinction between a warning and a threat: 
“[a] threat is a proposal to bring about an unwelcome event that is made so as to induce the recipient of 
the proposal to do a requested act (e.g., enter into a contract). A warning … is a mere prediction that an 
unwelcome event will happen. In typical cases, warnings can be distinguished from threats by the 
speaker’s lack of control over the unwelcome consequence.”563 Therefore, in the case of a 
subcontractor who requires more money to complete the contract, or risk bankruptcy, this is a warning. 
However, if the subcontractor is able to complete the contract yet is simply demanding more money, 
this is a threat.564 
 
Another way to reconcile the cases is to identify a “classic hold-up situation:” where there is no change 
in the commercial environment that could justify the defendant’s demands and the threatened breach of 
contract is calculated to take advantage of the other party’s vulnerability. Therefore, in the case of 
market fluctuations or discovery of a negotiation error, the defendant is effectively trying to renegotiate 
the contract, or reallocate the risks under the contract. This will amount to illegitimate pressure.565 
Todd takes a similar view on deliberate under-quoting in order to secure a contract, and then 
negotiating the price upwards. While he concedes that the problem may be more theoretical than real, 
                                                 
560 S Todd, Burrows, Finn and Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 345. 
561 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), p 661. 
562 S Smith, Contract Theory (2005). 
563 Ibid, p 318. 
564 See also P S Atiyah and S A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction of the Law of Contract (6th ed 2005), p 270. A threat to break a 
contract is illegitimate, whereas a warning that a party may be unable to perform the contract unless more money is received 
is not. Atiyah and Smith argue that if both parties are willing to compromise and pay more, then this is enforceable because 
this is the only way that performance can be induced. Any issues of deliberate underbidding should be dealt with by 
regulation, for example licensing standards and mandatory insurance. 
565 R Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ 46 U Toronto LJ 201, p 247-8. 
Bigwood interprets Williams v Roffey Bros as exceptions to the general rule; see R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), 
p 336, at footnote 310. This approach also explains DSND Subsea Ltd because the contract did not contain a provision to 
cover the situation that eventuated. 
 90
“evidence of earlier deliberate underbidding could help in showing bad faith, which is an alternative 
basis for a finding of illegitimate pressure.”566 
 
Enonchong discusses the issue of whether a threatened breach of contract constitutes illegitimate 
pressure at some length. He argues that there is no simple comprehensive test to determine the issue. 
Instead, a number of factors need to be considered: “whether the demand is made because 
circumstances have changed, whether the demand is reasonable in the circumstances and whether the 
demand is made in good faith.”567 
 
The situation could quite simply be that Williams v Roffey Bros is wrongly decided. The fact that one 
party has asked nicely to renegotiate the terms of a contract means that the party is highly likely to 
break that contract if the other party does not agree to its variation. It may not have been an express 
threat, but it certainly is an implied threat.568 Whether threats are express or implied, the threat still 
places the party in a situation of making an unfair choice, and is thereby compelled to undertake what 
the “threatening” party proposes.569 However, this ignores the fact that both parties received a benefit 
from the completion of the contract,570 and that parties should be free to voluntarily vary a contract. 
There was an element of fairness and reasonableness to the whole process of negotiation in Williams v 
Roffey Bros. If the subcontractor had demanded three times the appropriate rate to complete the work, it 
would have been likely that the agreement would not be enforced.571 
 
Another approach may be to decide these cases under undue influence. The general nature of influence 
is more flexible than the pressure required by duress, and it is unnecessary to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate pressure. However, in the event that the evidential presumption is relied on, 
there needs to be established a relationship of trust and confidence, and this may be difficult in a 
business situation. The very nature of a business relationship means that each party is entitled to put his 
or her interests first, and the fiduciary nature of the evidential presumption does not sit well with a 
business relationship. This can be overcome by relying on the exertion of pressure under actual undue 
                                                 
566 S Todd, Burrows, Finn and Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 345. 
567 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 3-004. 
568 See also B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419, where there was no overt 
demand to break the contract if the extra payment was not made, however it was implicit in the negotiations and the conduct 
of the party exerting the pressure that if the payment was not made, the contract would not be completed. 
569 R Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ 46 U Toronto LJ 201, p 210-11. 
570 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 342. Any benefit received by the parties to the renegotiated contract must 
also be considered. 
571 P S Atiyah and S A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction of the Law of Contract (6th ed 2005), p 281. 
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influence. Alternatively, unconscionability may be used in this area quite effectively, and the 
development of a defence of duress by necessity shows that the doctrines are very similar.572 
2. Threats of Lawful Conduct 
Threats of lawful action are considered generally to be insufficient to constitute duress.573 However, 
this is subject to exceptions,574 and the question of when a lawful threat (where one threatens to do 
what one is legally entitled to do), constitute illegitimate pressure needs to be answered. The issue has 
been expressed as “whether it is unconscionable for the party who issued the threat to take the benefit 
of the contract.”575 In the situation of a “lawful act duress” in a purely commercial context, it was held 
in CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallagher Ltd576 that it would be “relatively rare”577 to establish duress. 
The reason being, that it would produce uncertainty in the commercial bargaining process, and enable 
settled accounts to be reopened. 
 
When does the threat of a lawful action become illegitimate? It was held in Crescendo Management 
Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation578 that “[e]ven overwhelming pressure, not amounting to 
unconscionable or unlawful conduct, however, will not necessarily constitute economic duress.”579 In 
many cases, the person making the lawful threat has a legal right to take such action, even a moral 
obligation, such as reporting a crime or tax evasion.580 Having said that, the mere fact that there is the 
legal right to take such action does not make the demand supported by the threat lawful. In effect, “a 
demand which is backed by a threat of lawful action may bear little or no relationship to the purpose of 
the right to do the action threatened.”581 It is this lack of correlation that makes the threat unlawful (in 
other words, blackmail). Bigwood writes that a person is permitted to exercise an independent legal 
right, insofar as the exercise of that right is not for a purpose that is regarded by the law as improper, 
“or to extract a benefit which is otherwise ‘unconscionable,’ that is ‘exploitative,’ in the 
                                                 
572 See discussion below p 128-130. 
573 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 3-001; A Wertheimer, Coercion 
(1987), p 39; and R Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ 46 U Toronto LJ 201, p 214. 
574 Examples of this include the threat to prosecute, or to bring industrial action. See N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, 
Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), p 659-60. 
575 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), p 658. 
576 [1994] 4 All ER 714. 
577 Ibid, per Steyn LJ, p 719. 
578 (1988) 19 NSWLR 40. 
579 Ibid, per McHugh JA, p 46. 
580 Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797; and Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport 
Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366. 
581 Enonchong, above n 573 para 3-017. See also Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v The Attorney General (2004) 2 NZCCLR 
187, [2004] BCL 835, per Hammond J, para 93. 
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circumstances.”582 Therefore, threats to engage the legal process, although lawful, may become 
unlawful if the threat was made in bad faith. 
 
This is illustrated in Haines v Carter.583 The case concerned an agreement to divide assets of the parties 
on the breakdown of their relationship. Mr Haines wished to avoid the contract on the grounds of 
duress. He alleged Ms Carter threatened that if he did not enter into the agreement, she would make 
things difficult with the bank that provided banking facilities to the business, and would sabotage 
existing banking arrangements. She also threatened to make things difficult for Mr Haines at the Inland 
Revenue Department. It was held by Young J that the threats amounted to blackmail and were therefore 
illegitimate.584 In the situation of blackmail, the blackmailer is usually entitled to do what he or she is 
threatening to do. However, what the blackmailer must justify is “not the threat, but the demand of 
money.”585 
 
Good faith also has a role to play. Moyes & Groves Ltd v Radiation New Zealand Ltd586 illustrates that 
a demand made in good faith, does not usually constitute duress. In the case, the buyer and seller 
contracted for the supply of goods that were made to the buyer’s specifications. Both parties 
subsequently forgot about the contract, and the goods arrived two years late, and at a substantial 
increase to the original contract price. The buyers still wanted the goods, and the sellers were willing to 
supply the goods, but at the increased price. If the buyers were unwilling to pay the new price, the 
sellers would have returned the goods to the manufacturers. The buyers agreed to pay the new price 
“under protest”, but once they received the goods, they paid the original contract price. The sellers sued 
for the balance. Cooke J held that “in New Zealand law economic duress can be a ground for avoiding 
liability under a contract. But it is certainly something which should not be found lightly.”587 There was 
a genuine commercial dispute between the parties. The demand for increased payment by the sellers 
was justified, as they were entitled to treat the original contract as abandoned. There was no coercion of 
the buyer’s will. It was “a prudent and sensible compromise.”588 
                                                 
582 Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ 46 U Toronto LJ 201, p 217. 
583 [2001] 2 NZLR 167. The case was appealed to the Privy Council on the interpretation of a clause in the Relationship 
Property Agreement. 
584 Despite the illegitimacy of the threats, the threats did not amount to duress. The negotiation process was conducted via 
mediation, and it was unlikely that duress was applied; the pressure was not particularly coercive; and the agreement had 
been affirmed. 
585 Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797, per Lord Atkin, p 806. 
586 [1982] 1 NZLR 368. 
587 Ibid, per Cooke J, p 372. 
588 Ibid. 
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Todd589 writes that the genuine belief by the defendants of their entitlement to demand payment was 
crucial to defeating the plaintiff’s claim of duress. He acknowledged, that a lawful threat, made in good 
faith could possibly constitute duress, although this is “not easy to envisage.”590 
 
Reliance on the bona fide belief of a party to place pressure on another party is by no means a straight 
forward test to determine whether conduct constitutes duress. Bigwood argues that the motives and 
beliefs of the party exerting the pressure should not be determinative of any issues of duress. Such an 
approach also transforms duress cases into “difficult, highly fact-dependent, ‘exploitation’ analysis”,591 
requiring yet another test to determine when legitimate conduct becomes illegitimate.592 Therefore, the 
presence of bad faith can be viewed as an important factor in deciding whether a threatened lawful act 
constitutes illegitimate pressure. However, the absence of bad faith should not be considered a 
determinative factor,593 but given the nature of duress, the presence of some kind of improper conduct 
will be needed. 
 
In Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v The Attorney General594 Hammond J drew the distinction between the 
threat of criminal prosecution or to engage civil process. In the case of a threat to instigate a criminal 
prosecution, this is generally regarded as improper pressure. The resulting agreement is against public 
policy. However, in the case of a threat to resort to civil process, the threat would only be considered 
improper if the demand was exorbitant, or the threatened action was not a reasonable alternative. If 
threats to resort to civil process is categorised as illegitimate from the outset, this poses problems with 
regard to access to justice.595 
COERCION 
In addition to an illegitimate threat, that threat must also coerce a person into entering into the contract. 
The test of whether a threat has had a causative effect has been expressed in several different ways. In 
Pao On v Lau Yiu Long596 the test was expressed to be “a coercion of the will so as to vitiate consent.” 
To determine whether the will was coerced, additional factors to consider are whether or not: the 
                                                 
589 S Todd, Burrows, Finn and Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 346. 
590 Ibid p 347. See also M H Ogilvie, ‘Economic Duress in Contract: Departure, Detour or Dead End?’ (2001) 34 Can Bus 
LJ 194. 
591 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 340. 
592 Ogilvie, above n 590 p 210-20 
593 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), p 659. 
594 (2004) 2 NZCCLR 187, [2004] BCL 835. 
595 Ibid, per Hammond J, paras 94-5. 
596 [1979] 3 All ER 65, per Lord Scarman, p 78. 
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person protested; had alternative courses available such as a legal remedy; had independent advice; and 
after entering the contract, took steps to avoid it.597 
 
This was developed further in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers 
Federation.598 Lord Scarman acknowledged that in many cases, consent of the victim is not entirely 
absent. His Lordship expressed the test as “not the lack of will to submit but the victim’s intentional 
submission arising from the realisation that there is no other practical choice open to him.”599 
Therefore, the victim is aware of his actions, but the choices available to him are not viable. The 
example given by many commentators in this area involve a victim who has a gun held to his head. The 
options available to him are to hand over his money, or be shot in the head. Being shot is always an 
option, but not a particularly viable one. 
 
What may be the crucial point to justify the decision in Williams v Roffey Bros (but was not discussed 
in the judgment) was that there were practical and reasonable alternatives open to the contractor at the 
time the additional payments were agreed to.600 Reasonable alternatives include legal redress, or 
employing other subcontractors. While the alternatives may have been inconvenient, it was still a 
possibility. As the alternatives were not pursued, there was a benefit gained in agreeing to the extra 
payments. The benefit gained in agreeing to the additional payments is relevant to the question of 
duress as well as consideration. In relation to duress, the benefit is relevant to determine whether there 
has been a coercion of the will. In terms of consideration, a sufficient level of benefit received will 
suffice. McKendrick writes that historically, duress cases were decided under the doctrine of 
consideration. However, given the rule that consideration must be sufficient, but need not be adequate, 
McKendrick argues that consideration is ill-equipped to deal with duress cases.601 Instead “the modern 
courts will be more willing to find the presence of consideration in the renegotiation of a contract and 
leave it to duress to regulate the fairness of the renegotiation.”602 
                                                 
597 See also discussion by M H Ogilvie, ‘Economic Duress in Contract: Departure, Detour or Dead End?’ (2001) 34 Can 
Bus LJ 194, p 215. 
598 [1983] 1 AC 366. 
599 Ibid, per Lord Scarman, p 400. See discussion by Kerr LJ, B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications 
Ltd [1984] ICR 419,at p 428, where his Honour suggests that Lord Scarman’s passage contains a typographical error. 
Instead of the “lack of will to submit” it should be a “lack of will to resist”. 
600 See discussion in B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419, per Kerr LJ, p 428; 
R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 342; and N Seddon, ‘Compulsion in Commercial Dealings’ in P D Finn (ed) 
Essays on Restitution (1990), p 152. 
601 E McKendrick, Contract Law, (5th ed 2003). 
602 Ibid, p 362. 
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The courts take a strict view on reasonable alternatives. An alternative course of action can be 
construed as reasonable even if it is unpalatable. In Hennessy v Craigmyle & Co Ltd603, an employee 
was faced with the choice of signing an agreement giving up his rights to bring proceedings before an 
industrial tribunal, and then being made redundant (thereby becoming entitled to redundancy payment), 
or to be summarily dismissed. The employee took legal advice and signed the agreement, which he 
later sought to avoid on the grounds of duress. It was held that the conduct of the employer did not 
amount to duress because there were real, albeit unattractive alternatives open to the employee. He 
could have complained to an industrial tribunal, or drawn a social security benefit. 
 
Similarly in Engle v Carswell604 the court considered pressure exercised by the husband over the wife, 
inducing her to sign a prenuptial agreement. The wife had a law degree and was familiar with the 
relevant legislation. The husband threatened on their wedding day that if she did not sign the 
prenuptial, then he would not go through with the marriage ceremony. The couple were already 
cohabiting and had three children together. She maintained that she had no choice but to sign, and did 
so. It was not until the husband commenced divorce proceedings that the wife sought legal advice as to 
her position and the legal status of the prenuptial agreement. It was held that there was an alternative 
available to her. She could have refused to sign the prenuptial agreement, and taken the risk that the 
husband would back out of the ceremony. The claim of duress failed. 
 
Subsequent cases have moved away from the overborne theory and focused on how much of a “cause” 
the pressure operated on the party. In Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers 
Federation605 Lord Goff held the economic pressure that is sufficient for the purposes of duress “may 
be characterised as illegitimate and has constituted a significant cause inducing the plaintiff to enter 
into the relevant contract.”606 Similarly in Haines v Carter,607 Young J held that the party affected by 
duress need not “have been psychologically crippled by reason of pressure before relief can be 
available.”608 In effect, the pressure must have been a cause,609 or “an appreciable factor in 
                                                 
603 [1986] ICR 461. 
604 1995 ACWSJ LEXIS 46937, 1995 ACWSJ 632249, 53 ACWS (3d) 1282 (cited Lexis.com at 20 October 2006). 
605 [1992] 2 AC 152. 
606 Ibid, per Lord Goff, p 165. 
607 [2001] 2 NZLR 167. The case was appealed to the Privy Council on the interpretation of a clause in the Relationship 
Property Agreement. 
608 Ibid, per Young J, p 190. 
609 R Bigwood, ‘Economic Duress By (Threatened) Breach of Contract’ (2001) 117 LQR, 376, p 380. N Enonchong, 
Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 4-005-6 writes that there is difficulty in determining the 
precise degree of causal connection required by the law. Despite some suggestion by authorities that the test of causation 
may differ depending on the type of duress alleged, Enonchong argues that two different tests for causation would be a step 
backwards as the law has advanced from the notion that only duress to the person can constitute duress. 
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influencing”610 the plaintiff to enter into the transaction where there was no other practical choice or 
alternative open to the plaintiff.611 In Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking 
Corporation612 McHugh JA held that the correct approach “is to ask whether any applied pressure 
induced the victim to enter into the contract and then ask whether the pressure went beyond what the 
law is prepared to countenance as legitimate?”613  
 
Arguments discrediting the overborne theory of duress are supported by the legal effect of duress. 
Duress renders a contract voidable. If the true nature of duress is the overbearing of one’s will, then a 
contract entered into under duress should be void not voidable. 
 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal Attorney-General for England and Wales v R614 adopted the but for 
test: that is, “the existence of pressure causing the party under that pressure to enter into a contract 
which, but for the existence of the pressure, would not have been entered into.”615 Similar comments 
were made in Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co.616 It was held that the party asserting duress 
must show “that the illegitimate pressure was a least a significant cause inducing it to enter the 
                                                 
610 Haines v Carter [2001] 2 NZLR 167, per Young J, p 190. 
611 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 87. 
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makes the threatened party worse off relative to that person’s baseline, whereas an offer makes the offeree better off in 
relation to that person’s baseline. A person’s baseline consists of that person’s rights and entitlements. The baseline includes 
moral and non-moral (statistical) aspects, and can change according to a person’s current level of expectation. Therefore the 
baseline will differ for each person, and what will be a threat for one person may not constitute a threat for another. To 
determine a person’s baseline is not a straightforward exercise. The tests suggested by Wertheimer largely focus on 
subjective elements pertinent to the “offeree”. However, the determination of whether there is an offer or a threat depends 
also on the relative importance attached to the moral or the non-moral aspect of a person’s baseline. To illustrate the moral 
test, Wertheimer gives an example of a private/public physician. If a patient approached a private physician to treat his 
illness, and the doctor replied that he would only treat the patient if he was paid $100, which was a fair price, this 
constitutes an offer. The doctor is not obliged to treat the patient for free. However, if the doctor was a public physician, 
employed by the public health system, and was legally obliged to treat patients without cost, the demand for $100 becomes 
a threat. The doctor has an obligation to treat patients free of charge. It is submitted that the use of the baseline theory 
requires a detailed, subjective analysis of a person’s expectations, and unduly complicates the legal analysis. A Wertheimer, 
Coercion (1987), p 204-8. R Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ 46 U Toronto LJ 201, 
p 212. 
612 (1988) 19 NSWLR 40. 
613 Ibid, per McHugh JA, p 45-6. See also P S Atiyah, ‘Economic Duress and the “Overborne Will’ (1982) 98 LQR 197, p 
201. 
614 [2002] 2 NZLR 91. 
615 Ibid, per Tipping J, para 61. See also N Seddon, ‘Compulsion In Commercial Dealings’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on 
Restitution (1990); and N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), 
p 667 suggested a but for test: “is it more probable than not that, but for the threat, the party would not have entered into the 
transaction in question?” 
Smith writes that another way to conceptualise the issue is to adopt the NESS test. See S Smith, Contract Theory (2005), p 
321. “According to the NESS test, an action causes a result if ‘it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual 
conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the result.’” 
616 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 620. 
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contract.”617 “The illegitimate pressure must have been such as actually caused the making of the 
agreement … In that sense, the pressure must have been decisive or clinching.”618 Mance J also 
expressed the issue in terms of deflection of the will. 
 
In Barton v Armstrong619 it was held that the threats only had to be a reason, not the reason.620 This was 
cited with approval in Haines v Carter and by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Pharmacy Care 
Systems Ltd v The Attorney General.621 In Pharmacy Care, it was held that “[i]t is not necessary to 
show that duress was the sole cause inducing the agreement. It is enough if it was “an” inducement of 
the requisite character.”622 Hammond J acknowledged the debate regarding the overborne theory, and it 
was held that the “victim’s will must be overborne by the improper pressure so that his or her free will 
and judgment have been displaced … the threat or pressure must actually induce the victim’s 
manifestation of assent … [and] the threat or pressure must be sufficiently grave to justify the assent 
from the victim, in the sense that it left the victim with no reasonable alternative.”623 
 
Todd writes that “[i]t is unfortunate that the “overbearing of the will” theory has emerged again.”624 
Similar views on the overborne theory of duress were expressed by Atiyah.625 Atiyah argues that 
following the decision of the House of Lords in Lynch v DPP of Northern Ireland626 the overborne 
theory of duress has been discredited. Instead, the will should be thought of in terms of being deflected, 
as opposed to being destroyed.627 In terms of the decision in Pharmacy Care it is not apparent from the 
judgment that Hammond J intended to resurrect the overborne theory. The passage cited from the 
judgment contains a smorgasbord of elements of duress. His use of the term “overborne” may simply 
have been used to denote the circumstances whereby the victim has succumbed to pressure.628 
                                                 
617 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 620, per Mance J, p 630. 
618 Ibid p 636. 
619 [1976] AC 104. 
620 Many commentators have justified the decision in Barton v Armstrong on the basis that the threats in the case were so 
unacceptable that a low threshold of causation was accepted. See N Seddon, ‘Compulsion In Commercial Dealings’ in P D 
Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution (1990), p 156; and R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 336. 
621 (2004) 2 NZCCLR 187, [2004] BCL 835. 
622 Ibid, per Hammond J, para 90. 
623 Ibid, per Hammond J, para 98. 
624 S Todd, Burrows, Finn and Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 348. 
625 See P S Atiyah, ‘Economic Duress and the “Overborne Will’ (1982) 98 LQR 197, and P S Atiyah, ‘Duress and the 
Overborne Will Again’ (1983) 99 LQR 353. See also M H Ogilvie, ‘Economic Duress in Contract: Departure, Detour or 
Dead End?’ (2001) 34 Can Bus LJ 194; and J D McCamus Essentials of Canadian Law The Law of Contracts (2005), at p 
373. If the overborne theory was strictly applied, the defence of economic duress would rarely be available. 
626 [1975] AC 653. In Lynch v DPP of Northern Ireland the appellant contended that he had aided and abetted a murder 
under duress, and should be acquitted. Lord Morris held that in cases of duress the will of the victim is not overborne. The 
actions undertaken may have been done unwillingly; however, it would have been done intentionally. 
627 Ibid, per Lord Simon, p 685.  
628 See also D Tiplady in response to Professor Atiyah’s article (1982) 98 LQR 197: D Tiplady, ‘Concepts of Duress’ (1983) 
99 LQR 188. Tiplady argues that use of the term “overborne” is useful shorthand to describe the victim falling under 
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Duress requires that the plaintiff was under pressure. The question as to how much pressure has ranged 
from an objective assessment629 “that the threat [must] be sufficient to overcome the will of “a person 
of ordinary firmness””;630 to a subjective standard “under which the threat need only have deprived the 
particular victim of his free will.”631 This has led to the modern formulation, a hybrid, where the court 
takes into account whether there were reasonable alternatives open to the plaintiff.632 Subjective 
elements are also considered “such as the complainant’s age, health, financial circumstances or receipt 
of legal advice”633, and also the complainant’s background and relationship with the other party.634 
Whether the plaintiff took steps to avoid the contract when freed from the pressure is relevant,635 as is 
the victim’s response. Persons who are weak, cowardly or timid will need more protection than more 
courageous persons.636 Similarly, if a particular weakness or sensitivity is exploited, this may make 
what seems a trivial threat into something much more intolerable.637 Whether the plaintiff protested or 
not, is a relevant, albeit weak factor.638 
DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE 
There has been much written on the overlap between duress and actual undue influence.639 In the past, 
undue influence was considered a doctrine that would operate where there was no other remedy at law, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
pressure. The notion of the overborne theory is no obstacle to identifying the forms of pressure that the law regards as 
legitimate or illegitimate. He argues that the notion of overborne will “can be safely left, like other chameleon phrases, to 
take its colour from its context”, at p 194. 
629 E A Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (Vol I 2nd ed, 1998), p 487. N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and 
Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 4-002. 
630 Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v The Attorney General (2004) 2 NZCCLR 187, [2004] BCL 835, per Hammond J, para 96. 
631 Ibid. 
632 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 4-002. 
633 Ibid. 
634 E A Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (Vol I 2nd ed, 1998), p 489-90. 
635 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1979] 3 All ER 65; and Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 
87. 
636 Farnsworth, above n 534 p 489-90. 
637 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), p 665. 
638 Seddon, and Ellinghaus, Ibid, p 665; Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1979] 3 All ER 65; and Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total 
Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 87. In terms of undue influence in a commercial transaction, such as a guarantee, the 
reluctance of the surety may show that “she has yielded to the external exigencies of the situation.” Instead of showing the 
presence of pressure, reluctance on the part of the surety may show that she is executing the guarantee because she knew 
that it was the right thing to do. Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No2) [1998] 4 All ER 705 Court of Appeal, per Stuart-
Smith LJ, para 18. 
639 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls, p 457; M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, 
Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) NZULR 509; R B Grantham, and C 
E F Rickett, Enrichment & Restitution in New Zealand (2000); R McKeand, ‘Economic Duress – Wearing the Clothes of 
Unconscionable Conduct’ 2001 JCL LEXIS 6 (cited Lexis.com at 3 July 2007); M Cope, Duress, Undue Influence and 
Unconscionable Bargains (1985), p 64; P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and 
Trusts (1989); P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith 
and Fault in Commercial Law (1995), p 76; Bigwood, R, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 384; and P Vout, (ed and Current 
Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia (2006), para 35.7:2. 
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developed to cover “what would otherwise be a gap in the law,”640 and to embrace “those forms of 
illegitimate pressure which were not recognised at common law.”641 As the concept of duress has 
expanded, essentially to encompass lawful acts and economic duress, this has resulted in the blurring of 
the distinction between duress, undue influence and unconscionability.642 Both duress and actual undue 
influence are concerned primarily with procedural impropriety.643 The two doctrines focus more on the 
punishment of the “illegitimate use of power” as opposed to “the protection of a tender relationship 
against abuse.”644 
 
A key difference between duress and actual undue influence is that under the former, the complainant 
is unwillingly forced into the contract, whereas under the latter, the party influenced may have been 
only too willing to enter into the contract.645 However, this distinction has been eroded over time with 
the overborne theory of duress being discredited.646 The result in terms of relief for undue influence 
and duress are the same, the contract is voidable.647 
 
In essence, the distinction between undue influence and duress is the level of pressure required to 
constitute a sufficient wrong, to warrant the intervention of the law.648 Pressure, or the illegitimate 
                                                 
640 Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA v Aboody [1992] 4 All ER 955, per Slade LJ p 970; and National 
Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821, per Lord Scarman, p 831. E A Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 
(Vol I 2nd ed, 1998), p 496-7. 
641 P Vout, (ed and Current Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia (2006), para 35.7:2. 
642 Bigwood, R, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 362-3; A Phang, ‘Economic Duress: Recent Difficulties and Possible 
Alternatives’ (1997) 5 RLR 53; and I J Hardingham, ‘Unconscionable Dealing’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985), p 
21. 
See NA v MA [2006] EWCH 2900 at paras 122-3, where Baron J used the terms “acting under undue pressure”, undue 
influence, “that the Wife’s free will was overborne” and “manifestly [acting] to her disadvantage whilst under duress” to 
describe the pressure the wife was under to sign a post nuptial agreement. 
643 M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) 
NZULR 509, p 527. 
644 Ibid p 537. 
645 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), p 657; Vout, above n 
641 para 35.7:2; and R W Clarke, Inequality of Bargaining Power (1987), p 235. See also M Chen-Wishart, ‘The O’Brien 
Principle and Substantive Unfairness’ Cambridge LJ 56(1), March 1997, 60, p 66. Chen-Wishart argues that a finding of 
actual undue influence without substantive unfairness is an example of a case of clear pressure, which is more appropriately 
dealt with under duress. However, it is respectfully submitted that this is incorrect, because, in a case of actual undue 
influence, fairness, or disadvantage in the contract is not an issue, see Pitt. 
646 In terms of economic duress, the overborne theory is no longer applicable. The victim of duress normally knows what he 
or she is doing, but chooses to submit to the pressure. See P S Atiyah, ‘Economic Duress and the “Overborne Will”’ (1982) 
98 LQR 197; and Clarke, above n 645 p 235. 
647 Vout, above n 641 para 35.7:2; Atiyah, above n 646; Clarke, above n 645 p 235; E A Farnsworth, Farnsworth on 
Contracts (Vol I 2nd ed, 1998), p 490; and Seddon, and Ellinghaus, above n 645 p 657. 
648 A Burrows, ‘We Do This At Common Law But That In Equity’ 22 Oxford J Legal Stud 1, p 5. Burrows argues that the 
doctrines of undue influence and duress falls into the category where common law and equity co-exist, but “there is nothing 
to be gained by adherence to those historical labels.” The difference is simply between the different types of threats or 
pressure involved. 
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threat is not a prerequisite for actual undue influence,649 although typically it is present. “Undue 
influence involves the use of psychological pressure while economic duress involves the use of 
economic pressure.”650 Undue influence can also exist in cases of extreme submissiveness, where there 
is no evidence of any pressure exerted, because no pressure is required.651 
 
The difference in pressure required by duress as opposed to undue influence is illustrated in Mutual 
Finance Ltd v John Wetton & Sons Ltd.652 The case centred on the issue of whether a guarantee could 
be avoided on the basis of duress or undue influence. One of the sons in the family business forged a 
guarantee. Mutual Finance Ltd was aware that the family, and in particular, another brother would be 
unwilling to permit a prosecution, as it might cause the death of their ill father. A new guarantee was 
signed. There were no threats of prosecution, and there was no promise not to prosecute if the new 
guarantee was signed. However, it was acknowledged that both parties knew that the impetus for 
signing the guarantee was the fear of prosecution. It was held that the case failed to establish duress at 
common law. Porter J recognised that the issue of whether undue influence had superseded duress was 
raised as early as 1927 by Salmond. Undue influence was wider than duress by the fact that “it is not 
necessary that there should be any direct threat.”653 It was enough for undue influence that an 
undertaking was given out of a desire to prevent prosecution, and that desire was known by the person 
to whom the undertaking was given.654 The case books are littered with actual undue influence cases 
with little or no pressure, certainly not enough pressure to constitute duress. 
 
Given the similarities that undue influence and duress share in common, it raises the question: can the 
differences be overcome in order for the doctrines to be merged? This will be examined in chapter 8. 
                                                 
649 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1992] 4 All ER 955; Bank of Montreal v Stuart [1911] AC 
120; Dunbar Bank v Nadeem [1998] 3 All ER 876; G H Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th ed. 2003), p 409; and N 
Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 4-003. 
650 M H Ogilvie, ‘Economic Duress in Contract: Departure, Detour or Dead End?’ (2001) 34 Can Bus LJ 194, p 227. 
651 See discussion above p 45. 
652 [1937] 2 KB 389. 
653 Ibid, per Porter J, p 395. 
654 Ibid, per Porter J, p 395. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One final doctrine that will be discussed in this thesis is the doctrine of unconscionability. This doctrine 
is related in nature to the doctrines of undue influence655 and duress. Unconscionability is an equitable 
doctrine that allows a court of equity to set aside a bargain of an improvident character. The early 
unconscionability cases concerned the expectant heir who was just of age, and made an improvident 
bargain with respect to the inheritance yet to be received.656 The doctrine has now been extended to 
bargains “made by a poor or ignorant person acting without independent advice which cannot be shown 
to be a fair or reasonable transaction.”657 The rationale for the intervention of equity in cases of 
unconscionable bargains “is not the relief of the foolish from their foolishness but rather the relief of 
the weak in appropriate cases from bargains entered into as a result of their weakness.”658 
 
The doctrine of unconscionability has been utilised to differing degrees in New Zealand, England and 
Australia. In Australia unconscionable bargains has developed into a much wider doctrine as compared 
with the English cases. This has lead Glover to conclude that “‘unconscientious dealing’ is the doctrinal 
paradigm in Australia” whereas “‘undue influence’ is the paradigm in the United Kingdom.”659 
However, this is not to say that the unconscionability doctrine in England is completely barren. In 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch660 Nourse LJ held that equity’s jurisdiction to relieve 
against such transactions utilising unconscionable bargains is rarely exercised in modern times. 
However, he recognised that the doctrine “is at least as venerable as its jurisdiction to relieve against 
those procured by undue influence.”661 
 
As far as the divergence in the English and Australian jurisdictions on unconscionability are concerned, 
New Zealand can be seen to fall somewhere in between. As to which jurisdiction it is more analogous 
to, this is open to debate. Mason noted, “[s]o far, Australia’s enthusiasm for unconscionable conduct as 
a ground for relief has not been reciprocated elsewhere except in New Zealand.”662 Tipping J held in 
Attorney-General for England and Wales v R663 that “the English approach to unconscionable bargains 
                                                 
655 See discussion in Louth v Diprose (1992) 110 ALR 1, p 4-5 where Brennan J held that a similar jurisdiction exists to set 
aside gifts procured by undue influence. 
656 Fry v Lane (1889) 40 ChD 312, per Kay J, p 321. 
657 O’Conner v Hart [1985] 1 NZLR 159, per Lord Brightman, p 171. 
658 Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, per Tipping J, p 460. 
659 J Glover, Equity, Restitution & Fraud (2004), p 281. 
660 [1997] 1 All ER 144. 
661 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, per Nourse LJ, p 151. 
662 A Mason, ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing’, (2000) 116 LQR 66, p 89. 
663 [2002] 2 NZLR 91, per Tipping J, p 117 
 103
may not have developed to the same extent or in exactly the same way as its New Zealand and 
Australian counterparts.” Despite the recognition of the differences, Tipping J later concedes that “the 
English and New Zealand manifestations of an unconscionable bargain are not markedly different.”664 
ELEMENTS 
The principles derived from the leading cases on unconscionable bargains were summarised by the 
Court of Appeal in Gustav & Co Limited v Macfield Limited.665 The principles stated were not intended 
to be exhaustive:666 
1. Equity will intervene to relieve a party from the rigours of the common law in respect of an unconscionable 
bargain. 
2. This equitable jurisdiction is not intended to relieve parties from “hard” bargains or to save the foolish from their 
foolishness. Rather, the jurisdiction operates to protect those who enter into bargains when they are under a 
significant disability or disadvantage from exploitation. 
3. A qualifying disability or disadvantage does not arise simply from an inequality of bargaining power. Rather, it is a 
condition or characteristic which significantly diminishes a party’s ability to assess his or her best interests. It is an 
open-ended concept. Characteristics that are likely to constitute a qualifying disability or disadvantage are 
ignorance, lack of education, illness, age, mental or physical infirmity, stress or anxiety, but other characteristics 
may also qualify depending on the circumstances of the case. 
4. If one party is under a qualifying disability or disadvantage (the weaker party), the focus shifts to the conduct of 
the other party (the stronger party). The essential question is whether in the particular circumstances it is 
unconscionable to permit the stronger party to take the benefit of the bargain. 
5. Before a finding of unconscionability will be made, the stronger party must know of the weaker party’s disability 
or disadvantage and must “take advantage of” that disability or disadvantage. 
6. The requisite knowledge may be that of the principal or an agent, and may be actual or constructive. Factors 
associated with the substance of a transaction (for example, a marked imbalance in consideration) or the way in 
which a transaction was concluded (for example, the failure of one party to receive independent advice in relation 
to a significant transaction) may lead to a finding that the stronger party had constructive knowledge. So, in the 
particular circumstances the stronger party may be put on enquiry, and in the absence of such enquiry, may be 
treated as if he or she knew of the disability or disadvantage. 
7. “Taking advantage of” (or victimisation) in this context encompasses both the active extraction and the passive 
acceptance of a benefit. Accordingly, as Tipping J said in Bowkett at 457, an unconscionable victimisation will 
occur where there are: 
… circumstances which are either known or which ought to be known to the stronger party in which he 
has an obligation in equity to say to the weaker party: no, I cannot in all good conscience accept the 
benefit of this transaction in these circumstances either at all or unless you have full independent advice. 
8. If these conditions are met, the burden falls on the stronger party to show that the transaction was a fair and 
reasonable one and should therefore be upheld. 
 
On proof of the points three to seven it has been expressed that a “presumption of fraud”667 is raised 
which places the onus on the stronger party to prove that the “purchase was “fair, just, and 
                                                 
664 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, per Tipping J, p 119. 
665 CA 168/05 [2007] NZCA 205, per Arnold J, para 30. 
666 The elements were also discussed by Tipping J in Attorney-General for England and Wales v R above n 664, p 118-9; 
and in an earlier case of Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, p 460. 
See also discussion by M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 193; P Vout, (ed and 
Current Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia (2006) para 35.9:10; R P Meagher, J D Heydon, 
and M J Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed 2002), para 16-010; P D 
Maddaugh, J D McCamus, The Law of Restitution (1990), p 624-5; and N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and 
Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 15-004. 
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reasonable.””668 If this is not shown, a court of equity will set aside the transaction. The jurisdiction is 
based on the twin concepts of “inequality and improvidence.”669 Alternatively, there may be proof of 
actual fraud.670 
 
The elements of unconscionability illustrate that there is much in common between the evidential 
presumption of undue influence and the presumption of fraud. Text writers further highlight the 
similarities between undue influence and unconscionability. Enonchong’s chapter on unconscionability 
is a comprehensive summary of the law. It illustrates that elements of unconscionability is raised in 
much the same way as undue influence. Proof of impropriety to support a claim of unconscionable 
bargain can be established by showing actual impropriety, or presumed impropriety (where it is 
inferred from “either the relationship of the parties or the nature of the transaction”671 or from 
transactional imbalance). In terms of transactional imbalance, a modern way of expressing the 
requirement is “where the contractual imbalance is so large as to call for an explanation.”672 This is an 
identical formulation to that expressed in Etridge in terms of undue influence. This gives rise to a 
rebuttable presumption. The presumption of impropriety in unconscionability can be rebutted in much 
the same way as the presumption of undue influence.673 Enonchong concludes by observing that the 
“presumption of unconscionable dealing is similar to the presumption of undue influence”674 that is, it 
is evidential in nature. 
 
In Turner v Windever,675 Austin J held that an important feature of both the doctrine of undue influence 
and unconscionability is that “they both employ equitable presumptions. In the case of undue influence, 
a presumption arises out of the anterior relationship of the parties. The In (sic) the case of 
unconscionable dealings, the presumption that unconscionable advantage is being taken of a disability 
                                                                                                                                                                       
667 Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd 55 DLR (2d) 710, per Davey JA, p 713. The elements were expressed as firstly, proof of 
inequality of the parties’ positions arising out of ignorance, need or distress of the weaker, leaving her at the mercy of the 
stronger party; and secondly proof of substantial unfairness of the bargain. 
See also discussion in Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484, per Lord Selborne LC, p 490-1; Chesterfield 
(Earl of) v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves. Sen 125 [28 ER 82], per Lord Hardwicke, p 101; and Blomley v Ryan [1954-56] 99 CLR 
362, per McTiernan J, p 385. 
See also M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 196. 
668 Fry v Lane (1889) 40 ChD 312, per Kay J, p 322. 
669 B E Crawford, ‘Restitution – Unconscionable Transaction – Undue Advantage Taken of Inequality Between Parties’ 
(1966) 44 Can Bar Rev 142, p 143. 
670 Chesterfield (Earl of) v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves. Sen 125 [28 ER 82], per Lord Hardwicke, p 101. 
671 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 17-022. 
672 Ibid para 17-027. 
673 Ibid para 17-030. 
674 Ibid para 18-007. Enonchong goes on to write that a significant difference is that in terms of unconscionability, 
transactional imbalance is enough to raise the presumption, but in a case of undue influence, transactional imbalance (that is 
a transaction that calls for explanation) is not enough to raise the evidential presumption. 
675 [2003] NSWSC 1147, per Austin J, para 130. 
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arises out of the position of the parties at the time of the transaction and the nature of the benefits 
passing under it.”676 
SPECIAL DISADVANTAGE 
The first element is that one party must be at a disadvantage or disability vis-à-vis the stronger party. In 
Fry v Lane677 the disadvantage that one must suffer in relation to another was held to be “poor and 
ignorant.”678 Cresswell v Potter679 held that in modern times, “the word “poor” to be replaced by 
“member of the lower income group”, and the word “ignorant” by “less highly educated.””680 In 
Portman Building Society v Dusangh681 the modern equivalent of poor and ignorant was held to be 
elderly, illiterate and on a very low income. The categories of disadvantage has been held to include 
“poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or 
lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary.”682 
Unfamiliarity with or imperfect English can also be a disadvantage.683 It has been acknowledged that it 
is “neither desirable nor indeed possible to attempt exhaustively to define or catalogue the 
circumstances which may amount to a material disability or disadvantage.”684 
 
To establish a special disadvantage within a relationship there is no need to show a fiduciary 
relationship.685 However, the level of disability or disadvantage required for equity to intervene needs 
to be determined. There needs to be an unequal relationship, and the relevant disadvantage needs to be 
assessed relative to the parties concerned, not as a disability in general. Therefore, if both the parties 
suffer from a disability, then this would not constitute a sufficient disadvantage.686 
                                                 
676 This was cited with approval in Janson v Janson [2007] NSWSC 1344. 
An appeal of the decision in Turner v Windever was rejected in Turner v Windever [2005] NSWCA 73. 
677 (1889) 40 ChD 312. 
678 Fry v Lane (1889) 40 ChD 312, per Kay J, p 322. 
679 Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255. 
680 Ibid, per Megarry J, p 257. See also discussion in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, per 
Nourse LJ at p 151, where he considers that recognition of the change in the categories “demonstrates that the jurisdiction is 
in good heart and capable of adaptation to different transactions entered into in changing circumstances. 
681 (2000) 80 P & CR D20, (cited 2000 WL 491447, Westlaw at 17 November 2007, Transcript). 
682 Blomley v Ryan [1954-56] 99 CLR 362, per Fullagar J, p 405. In Nichols v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226, at p 233, 
McMullin J held that the factors to be regarded are: poverty, ignorance, lack of independent advice, illness, age, inequality 
of bargaining power and inadequacy of consideration. 
683 R P Meagher, J D Heydon, and M J Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed 
2002), para 16-010. 
684 Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, per Tipping J, p 458. 
685 J P F Bogden, ‘On the “Agreement Most Foul”: A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Unconscionability’ Manitoba Law 
Journal, Vol 25 No 1 187, p 193. 
686 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 16-003-4. 
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Further, the disadvantage between the parties must be serious or special. The fact that one of the parties 
is in a stronger bargaining position is insufficient.687 In Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio688 
Mason J qualified the word “disadvantage” by adding the adjective “special” “in order to disavow any 
suggestion that the principle applies whenever there is some difference in the bargaining power of the 
parties and in order to emphasize that the disabling condition or circumstance is one which seriously 
affects the ability of the innocent party to make a judgment as to his own best interests.”689 The 
stronger party must know or ought to know of that disability.690 
 
In terms of the special disadvantage “the Australian courts have gone so far as to recognise that this 
could be inferred from the improvidence of the transaction, the modern English judges have hardly 
ventured out of the traditional categories such as “poor and ignorant””.691 In Bridgewater v Leahy692 an 
elderly uncle transferred to his nephew his interest in land, and forgave most of the purchase price. In 
his will, he gave his nephew an option to purchase further land. It was established in evidence that there 
was a close relationship between the uncle and nephew, and the uncle regarded his nephew as the son 
he never had. It was held that the relationship between the parties was such that, an unequal 
relationship was created when the nephew raised the question of acquiring the land. The nephew took 
advantage of his stronger position to obtain a benefit through a grossly improvident transaction at the 
expense of the uncle. Bridgewater v Leahy has been regarded as relaxing the requirement of special 
disadvantage to the extent that the case can “be interpreted as not requiring special disability, or at least 
widening the ambit of what can constitute special disability.”693 
 
In Elia v Commercial & Mortgage Nominees Ltd694 the plaintiff claimed that he was under a special 
disadvantage due to his ignorance and inexperience of legal and financial matters, unfamiliarity with 
written English, and his race.695 He also claimed there was a lack of assistance or explanation provided 
to him. Mr Elia invested in a rest home business from which he derived no benefit. It was held that the 
finance transactions were complex and any ordinary borrower would have found them difficult to 
follow. However, for Mr Elia, given his disadvantage, it would have been beyond him. It was held that 
                                                 
687 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 16-005. 
688 (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
689 Ibid, per Mason J, p 462. 
690 Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, per Tipping J, p 460. 
691 Enonchong, above n 687 para 20-018. See also R McKeand, ‘Economic Duress – Wearing the Clothes of 
Unconscionable Conduct’ 2001 JCL LEXIS 6 (cited Lexis.com at 3 July 2007). 
692 [1998] HCA 66. 
693 McKeand, above n 691 [*25]. 
694 (1988) 2 NZBLC 103,296. 
695 Elia v Commercial & Mortgage Nominees Ltd (1988) 2 NZBLC 103,296, per Gault J, p 103,304. 
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the defendants took advantage of Mr Elia’s “inability separately to make an informed judgment as to 
the transactions he became committed to.”696 It did not matter that Mr Elia did not protest or indicate 
his unwillingness. His disadvantages should have been apparent, and inquiries should have been made 
as to his level of comprehension. Therefore, there was a combination of the impaired ability of Mr Elia 
combined with the unconscionable conduct of the defendants that resulted in the finding of 
unconscionable conduct. 
 
Further, a distinction has been drawn between a disadvantage which is constitutional, and a 
disadvantage which is situational. Constitutional disadvantage derives from factors inherent in the 
weaker party, such as those discussed above, age, illness, poverty, inexperience or lack of education.697 
Situational disadvantage arises “from particular features of a relationship between actors in the 
transaction such as the emotional dependence of one on the other.”698 While drawing a distinction 
between the two types of disadvantage may be useful, it is important that “such descriptions do not take 
on a life of their own, in substitution for … the content of the law to which it refers. There is a risk that 
categories, adopted as a convenient method of exposition of an underlying principle, might be 
misunderstood, and come to supplant the principle.”699 
 
The issue of commercial (situational) disadvantage was considered in Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd.700 It was held that in the case of an experienced 
business person, something more than mere commercial vulnerability (however extreme) is needed to 
elevate disadvantage into special disadvantage. It was held that the disadvantage suffered in this case 
was a combination of poor commercial judgment (the decision to borrow heavily to purchase the 
business), and oversight in neglecting to exercise the option to renew the lease in good time. This did 
not amount to a special disadvantage. 
                                                 
696 Elia v Commercial & Mortgage Nominees Ltd (1988) 2 NZBLC 103,296, per Gault J, p 103,311. 
697 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd 189 ALR 76, per Gray, French and Stone 
JJ, p 92. 
698 Ibid. See also discussion by J P F Bogden, ‘On the “Agreement Most Foul”: A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of 
Unconscionability’ Manitoba Law Journal Vol 25 No 1 187, p 193. 
699 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 197 ALR 153, per Gleeson 
CJ, p 156-7. 
700 189 ALR 76. 
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Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd701 concerned the 
inequality of bargaining power between the lessees of business premises and the lessors, (the owners of 
the mall). The lessees were in a difficult bargaining position because they wanted to renew their lease, 
but had no option to do so. They needed to renew in order to proceed with the sale of their business. 
The lessors took opportunity of their bargaining position and required the lessees to discontinue any 
legal proceedings they were pursuing against the lessors. It was held that taking advantage of a superior 
bargaining position is not the same as unconscientious exploitation of another’s inability, or diminished 
ability to preserve one’s own interest.702 It was held in this case the lessees were not labouring under a 
special disadvantage: “many, perhaps even most, contracts are made between parties in unequal 
bargaining power.”703 It was also held that there was no unconscientious conduct on the part of the 
lessors, because “good conscience does not require parties to contractual negotiations to forfeit their 
advantages, or neglect their own interests.”704 
EXPLOITATION 
The second element to establish an unconscionable bargain is the exploitation of the special 
disadvantage by the stronger party in circumstances that amount to actual or equitable fraud. Related to 
this element is some procedural impropriety on the part of the stronger party which can be established 
or presumed.705 The element of procedural impropriety is not mandatory but will often be a feature in 
cases.706 The interaction of procedural and substantive unfairness was discussed in O’Conner v Hart:707 
If a contract is stigmatised as “unfair”, it may be unfair in one of two ways. It may be unfair by reason of the unfair 
manner in which it was brought into existence … It will be convenient to call this “procedural unfairness”. It may 
also, in some contexts, be described (accurately or inaccurately) as “unfair” by reason of the fact that the terms of 
the contract are more favourable to one party than to the other … it will be convenient to call it “contractual 
imbalance”. The two concepts may overlap. Contractual imbalance may be so extreme as to raise a presumption of 
procedural unfairness such as undue influence or some other form of victimisation. Equity will relieve a party from 
a contract which he has been induced to make as a result of victimisation. Equity will not relieve a party from a 
contract on the ground only that there is a contractual imbalance not amounting to unconscionable dealing.708 
                                                 
701 (2003) 197 ALR 153. The decision was based on a provision of the Australian statute, the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
However, it still has general significance in the law of unconscionability. See the discussion by S Todd, Burrows Finn & 
Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 371. 
702 (2003) 197 ALR 153, per Gleeson CJ, p 157. 
703 Ibid. 
704 Ibid. 
705 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, per Tipping J, p 118-9. 
706 Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, per Tipping J, p 460; and O’Connor v Hart [1985] 1 NZLR 159. 
See also Australian Competition & Consumer Comm v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 197 ALR 153 where the court 
made the distinction between constitutional and situational disadvantage. 
See also discussion by N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), 
para 15.4; and S Worthington, Equity (2003), p 200. 
707 [1985] 1 NZLR 159. 
708 Ibid, per Lord Brightman, p 166. See also discussion in Rosen v Rosen 3 RFL (4th) 267 Ont CA, per Grange JA, p 273-4. 
An appeal brought by the husband against an order setting aside a separation agreement on the ground of unconscionability. 
The appeal was allowed. In terms of unconscionability it was held the doctrine of unconscionability does not seek to make 
equal, the bargaining strengths of the parties. In terms of grossly inadequate consideration, this is not a ground to set aside a 
 109
 
In Boustany v Pigott709 Lord Templeton held that the fact that a bargain is hard, unreasonable or foolish 
is insufficient to establish unconscionability. The stronger party must have “imposed the objectionable 
terms in a morally reprehensible manner, that is to say, in a way which affects his conscience.”710 This 
has alternatively been expressed as conduct by the stronger party “that can be characterised by some 
moral culpability or impropriety,” in that it is “not right that the strong should be allowed to push the 
weak to the wall.”711 
 
The doctrine of unconscionability by its nature looks at the conduct of the stronger party. There must 
be some impropriety on the part of the defendant.712 However, the issue as to how much moral 
wrongdoing the stronger party must demonstrate, has been an issue in unconscionability cases, as it has 
featured in undue influence cases. It must be shown that the defendant knew of the disadvantage and 
took advantage of it. The test is constructive, not actual knowledge. “That is, if the stronger party had 
reason to know of the other’s disadvantage, that is enough,”713 or alternatively, “when a reasonable 
man would have adverted to the possibility of its existence.”714 The unconscionable conduct, or 
victimisation by the stronger party, has been held to “consist either of the active extortion of a benefit 
or the passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances.”715 The result of the 
unconscionable conduct has been expressed as affecting the conscience of the stronger party to the 
extent that the stronger party “cannot in all good conscience enforce or take advantage of this 
bargain.”716 
                                                                                                                                                                       
contract that has been freely entered into. “It is the taking advantage of that ability to prey upon the other party that 
produces the unconscionability.” 
See also Nichols v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226, McMullin J p 233. 
709 (1995) 69 P & CR 298. 
710 Ibid, per Lord Templeman, p 303. 
711 Ibid. 
712 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 17-002-17-003. Enonchong writes 
that the reason for impropriety is because without it, the doctrine of unconscionability would be too wide. “The second 
reason for the requirement of impropriety is that since the ground for relief is the unconscientious conduct of the defendant, 
it would be strange if relief were available where there was nothing unconscientious in the defendant’s conduct.” 
713 N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), para 15.9. See also R 
P Meagher, J D Heydon, and M J Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed 2002), 
para 16-010. 
714 Nichols v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226, per Somers J, p 235. 
715 O’Connor v Hart [1985] 1 NZLR 159, per Lord Brightman, p 171. See also Nichols v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226 p 232-
4; and Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 at [75]. 
716 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, per Tipping J, p 119; and Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd 
[1992] 1 NZLR 449, per Tipping J, p 457. In terms of surety cases, “it is necessary to show that the conscience of the party 
who seeks to uphold the transaction was affected by notice, actual or constructive, of the impropriety by which it was 
obtained by the intermediary”, Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, per Millett LJ, p 153. 
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The difficulty in cases arises when there appears to be no unconscionable conduct on the part of the 
stronger party. In O’Conner v Hart717 Mr O’Conner did not have sufficient mental capacity to enter 
into the agreement but this was not known to Mr Hart. On his death, the trustees of Mr O’Conner’s 
trust estate sought to have it set aside on the grounds of unfairness and unconscionability. It was held 
that Mr Hart’s conduct was above reproach and he had done nothing wrong. It was held that the 
doctrine of unconscionability would not assist a claimant “where there was no victimisation, no taking 
advantage of another’s weakness, and the sole allegation was contractual imbalance with no undertones 
of constructive fraud.”718 There must be an element of unfairness that amounts to equitable fraud.719 
The contract was upheld and not set aside on the ground of unconscionable bargain because Mr Hart 
was not guilty of any unconscionable conduct. He had acted with complete innocence throughout, and 
was unaware of the unsoundness of mind. 
 
The Court of Appeal was faced with a similar issue in Nichols v Jessup.720 The Court of Appeal 
criticised the Privy Council in O’Conner v Hart because no arguments were heard as to whether the 
agreement was fair or not, because disparity of consideration is a factor when deciding whether a case 
of unconscionable bargains has been proved. With regard to the conduct of the stronger party, it was 
held that it is not necessary to provide: 
… proof of an active extortion of a benefit, an abuse of confidence, a lack of good faith by the party seeking to 
hold the bargain. Accepting the benefit of an improvident bargain by an ignorant person acting without 
independent advice which cannot be shown to be fair, may be unconscionable. Such a transaction may affect the 
conscience of the party who benefits from it.721 
However, that statement was not intended to negate the importance of objective considerations and the 
requirement to establish overreaching behaviour.722 
 
Cooke P held that the plaintiff did not set out to intentionally exploit the defendant. However, given the 
disparity in contractual values, the plaintiff must have at some stage realised the imbalance in the 
arrangement. The plaintiff should have done more to ensure the defendant received adequate 
independent legal advice. Further, the plaintiff “must have been well aware of the defendant’s 
characteristics and must have known or suspected that she was no judge of her own interests.”723 (The 
trial judge found that the defendant was ignorant about property rights, unintelligent and muddleheaded 
and her judgment in business matters were swayed by irrelevant considerations.) 
                                                 
717 [1985] 1 NZLR 159. 
718 Ibid, per Lord Brightman, p 171. 
719 Ibid, per Lord Brightman, p 174. 
720 [1986] 1 NZLR 226. 
721 Ibid, per McMullin J, p 234. 
722 Ibid, per McMullin J, p 234. 
723 Ibid, per Cooke P, p 231. 
 111
 
In a recent Court of Appeal case Gustav & Co Limited v Macfield Limited,724 the sole director of the 
appellant company was diagnosed with terminal cancer. He entered into a transaction to purchase 
commercial property at a premium shortly before his death. It was held that due to the cancer and the 
associated medical treatment, he was under a qualifying disability or disadvantage. However, despite 
the fact that the purchaser “looked terminal,” he had days where he was lucid, mentally acute, and 
business-like. He gave the impression that he knew what he was doing. It was held that the vendor did 
not have the requisite knowledge of the disadvantage. It was the purchaser who initiated the offer to 
buy, and it was subject to a full due diligence process. Further, it was held that despite knowing that the 
purchaser had terminal cancer, and that there was no joint venture or funding arrangements in place, 
there was no duty on the vendors to make further enquiries. 
 
Therefore, while it is generally accepted that the basis of unconscionable bargains is the conduct of the 
stronger party, the issues regarding the level of moral culpability arise in the context of 
unconscionability as well as undue influence.725 Later discussion will illustrate that rebutting the 
presumption of fraud, and the role of independent advice, serves different purposes under the doctrine 
of undue influence as compared with unconscionability. 
SUBSTANTIAL INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION 
In order to successfully challenge a contract on the basis of unconscionability, substantive unfairness is 
an element to be considered. A large component of this is inadequacy of consideration, “and the 
stronger party either knows or ought to know that to be so.”726 Inadequacy of consideration alone is 
insufficient to establish unconscionability.727 However, it is a powerful evidential tool.728 “It may be 
important in either or both of two ways – firstly as supporting the inference that a position of 
disadvantage existed, and secondly as tending to show that an unfair use was made of the occasion.”729 
                                                 
724 CA 168/05 [2007] NZCA 205. 
725 See also the discussion by D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, 
p 485. Capper lists recklessness and improvidence as one of the categories of disadvantage. He notes that the cases that 
support this category are remarkable as equity does not relieve people from the consequences of their own folly. However, 
he notes that the cases that he cites included an element of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant because the plaintiff was 
unaware of the value of property and was deceived into selling it at a much lower price. 
726 Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, per Tipping J, p 460. 
727 Blomley v Ryan [1954-56] 99 CLR 362, per Fullgar J, p 405. 
728 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 486. 
729 Above n 727, per Fullgar J, p 405. 
See also N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 18-001. Enonchong writes that 
in some cases the transactional imbalance may be so great that the court is left “with no option but to draw an inference that 
the disadvantaged party must have been under some special disability or that the stronger party must have taken advantage 
of the disability of the weaker party or both.” He describes this inference “as a presumption of unconscionable dealing.” 
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While transactional imbalance is a strong evidential factor, it is recognised that there may be some 
cases where a transaction may be unconscionable even if the values of the exchange are relatively 
equal.730 
 
The level of transactional imbalance required to establish unconscionability has varied within different 
jurisdictions.731 In English law a high degree of transactional imbalance must be shown. “The 
complainant must show that the terms of the transaction were “harsh or oppressive” or “overreaching 
and oppressive.””732 The phrase employed in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd733 
is that it “shocks the conscience of the court.”734 
 
The difficulty in establishing a case on the ground of unconscionable bargain in England is illustrated 
in Portman Building Society v Dusangh.735 A 25 year mortgage was granted by Mr Dusangh when he 
was 72 and retired. Mr Dusangh had come to live in England from India. His understanding of spoken 
English was poor, and he was illiterate. Part of the loan was used to pay off the existing mortgage, and 
the remainder of the money was paid to his son for use in the son’s business. The business failed. In 
defence of mortgage proceedings, Mr Dusangh relied on inter alia unconscionable bargains. It was held 
that the transaction was an improvident one. The ability of his son to make repayments depended on the 
                                                 
730 See Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 449, per Tipping J, p 460; where it was held that “inadequacy of 
consideration is not mandatory but will almost always be present.” 
See also S M Waddams, ‘Unconscionability In Contracts’ (1976) 39 Mod L Rev 369, p 392; and J D McCamus, Essentials 
of Canadian Law The Law of Contracts (2005), p 407. 
Lindsay v Lindsay 21 RFL (3d) 34, (cited 1989 CarswellMan 44, Westlaw), per Kroft J, para 42 held that “the fact that an 
agreement is unwise or one-sided is not tantamount to unconscionability. No court should relieve a person from 
responsibility for a contract entered into willingly and knowingly, even where the contract is an act of folly.” 
731 A Mason, ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing’, (2000) 116 LQR 66; and A Mason, ‘The 
Place of Equity and Equitable Doctrines in the Contemporary Common Law World: An Australian Perspective’ in D W M 
Waters (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1993) writes that in Australia, (as compared with England); unconscionability 
has relegated undue influence to a position of relative unimportance. Whereas in England, unconscionability as an 
independent ground for relief does not loom large. 
L McMurtry, ‘Unconscionability and Undue Influence: an Interaction’ Conv 2000 Nov/Dec 573 (cited Westlaw at 13 
August 2006), where McMurtry argues that the requirement of affirmative proof of unconscionable conduct, or inferring the 
conduct from an inexplicable transaction, has limited development of the doctrine of unconscionability in England. 
N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 18-004-5. Enonchong goes on to assert 
that it is because there is no need to show transactional imbalance in Australia that it has enabled Australia to use the 
doctrine of unconscionability in the context of tripartite transactions. 
See also R P Meagher, J D Heydon, and M J Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies 
(4th ed 2002), para 16-005; and S Worthington, Equity (2003), p 200. 
732 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 18-004. 
733 [1983] 1 WLR 87. 
734 Ibid, per Peter Millett QC, p 95. See Humphreys v Humphreys [2004] EWHC 2201, where the claim for undue influence 
succeeded, but unconscionable bargains did not because it was not sufficiently disadvantageous for the purposes of 
unconscionable bargains. Portman Building Society v Dusangh (2000) 80 P & CR D20, (cited 2000 WL 491447, Westlaw at 
17 November 2007, Transcript), per Ward LJ, p 11, where the case lacked “moral outrage” and “the moral conscience of the 
court [was not] shocked.” See also discussion by K N Scott, ‘Evolving Equity and the Presumption of Undue Influence’ 
(2002) 18 JCL 15, 2002 JCL LEXIS 15, (cited Lexis.com at 10 February 2006), [*16]-[*17]. 
735 (2000) 80 P & CR D20, (cited 2000 WL 491447, Westlaw at 17 November 2007 Transcript). 
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success of a risky supermarket venture, and the father did not receive any benefit from the transaction. 
However, the transaction was held to be not overreaching and oppressive. It was held by Ward LJ that 
the son had not exploited the father in a way that would affect his conscience. There was a lack of 
moral outrage in the case and the moral conscience of the court was not shocked. 
 
In New Zealand and Australia a striking transactional imbalance is not essential.736 In Gustav & Co 
Limited v Macfield Limited737 Arnold J held that a marked imbalance in consideration is usually present 
in unconscionability cases, but it is not a prerequisite for relief. “However, if there is no significant 
imbalance in consideration or if the weaker party received full independent advice it is unlikely that 
any issue of unconscionability will arise.”738 Similarly in Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee739 it was held 
that the focus must be on the conduct of the stronger party. Transactional imbalance “is a factor for 
consideration it is not the touchstone.”740 All the circumstances of the case must be assessed, the 
special disadvantage, independent advice, the terms of the contract, and whether the disability was 
known, or should have been known by the stronger party. Equity will intervene if one party has 
“obtained benefits or have accepted benefits in unconscionable circumstances.”741 In Commercial Bank 
of Australia v Amadio742 Deane J held that in most cases of unconscionable dealing, inadequacy of 
consideration will be present. However, a transaction may be unconscionable (unfair, unreasonable and 
unjust) even if adequate consideration has moved from the stronger party to the weaker.743 
 
Dusangh can be contrasted with Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd.744 Both cases share similar facts: 
elderly parents who wanted to financially help their child in a business venture. In Bowkett the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal held that there was a dramatic inadequacy of consideration as the parents 
received nothing apart from the benefit of assisting their son. The circumstances of the case did shock 
the conscience of the court, and relief was granted. Similarly in Nichols v Jessup745 the consideration to 
                                                 
736 See Blomley v Ryan [1954-56] 99 CLR 362; Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Louth v 
Diprose (1992) 110 ALR 1; and Nichols v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226. N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and 
Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 18-005. Enonchong writes that transaction imbalance is not required in Australia. He 
considers that “[i]n Australia there appears to be only two requirements for relief on the ground of unconscionable dealing 
(special disability and unconscientious conduct of the defendant) and transactional imbalance is not one of them.” Similar 
conclusions were drawn by N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 
2002), para 15.7. 
737 CA 168/05 [2007] NZCA 205. 
738 Ibid, per Arnold J, para 31. 
739 [1992] 2 NZLR 157. 
740 Ibid, per Richardson J, p 174. 
741 Ibid, per Richardson J, p 174. 
742 (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
743 Ibid, per Deane J, p 475. 
744 [1992] 1 NZLR 449. 
745 [1986] 1 NZLR 226. 
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be received by the defendant was grossly inadequate. However, in addition to that, the defendant was at 
a disadvantage, and she received no independent legal advice. The contract was set aside. Therefore, in 
New Zealand and Australia, transactional imbalance is an important evidential factor, but it has not 
been elevated to the same level as required in England.746 
 
A significant point of differentiation between the English and Australian jurisdiction is whether or not 
the doctrine of unconscionability applies to gifts. English authorities have held that unconscionable 
bargains do not apply to gifts.747 The nature of a gift is that it is a one sided transaction without the 
element of a bargain. An example is Langton v Langton.748 In Langton, the plaintiff transferred his 
property to his son and his daughter-in-law after he had been released from jail for murdering his wife. 
The plaintiff had undergone a serious of operations, and was dependent upon his son and daughter-in-
law for his daily care. He gifted his house to them. When the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendants soured, they asked him to leave the house. He sought to have the gift set aside on the 
grounds of actual and presumed undue influence and unconscionability. 
 
He succeeded on the ground of undue influence. It was held that it is better to deal with gifts under the 
doctrine of undue influence. Despite considerable similarities between the doctrines of presumed undue 
influence and unconscionability, the crucial difference is that the doctrine of unconscionable bargains 
does not apply to gifts. If gifts were included into unconscionable bargains it would encroach onto the 
jurisdiction of undue influence. Further, if unconscionable bargains applied to gifts, then all gifts from 
poor and ignorant persons without independent advice will always shift the burden to the donee to 
prove that the gift was fair and reasonable. 
 
Langton has been criticised, and academic writers are in support of the Australian stance, that 
unconscionability applies to gifts as well as to bargains.749 Louth v Diprose750 held that “gifts can also 
potentially be classified as having been unconscionably extracted, even though no consideration passes 
                                                 
746 See also Stuart v Wain & Naysmith [2001] DCR 61. In the case there was an agreement that the plaintiff would be paid 
$100,000 in return for six months of companionship to the defendant. The defendant was lonely, elderly, and of ill health. It 
was held that this may have been excessive and disproportionate, but it did not render the contract unconscionable. 
747 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 195. 
748 [1995] 2 FLR 890. 
749 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 482, argues that the term 
relational inequality, not inequality of bargaining power, should be utilised so that it does not imply that unconscionable 
bargains does not apply to gifts. 
See also M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 195; and N Enonchong, Duress, 
Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 20-003. 
750 (1992) 110 ALR 1, per Brennan J, p 5. 
 115
at all.”751 There is no New Zealand authority that discusses the doctrine of unconscionability in relation 
to gifts. However, Lord Brightman’s statement in O’Conner v Hart752 where he held that “an 
unconscionable bargain [is] a bargain of an improvident character made by a poor or ignorant person 
acting without independent advice which cannot be shown to be a fair and reasonable transaction” has 
been regarded as reflecting the view that the doctrine of unconscionability does not apply to gifts.753 
However, given that in New Zealand and Australia, substantial inadequacy of consideration is simply a 
factor to be considered, and not elevated to the standard required by English cases, it is arguable that in 
New Zealand the doctrine applies to gifts as it does in Australia. 
UNDUE INFLUENCE AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 
Much has been written on the similarities between undue influence and unconscionability. To many the 
distinctions between the doctrines are becoming blurred,754 and therefore there have been calls to 
merge the two doctrines. In some judgments it is often difficult to distinguish between the two.755 
Bridgewater v Leahy756 held “[e]ach doctrine may be seen as a species of that genus of equitable 
intervention to refuse enforcement of or to set aside transactions which if allowed to stand, would 
offend equity and good conscience.”757 
1. Similarities 
The doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability share much in common.758 The first is that 
procedural impropriety underlies both of the doctrines.759 Both doctrines are anti-exploitation 
devices,760 “designed to mitigate the risk of abuse by the stronger party of his position of special 
advantage.”761 Both doctrines require that the stronger party be aware of their influence, or the other 
party’s disadvantage, and an obligation on the stronger party to ensure that the weaker party has made 
                                                 
751 M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) 
NZULR 509, p 523. 
752 [1985] 1 NZLR 159, p 171. 
753 Conaglen, above n 751 p 523. 
754 Barclay’s Bank plc v Goff [2001] EWCA Civ 635. P Vout, (ed and Current Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct 
The Laws of Australia (2006), para 35.9:33. 
755 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002) para 14.1. 
756 [1998] HCA 66. 
757 Ibid, per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ, para 73. 
758 S Todd, Burrows Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 369. See also discussion by Millett LJ 
in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, p 153. 
759 M Chen-Wishart, ‘The O’Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness’ Cambridge LJ 56(1), March 1997, 60, p 64. 
Clarke, R W, Inequality of Bargaining Power (1987), p 251. Clarke argues that Lord Scarman’s perspective in Morgan that 
undue influence involves the victimisation of the weak by the strong emphasizes the unitary nature of undue influence and 
unconscionability. 
760 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 398-9. 
761 I J Hardingham, ‘Unconscionable Dealing’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985), p 18. 
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an independent and informed decision.762 Transactional imbalance is a potent evidential factor in both. 
As discussed earlier, the evidential presumption of fraud in an unconscionability case is raised in much 
the same way as the evidential presumption of undue influence. 
 
More importantly however, both doctrines can be utilised to the same effect.763 There are some cases 
that could easily be decided on either ground of undue influence or unconscionability. For instance, 
Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy could have been either a case on undue influence, unconscionability, or 
both.764 While Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien was a case on misrepresentation and undue influence, it 
has been considered an application of unconscionability.765 
 
Louth v Diprose766 is an example of how the two doctrines can be utilised to give the same result. The 
relationship between the parties was one of immense love, devotion and infatuation on the part of Mr 
Diprose, which was not reciprocated by Ms Louth. Mr Diprose was under an immense degree of 
emotional dependence on Ms Louth. It was held that he was extremely susceptible to Ms Louth’s 
influence. She exploited his infatuation by engineering a situation of crisis, for which he purchased a 
house in her name. It was held that Mr Diprose was under a special disability that arose from his 
infatuation. This lead to a situation of extraordinary vulnerability to Ms Louth’s actions.767 As a result, 
Mr Diprose was able to retain the house he purchased for Ms Louth. However, the manipulation of Mr 
Diprose’s infatuation to Ms Louth’s advantage could quite easily fit under the jurisdiction of undue 
influence. 
 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Ohlson768 was also such a case. The appellant was an 82 year 
old woman who borrowed money and secured it to her house for the benefit of her son. At the time she 
signed the documents the funds had already been advanced to the son. The bank structured the 
transaction as a loan as opposed to a guarantee, and it deprived Mrs Ohlson of independent advice. It 
was held that in substance, the transaction was a guarantee, and it was unconscionable to Mrs Ohlson. 
The doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability were described as twins, and amorphous in 
nature.769 
                                                 
762 I J Hardingham, ‘Unconscionable Dealing’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985), p 18. 
763 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 192. 
764 J D McCamus, Essentials of Canadian Law The Law of Contracts (2005), p 365. 
765 Pawlowski and Brown, above n 763 p 191; and M Chen-Wishart, ‘The O’Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness’ 
Cambridge LJ 56(1), March 1997, 60, p 62. 
766 (1992) 110 ALR 1. 
767 Ibid, per Deane J, p 14. 
768 154 DLR (4th) 33, (cited 1997 CarswellAlta 1050, Westlaw). 
769 Ibid, per Conrad JA, para 19. 
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Alirezai v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited770 and Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland NV v Burch771 both applied the concepts of unconscionable bargains and undue influence on 
the facts. In Alirezai McMurdo P held that unconscionability exists “when the inequality of a 
relationship between two people gives one a measure of influence or ascendancy over the other of 
which the dominant person takes unfair advantage and abuses that influence.”772 He cited Garcia v 
National Australia Bank Ltd773 in support of this. However, he also cited Etridge because in his view 
“an unequal relationship existed between the borrower, (the husband), and the surety, (the wife, who 
mortgaged the matrimonial home), giving the borrower a measure of influence or ascendancy over the 
surety.”774 Similarly in Burch it was held that the unconscionability of the transaction was directly 
material to the case based on undue influence.775 Therefore the two doctrines can be applied in the 
same doctrinal manner to the same facts.776 
2. A Unique New Zealand Perspective 
A distinct New Zealand development has come in the area of disability vis-à-vis undue influence. In 
England a complainant’s disability may not constitute undue influence.777 This was illustrated in Irvani 
v Irvani778 where it was held that the relationship of undue influence could not arise out of a condition 
of chronic intoxication.779 The relationship may arise if the dominant party assumes a role of guardian 
or adviser to the inebriate. Buxton LJ regarded the New Zealand case of Brusewitz v Brown780as 
incorrect. 
 
In Brusewitz, Mr Brusewitz was 66 years old, separated from his wife and family and living by himself 
in a hotel. He suffered from poor health as a result of chronic alcoholism. Four months before his death  
                                                 
770 [2004] QCA 6, [2004] Q ConvR 54-601, (cited 2004 WL 227507, Westlaw at 10 February 2006). 
771 [1997] 1 All ER 144. See also the approach of the Privy Council in Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2004] 
2 NZLR 577; and Mahoney v Purnell [1996] 3 All ER 61, per May J, p 81-2. Further discussion below p 133 on Mahoney v 
Purnell. 
772 Above n 770, per McMurdo P, para 39. 
773 155 ALR 614. 
774 Ibid. 
775 [1997] 1 All ER 144, per Nourse LJ, p 151. 
776 L Ho, ‘Undue Influence: When and How it Matters to Banks and Solicitors’ [2002] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
617, p 624. Ho also draws similarities with the doctrinal approach of unconscionability, and the undue influence approach in 
Etridge. The two concepts of undue influence and unconscionable bargains were also merged in arguments in White v State 
Bank of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 241. 
777 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 10-031. 
778 [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 412. 
779 A more recent English case of Macklin v Dowsett [2004] EWCA Civ 904 also appears contrary to Irvani. In considering 
whether there was a relationship of trust and confidence, the financial disparity of the parties was considered. This was 
crouched in similar terms to unconscionable bargains. 
780 [1923] NZLR 1106. See also discussion above p 68. 
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he transferred to the defendant, Mr Brown a mortgage for £1,000 for an annuity of £108, payable by 
monthly instalments. The mortgage was effectively Mr Brusewitz’s only asset and therefore a grossly 
improvident transaction. The relationship between Mr Brusewitz and Mr Brown was not just one of a 
friend and trusted companion, but also a trusted agent. Mr Brown collected money for Mr Brusewitz 
and cashed cheques on his behalf. Salmond J found that far from trying to protect Mr Brusewitz from 
his drinking problem, it became Mr Brown’s daily habit to drink with Mr Brusewitz in the hotels of 
Nelson. It was held that the combination of the factors of alcoholism, isolation from his family, ill 
health, and his relationship with Mr Brown raised the presumption of undue influence. It is important to 
note that it was not the alcoholism alone which raised the presumption; it was a combination of factors. 
Cases that have cited Brusewitz have cited it as a case concerned with unconscionability.781 
 
Richardson v Harris782 illustrates that certain fact scenarios can constitute both undue influence and 
unconscionability. However, the importance of the case is that the Supreme Court considered that a 
relationship of unequal power created a relationship of influence. In the case, Mr Harris was “a farm 
labourer of weak character and possessing an intelligence which is not of a high order.”783 Mr Harris 
had creditors who were pressing him to borrow money on his life interest to settle debts. Mr 
Richardson was a money-lender who was described as shrewd and experienced. He had had previous 
dealings with Mr Harris. He knew of Mr Harris’ financial difficulties, and impoverished circumstances, 
and inexperience in matters of finance. Mr Harris sold to Mr Richardson his life interest in a sum of 
£7,250 for £1,750 and the placing of adequate life insurance by Mr Richardson. 
 
The Supreme Court held that this was a case of undue influence. It was held that the relationship 
between a “bankrupt and dullard” versus a “shrewd experienced money-lender”784 created a 
relationship of influence. This relationship of influence was not based on any established presumptions; 
it arose from the “conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the particular case.”785 This 
relationship of influence was not rebutted by Mr Richardson, and the transaction was set aside. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a person in the position of Mr Harris is normally protected as an 
expectant heir, under unconscionable bargains. Mr Richardson failed to discharge the burden placed on 
                                                 
781 In the Marriage of JW and AM Gebert (1990) 14 Fam LR 62. It was also cited in Krambousanos v Jedda Investments Pty 
Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 604 in relation to the issue of a solicitor’s retainer which does not involve a duty to give advice 
regarding the propriety of a transaction. 
782 [1930] NZLR 890 (SC). 
783 Ibid, per Herdman J, p 891. 
784 Ibid, per Herdman J, p 899. 
785 Ibid, per Herdman J, p 900. 
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him to prove that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable. It was held that this was an 
unconscionable bargain. 
 
A further example is Westpac Banking Corporation v Chang.786 The case involved a claim by Mrs 
Chang of undue influence and unconscionable bargains on the part of her husband for a mortgage 
executed in favour of Westpac Banking Corporation. Mrs Chang argued that she could not speak or 
write English, she had never had a paid job, and she had been a housewife all her married life. It was 
held that Mrs Chang was induced to sign the mortgage based on the undue influence of her husband. It 
was held that the influence was very clear, because Mrs Chang did not speak English and did not 
understand what she was signing. Given that she was totally dependant on her husband, undue 
influence was established.787 
 
In Milsom v Mazey and Ritz Hair Fashions788 Heron J cites Brusewitz v Brown as an authority where a 
disability is considered a weakness under the undue influence doctrine. In Milsom v Mazey and Ritz 
Hair Fashions, the relationship that developed between Miss Milsom and Mr Mazey arose out of her 
marriage break up. She had lost custody of her children and was clearly unwell from drinking and drug 
taking. She was also admitted to a mental hospital. She was clearly dominated by Mr Mazey, and 
unduly influenced to enter into purchasing his hairdressing business, a transaction that was 
unfavourable to her, and the contract was set aside. 
3. Which Doctrine is “Wider”? 
If the argument is made to merge undue influence and unconscionability, authorities and academics 
have considered the question as to which doctrine is wider than the other. The basis of this discussion is 
to determine which one should be subsumed by the other. The majority of the academic and text writers 
consider that unconscionability is wider than undue influence.789 Undue influence can be 
                                                 
786 HC CH CP 120/98 [1 December 1998]. 
787 However, in terms of unconscionable conduct it was held that Mrs Chang’s disability arose from her inability to 
understand English. As there was no evidence to suggest that the Bank knew of this disability, Mrs Chang failed on the 
ground of unconscionable bargains. Because the Bank had no notice of the disability, Master Venning did not discuss 
whether Mr Chang’s conduct to his wife was unconscionable. 
788 HC CH A159/84 [May 30 1985]. 
789 S M Waddams, ‘Unconscionability In Contracts’ (1976) 39 Mod L Rev 369, p 387; D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and 
Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 498; J P F Bogden, ‘On the “Agreement Most Foul”: A 
Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Unconscionability’ Manitoba Law Journal Vol 25 No 1 187, p 190-1; and A Mason, 
‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World’ (1994) 110 LQR 238, p 249. 
Chen-Wishart, M, Unconscionable Bargains (1989), p 42. Chen-Wishart argues that unconscionability is more expansive 
than undue influence because unconscionability can extend to “those who act, not through their own influence but through 
the influence or advantage of others.” (She was writing here about third party rights). However, it is submitted that this is 
not correct as third parties can be held accountable under undue influence pursuant to the doctrine of constructive notice. 
 120
conceptualised as a species of unconscionable conduct790 for a number of reasons. Undue influence 
requires some personal relationship between the parties (whether there is an actual relationship or one 
presumed by the law). The need to prove a relationship of trust and confidence limits undue 
influence.791 Further, unconscionability can be considered to be wider than undue influence because, in 
theory, an agreement that is brought about because of undue influence is highly likely to be 
unconscionable, or alternatively, an unconscionable bargain can exist without undue influence.792 
 
However, the arguments that undue influence is wider than unconscionability are also as strong and 
compelling. “Snell’s Principles of Equity treats undue influence as the dominant category of 
constructive fraud, followed by abuse of confidence and, finally, unconscionable bargains. This is a 
familiar pattern in all modern textbooks.”793 Further, the limited nature of unconscionability in the 
English jurisdiction is an example that undue influence is wider. Unconscionable bargains have been 
considered an “offshoot”794 of undue influence. 
 
Langton v Langton795 discussed the issue. It was held that the underlying basis to the doctrine of 
unconscionability was to protect persons who were persuaded to enter into an unfair or unconscionable 
bargain. Equity imposed an onus to prove that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable, and to 
protect a weaker party from those in a position to take advantage of them. It was held that an 
unconscionable bargain fits within the rationale behind the class 2B presumption796 arising from 
O’Brien: that is the nature of the relationship between the vendor and purchaser which arises because 
of the nature of the transaction concluded, coupled with the dominating characteristic of the vendor. It 
was held that unconscionable bargain cases with poor and ignorant people could, and should be treated 
as undue influence cases.797 It is unclear from the judgment whether the judge was treating all 
categories of special disability as falling within undue influence, or purely poor and ignorant people. 
                                                 
790 S Todd, Burrows Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 369. 
791 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 498. 
792 J P F Bogden, ‘On the “Agreement Most Foul”: A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Unconscionability’ Manitoba Law 
Journal Vol 25 No 1 187, p 190-1. Bogden concedes that in practice the distinction between the doctrines is not as acute. 
Enonchong also agrees. He writes that conduct can fall short of undue influence, yet may still amount to impropriety for the 
purposes of unconscionability. N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 17-012. 
See also Zabolotney v Szyjak 5 Man R (2d) 107, (cited 1980 CarswellMan 249, Westlaw). 
793 M Halliwell, Equity & Good Conscience in a Contemporary Context (1997), p 44. 
794 Fridman, G H L, The Law of Contract in Canada (5th ed, 2006), p 321. 
795 [1995] 2 FLR 890. 
796 There is also a close correlation between class 2B, actual undue influence and duress. 
797 Wilson argues that class 2B “bears the strongest comparison with the Australian unconscionability cases.” P Wilson, 
‘Unconscionability and fairness in Australian equitable jurisprudence’ 2004 APLJ LEXIS 19 (cited Lexis.com at 10 
February 2006), [*72]-[*73]. 
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However, His Honour did appear to use the phrase “poor and ignorant” as a short hand for special 
disability. 
 
Despite the volume of debate as to which doctrine is wider than the other, it is submitted that this 
debate is unnecessary. Ultimately, the basis for any subsumption of one doctrine into another depends 
on whether one doctrine can encapsulate the other in terms of proof, and outcome in cases. Any merger 
also depends on the doctrines sharing enough doctrinal elements. The discussion below as to the 
differences between the doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability will show that neither 
doctrine share the same exact characteristics. 
4. Differences 
To some, the doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability are distinct and separate.798 The 
special disadvantage or disability is more difficult to establish than a relationship of trust and 
confidence. Further, undue influence has a level of “subtlety which unconscientious dealing lacks.”799 
Glover gives an example of a man who threatens to shoot himself unless his wife signs a contract. For 
unconscionable bargains, she would not be under a special disability, nor would her cognitive faculties 
have been impaired. The situation would be “objectionable because of the way in which motives were 
produced antecedent to consent.”800 She would therefore, succeed under undue influence.801 
 
In Wilkinson v ASB Bank Ltd802 Blanchard J approached the issue of the interaction between undue 
influence and unconscionable bargains as if they were two separate doctrines in their own right. There 
were no attempts to reconcile the two doctrines, even though cases that seem to blur the distinction 
were cited, such as Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch. Similarly in Humphreys v 
Humphreys803 Rimer J considered undue influence and unconscionability as two separate doctrines. 
Rimer J held that the trust deed was executed by a mother under the influence of her son. The Judge 
reached this conclusion using the evidential presumption established in Etridge. However, in terms of 
unconscionability, it was held that the son did not act with sufficient moral culpability to enable a 
finding on unconscionable bargains. 
                                                 
798 B E Crawford, ‘Restitution – Unconscionable Transaction – Undue Advantage Taken of Inequality Between Parties’ 
(1966) 44 Can Bar Rev 142, p 143. 
799 J Glover, Equity, Restitution & Fraud (2004), p 282. 
800 Ibid. 
801 Glover was discussing this issue in his comparison of undue influence and unconscionability. However, given the fact 
scenario he has outlined, the wife could also succeed under duress. 
802 [1998] 1 NZLR 674. 
803 [2004] EWHC 2201. 
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Irvani v Irvani804 is a recent case that considered the difference between undue influence and 
unconscionable bargains. Buxton LJ treated undue influence and unconscionability as distinct. It was 
held that undue influence was concerned with prior relationships between the contracting parties, and 
the motivations for entering into the contract. On the other hand, unconscionability was “concerned 
with the nature and circumstances of the bargain itself, and can arise without there being any 
relationship, outside that of the immediate contract, between the parties.”805 His Honour felt it was 
important to keep the distinctions clear. If not, there will be a tendency to import undue influence 
elements into an unconscionability case, and vice versa. This, he argues will attract “relief on a vaguer 
basis of general equity.”806 The importance of retaining the distinction was also important in cases of 
contracting with parties suffering from mental incapacity, or addiction to drugs or alcohol. Buxton LJ 
held that it is unlikely that those circumstances can give rise to a claim of undue influence.807 
 
More recently Austin J in Turner v Windever808 held that: 
The similarities in the operation of the two doctrines can engender false assumptions about similarity of scope. It is 
essential for a judge at first instance to bear in mind the different evidentiary foundations of cases invoking the 
doctrines, the one focusing on evidence of the prior relationship and the domination and dependence said to have 
been engendered, and the other focusing on the position of special disadvantage of one party and the other party’s 
knowledge of it at the point of transaction. Thus, if a plaintiff is permitted to shift from reliance on one doctrine to 
reliance on the other at the trial, the defendant’s evidentiary preparation for the hearing could be undermined. On 
the other hand, if a plaintiff has prepared its case with a view to invoking one doctrine, the evidence is unlikely to 
be sufficient to warrant relief under the other. 
(a) Plaintiff-Defendant Basis 
The distinction between undue influence and unconscionability need not be as subtle as described by 
Glover. It is commonly thought that the prime focus in unconscionability is on the conduct of the party 
applying the pressure,809 whereas undue influence focuses on the consent of the weaker party. This was 
discussed extensively in chapter 2. The distinction between the two doctrines is not without criticism. It 
has been written that the difference is “more of emphasis than substance”810 and that “such a basis of 
distinction is untenable”811 as both doctrines require to some extent both impaired consent and wicked 
                                                 
804 [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 412. 
805 Ibid, per Buxton LJ, p 424. 
806 Ibid. 
807 Ibid. Contrast to the New Zealand case of Brusewitz v Brown above p 117. 
808 [2003] NSWSC 1147, per Austin J, para 131. This was cited with approval in Janson v Janson [2007] NSWSC 1344. 
809 R McKeand, ‘Economic Duress – Wearing the Clothes of Unconscionable Conduct’ 2001 JCL LEXIS 6 (cited 
Lexis.com at 3 July 2007), [*7]. 
810 P Parkinson, (ed) The Principles of Equity (2nd ed 2003), p 129. 
811 M Chen-Wishart, Unconscionable Bargains (1989), p 91. 
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exploitation.812 The differentiation has also been described as “unconvincing,”813 “strained,”814 
“illusory,”815 and incorrect in theory.816 
 
As it was established in chapter 2, the argument that undue influence is a purely plaintiff based doctrine 
or defendant based doctrine is unsupported by precedent and theoretically incorrect. Inherent in undue 
influence is an element of both. Accordingly, conceptualising undue influence and unconscionability as 
purely defendant based, does not afford the basis to merge the two doctrines. On the other hand, 
unconscionability is largely a doctrine centred on the wrongful conduct of the stronger party. Finn 
writes that the focus of unconscionability has undergone a basic reorientation: 
Historically it has focused upon protecting a person because of his own weakness. Today the pressure would seem 
to be to protect a person because of another’s strength – to curb an overweening and self-interested power rather 
than to aid an inept and incompetent interest.817 
It is conceded that there are some unconscionability cases where it is difficult to ascertain wrongful 
conduct on the part of the stronger party. However, those cases can be construed as a passive 
acceptance of a benefit. 
 
It is submitted that the crucial distinction between undue influence and unconscionability is the focus 
of rebutting the evidential presumption of undue influence as opposed to the presumption of fraud. If 
the elements of unconscionability are established, and a presumption of fraud is raised, the onus shifts 
to the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable. “It is here that the 
difference between undue influence and unconscionability can be most clearly seen. In the former, the 
stronger party has to show that the weaker acted independently. In the latter, the burden is to show that 
the transaction was fair.”818 Independent advice serves a different role in the two doctrines. In Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch819 Millett LJ held that the role of the independent adviser in an 
undue influence case as opposed to a case on unconscionability is not identical but is not dissimilar.820 
However, His Honour did not elaborate how it differs. It is submitted that in an unconscionability case, 
independent advice helps to “redress the relational imbalance which would otherwise exist by reason of 
                                                 
812 M Chen-Wishart, Unconscionable Bargains (1989), p 91; and N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and 
Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 20-013. 
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815 K N Scott, ‘Evolving Equity and the Presumption of Undue Influence’ (2002) 18 JCL 15, 2002 JCL LEXIS 15 (cited 
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DLR (2d) 710. 
817 P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), p 7. 
818 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), para 15.10. 
819 [1997] 1 All ER 144. 
820 Ibid, per Millett LJ, p 156. 
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the special disability of the weaker party.”821 It helps to establish that the stronger party did not abuse 
the position he or she held over the weaker party. In effect, the role of independent advice is to clear the 
conscience of the stronger party.822 In a case of undue influence, the role of independent advice is not 
only to free the weaker party from the influence of another, (the wrong doing aspect) but also to ensure 
that free will was exercised (the plaintiff based aspect). 
(b) Fiduciary Elements 
The distinction between undue influence and unconscionability has also been drawn along the lines of 
the fiduciary element. The nature of the emphasis on the relationship of influence has some convinced 
that the difference is that undue influence has a fiduciary element823 to it, whereas unconscionability 
does not. According to Finn, one of the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship is that “one party reposes 
trust and confidence in the other.”824 Fiduciary exploitation must be guarded more jealously because it 
in effect is an “attack from within”825, and involves a “greater wrong.”826 Unconscionable bargains are 
considered to be concerned with maintaining the parties’ freedom, whereas undue influence is 
concerned with subordinating freedom, that is the stronger party must put his or her interest behind that 
of the weaker party.827 It is considered that any merger of unconscionability with undue influence 
would obscure any fiduciary characteristics of undue influence.828 
 
However, others argue that there is a fiduciary element to unconscionability. It is an extension of the 
“morality aspect of the fiduciary relationship”.829 La Forest J in Hodgkinson v Simms830 held that: 
                                                 
821 N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), para 19-001. 
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824 P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), p 33. 
825 Bigwood, above n 823 p 400. 
826 R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence in the House of Lords: Principles and Proof’ (2002) 65 (3) MLR 435, p 438. 
827 Bigwood, above n 823 p 399-400. 
828 Parkinson, above n 823 p 433. 
829 J Dixon, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust Based on Unconscionability in the New Zealand Commercial Environment’ 
(1992) 7 AULR 147, p 163. 
830 117 DLR (4th) 161, [1994] 3 SCR 377, (cited 1994 CarswellBC 438, Westlaw at 11 October 2006) Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
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Vulnerability is common to many relationships in which the law will intervene to protect one of the parties. It is, in 
fact, the “golden thread” that unites such related causes of action as breach of fiduciary duty, undue influence, 
unconscionability and negligent misrepresentation.831 
 
Finn lists, in ascending order of intensity of fiduciary standard: ““the unconscionability standard,” “the 
good faith standard,” and the “fiduciary standard.””832 What differentiates the level of fiduciary 
obligation is the extent that one party must defer his or her own interest in favour of another. 
““Unconscionability” accepts that one party is entitled as of course to act self-interestedly in his actions 
towards the other,”833 unless one party is unable to look after his or her own interests and is vulnerable 
to the exploitation or manipulation of the other party. The standard progresses to the fiduciary standard 
which “enjoins one party to act in the interests of the other – to act selflessly with undivided loyalty. 
There is, in other words, a progression from the first to the third: from selfish behaviour to selfless 
behaviour.”834 
 
With a similar concept, Conaglen argues that duress, undue influence and unconscionable bargains are 
all examples of duties of good faith. Conaglen suggests that to understand the interrelationship between 
the doctrines they should be placed on a continuum of human relationships, ranging from equal 
bargaining power, to the imposition of fiduciary duties. Conaglen draws similarities with presumed 
undue influence, unconscionable bargains and the doctrine governing fiduciary relationships. The 
similarities between presumed undue influence and unconscionability is that a weaker party may be 
excessively dependent on another so that he is prone to being influenced to enter into a transaction 
which is not in his best interests, or unable to determine what is in his best interests.835 In other words, 
the law is concerned with protecting the weaker party in both doctrines. However, the doctrines fall at 
different points along the continuum. There is a fiduciary element in each, but to differing amounts. 
Conaglen concedes that his arguments for a continuum may be criticised for being uncertain. However, 
it does not rely solely on the courts determining what is fair. 
 
Despite the doctrine of unconscionability exhibiting some fiduciary characteristics, it is submitted that 
this is not enough to conceptualise it as analogous with undue influence. There are a range of 
                                                 
831 Hodgkinson v Simms 65 BCLR 243, (cited 1985 ACWSJ LEXIS 20146, Lexis.com at 20 March 2006, cited 1985 
CarswellBC 240, Westlaw at 13 October 2006), per La Forest J, para 27. 
832 P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youden (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), p 3. 
833 Ibid p 4. 
834 Ibid. 
835 M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) 
NZULR 509, p 536. 
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relationships which may have fiduciary responsibilities imposed on it. This was discussed by Fletcher 
Moulton LJ in Coomber v Coomber.836 His Honour held that: 
Fiduciary relations are of many types; they extend from the relation of myself to an errand boy who is bound to 
bring me back my change up to the most intimate and confidential relations which can possibly exist between one 
party and another where the one is wholly in the hands of the other because of his infinite trust in him. 
Similarly, Flannigan gives the example of “a mechanic who uses a customer’s vehicle for personal or 
business purposes would also be in breach of fiduciary obligation.”837 The fiduciary element present in 
an undue influence case differs from an unconscionability case: 
undue influence often has a subtle operation and may be understood or unprovable as a result. Accordingly, 
because of the detection and evidentiary difficulties, the law presumes undue influence if a ‘special’ relationship 
exists. This special relationship corresponds to the relationship where a person reposes a deferential trust in 
another.838 
While there may be a fiduciary element in unconscionability, the doctrine still recognises the ability of 
one party to put his or her own interests before another. The doctrine is aimed not at subordinating 
one’s interest, but to ensure that a person who suffers from a special disability is not taken advantage 
of. 
(c) Miscellaneous Distinctions 
Parkinson has drawn the distinction between unconscionability and undue influence based on the focus 
on procedural or substantive unfairness. It was contended that both procedural unfairness and 
substantive unfairness are elements in unconscionability,839 whereas undue influence only focuses on 
procedural unfairness.840 It is respectfully submitted that both procedural unfairness and substantive 
unfairness are relevant in undue influence cases. In Etridge it was held that in order to raise the 
evidential presumption, a relationship of trust and confidence, and a transaction that calls for 
explanation is required. 
 
There are different remedies for undue influence and unconscionable bargains.841 It is considered that 
there are a wider range of remedies available for a claim in undue influence.842 Remedies such as 
constructive trust, account of profits and compensation may be available pursuant to undue influence, 
because it can involve a breach of a fiduciary obligation. In both undue influence and unconscionability 
cases, the transaction can be set aside.843 
                                                 
836 [1911] 1 Ch 723 per Fletcher Moulton LJ, p 728. 
837 R Flannigan, ‘Commercial Fiduciary Obligation’ 36(4) Alberta LR 905, p 909. 
838 R Flannigan, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1989) 9 OJLS 285, p 293. 
839 P Parkinson, (ed) The Principles of Equity (2nd ed 2003), p 130. 
840 Ibid, p 396. 
841 P Vout, (ed and Current Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia (2006), para 35.8:19. 
842 Bigwood, R, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 399-400. 
843 Vout, above n 841. 
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Others have drawn the distinction based on the focus of the doctrines. Undue influence seeks to 
monitor the relationship of influence built up over time. Further, undue influence has the benefit of 
recognised relationships which give rise to a presumption of influence.844 A claimant in undue 
influence need not suffer from any particular disability.845 On the other hand, unconscionability does 
not require a relationship,846 and there are no established presumptions of unconscionability. “Attention 
is not paid to the history of the relationship so much as to the particular transaction.”847 In other words, 
“undue influence is concerned with the exploitation of relationships of influence, the main concern of 
unconscientious dealing is with ad hoc exploitation.”848 However, this argument ignores the fact that 
actual undue influence can be utilised to encompass relationships that are of a more one-off, ad hoc 
nature. The nature of the abuse of the relationship in an actual undue influence case is similar to 
exploitation of a special disability which one party is or should have been aware of. 
DURESS AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 
While there has been much discussion on the common elements of undue influence and 
unconscionability, there is some element of overlap between unconscionability and duress. In Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Cockerill849 it was held that since unlawful conduct and threatened or actual 
physical violence can constitute unconscionable conduct in equity, it is arguable that common law 
duress has been subsumed by the equitable ground for relief.850 
 
There is also much correlation between unconscionability and economic duress. “A common thread 
centres on the element of domination of the will of the innocent party,”851 or on “the defendant 
unconscientiously exploiting a superior negotiating position”.852 Lawful act duress is considered to be 
almost indistinguishable from unconscionability.853 In Equiticorp Finance Ltd (In Liq) v Bank of New 
Zealand,854 Kirby P in his dissent criticised the economic expertise of judges. He argued that the 
doctrine of economic duress would be better dealt with under either the doctrines of undue influence or 
                                                 
844 P Vout, (ed and Current Updating Author), Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia (2006) para 35.9:33; and 
Bigwood, R, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 399-400. 
845 K N Scott, ‘Evolving Equity and the Presumption of Undue Influence’ (2002) 18 JCL 15, 2002 JCL LEXIS 15 (cited 
Lexis.com at 10 February 2006), [*17]. 
846 Louth v Diprose (1992) 110 ALR 1, per Brennan J, p 5. 
847 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), para 15.3. 
848 P Parkinson, (ed) The Principles of Equity (2nd ed 2003), p 128. See also M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and 
Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) NZULR 509, p 532. 
849 (1998) 152 ALR 267. 
850 Vout, above n 844, para 35.7:3. 
851 A Phang, ‘Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552, p 570. Bigwood, above n 844, p 283 
852 R W Clarke, Inequality of Bargaining Power (1987), p 232. 
853 Bigwood, above n 844 p 365. 
854 (1993) 32 NSWLR 50, p 107. 
 128
unconscionability. This would enable a more consistent and principled development of the law rather 
than the law being distorted by judges who lack economic expertise.855 
 
The recent development of a defence of duress by necessity has seen the two doctrines move closer 
together.856 This defence operates within duress where a stronger party takes advantage of another’s 
necessity. In certain cases, the defence of duress by necessity will operate “like a partial doctrine of 
unconscionability”.857 Smith concedes that there is little academic or judicial support for a defence of 
necessity in contract law.858 
 
W H Violette Ltd v Ford Motor Co of Canada 859 “illustrates a movement towards viewing economic 
duress as an unconscionability doctrine.”860 If there is unconscionable behaviour, then the contract may 
be unenforceable regardless of the wrongfulness of the behaviour. In the case there was a binding 
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant where the plaintiffs could pick up the vehicles 
directly from the defendant’s factory (at their own cost). This was an arrangement that was not 
available to other dealers. Over time, a five dollar charge per vehicle was imposed. Later, the charge 
was arbitrarily increased in line with charges with all other distributors. The increases in charges were 
paid to the defendant under a power of attorney which it held. The plaintiff continually protested the 
increase in charges, and action was taken for recovery. It was held that it was clear that the payments 
made by the plaintiff were not made with the intention of closing the matter. The relationship between 
the plaintiffs and the defendant was franchiser and franchisee. This was a complex, continuing business 
relationship. The Ford Company was held to be a corporation with vast resources and economic power 
which placed it in a superior position to its dealers. It was this relationship which established that the 
plaintiffs acted under practical compulsion, because there was no alternative manner to deal with the 
demand for payment. The moneys paid were recoverable.861 
                                                 
855 See also S Todd, Burrows, Finn and Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 347. 
856 P Jaffey, The Nature and Scope of Restitution (2000); S A Smith, ‘Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of Duress’ 
[1997] Cambridge Law Journal 343; and R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 364. 
An analogy can also be drawn with unfair maritime salvage agreements, where a distressed ship is saved in return for a fee; 
see M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) 
NZULR 509, p 524. 
857 Smith, above n 856 p 367. Bigwood, above n 856 p 364. 
858 Bigwood, above n 856 p 367. Bigwood argues that these cases are better dealt with under unconscionability. 
859 31 NBR (2d) 394, 75 APR 394, (cited 1980 CarswellNB 271, Westlaw). 
860 R W Clarke, Inequality of Bargaining Power (1987), p 244. 
861 31 NBR (2d) 394, 75 APR 394, (cited 1980 CarswellNB 271, Westlaw), per Leger J, para 49. An appeal by the Ford 
Motor Company was rejected in W H Violette Ltd v Ford Motor Co of Canada 34 NBR (2d) 238, 85 APR 238, (cited 1981 
CarswellNB 146, Westlaw). 
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In Dusik v Newton862 the stronger party, the board of the company exploited the weaker party’s 
ignorance of the value of his shares. Dusik was a minority shareholder in a company. An offer was 
made to purchase all the shares of the company, and the offer was communicated to the defendant and 
not the plaintiff. Pressure was placed on Dusik to sell his shares at considerable undervalue, or the 
shares would be purchased from the bank. The bank held a pledge of the shares to secure borrowings 
and purchasing the shares from the bank would have caused Dusik to suffer severe tax consequences. 
The defendant did not want to pay the plaintiff the market value of the shares because it did not want to 
give him the finances to enable the plaintiff to set up in competition with the company. The plaintiff 
sold his shares at the under value, and discovered the next day that the majority of the shares were sold 
at a premium. He sued for the balance. It was held that “the conduct of the board was markedly 
divergent from the community standards of commercial morality normally observed by reputable 
businessmen.”863 The conduct could not amount to tortious intimidation because the threats were not 
illegitimate. However, it was held that there was an inequality of bargaining power, and advantage was 
taken of the plaintiff’s financial circumstances, and ignorance of the take over offer. The conduct in 
making the threats was unconscionable, and amounted to unconscionable dealing. 
 
Osorio v Cardona864 has been cited as “the most graphic authority of the overlap between the doctrine 
of unconscionability and duress.”865 The plaintiffs and the defendant entered into an agreement where 
they agreed that each would share in each other’s winnings if either of them won a series of horse 
races. If the plaintiffs’ ticket won, they agreed to pay the defendant 30% of winnings. If the defendant’s 
ticket won, he agreed to pay the plaintiffs 20% of the winnings (the plaintiffs’ ticket contained fewer 
possibilities for a win than the defendant’s.) The defendant’s ticket won and paid $735,000. He refused 
to pay 20% to the plaintiffs. Instead he offered to pay the plaintiffs $60,000 in full satisfaction of their 
claim. The plaintiffs accepted payment of $60,000 because they were anxious that the defendant might 
leave the country without any payment. The plaintiffs maintained that the $60,000 was not in full 
settlement and they sought to recover the full $147,000. 
 
It was held that the balance had to be paid not only on the ground for want of consideration, but also on 
the ground of unconscionability. “This is so where the debtor has exercised undue pressure by 
threatening to pay nothing unless the creditor, who has little option to accept what he can get, agrees to 
                                                 
862 (1985) 62 BCLR 1. 
863 Ibid, per Carrothers, Macdonald and Anderson JJA, p 46. 
864 59 BCLR 29, 15 DLR (4th) 619, (cited 1984 CarswellBC 419, Westlaw). 
865 R W Clarke, Inequality of Bargaining Power (1987), p 245. 
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settlement.”866 The plaintiffs were poor people, with no legal knowledge, and no money to hire a 
lawyer (the legal advice they had received was free). The defendant was single, with no family or 
property ties, and able to leave the country easily. He let this fact be known to the plaintiffs, and left 
them in a “state of uncertainty and emotional turmoil”867 in the days leading up to the payment. This 
constituted an inequality of bargaining power, leaving the weak at the mercy of the strong. It resulted in 
the plaintiffs accepting the smaller amount, so it could be used to hire a lawyer to fight for the rest. It 
was held that “[t]he resultant agreement was … procured by undue pressure and intimidation,”868 and 
the agreement was set aside. 
 
Most discussion regarding the similarities between duress and unconscionability is centred on 
economic duress,869 especially “if the victim of the economic pressure is seen as being at a special 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the other party, in making a decision about the transaction.”870 The argument is 
made that economic duress should be subsumed into unconscionability.871 However, in order for a 
successful merger, duress in general must have sufficient overlap with unconscionability, and it is 
submitted that it does not. 
 
The most striking difference between unconscionability and duress, is that in a duress case, the party 
coerced is aware of the situation, and consents to the transaction as the “least unpalatable of a series of 
unattractive options.”872 The person coerced is in a sense, traumatised into consent. However, in an 
unconscionability case “power is abused generally by keeping the victim in the dark; the victim is 
lulled into a false sense of security.”873 
 
It is submitted that the similarities drawn between duress and unconscionability centre on the abuse of 
the stronger bargaining position. However, this ignores the other elements to establish 
unconscionability. The unequal power and abuse of that power is one aspect of unconscionability. As 
discussed earlier, there are some cases where the moral culpability may be difficult to establish. This 
factor alone will not defeat a claim of unconscionability, but will defeat a claim based on duress. 
                                                 
866 Osorio v Cardona 59 BCLR 29, 15 DLR (4th) 619, (cited 1984 CarswellBC 419, Westlaw), per McLachlin J, para 46. 
867 Ibid, per McLachlin J, para 48. 
868 Ibid. 
869 A Phang, ‘Economic Duress: Recent Difficulties and Possible Alternatives’ (1997) 5 RLR 53, p 63. 
870 R McKeand, ‘Economic Duress – Wearing the Clothes of Unconscionable Conduct’ 2001 JCL LEXIS 6 (cited 
Lexis.com at 3 July 2007), [*28]-[*29]. 
871 A Phang, ‘Economic Duress: Recent Difficulties and Possible Alternatives’ (1997) 5 RLR 53, p 63. 
872 R W Clarke, Inequality of Bargaining Power (1987), p 249. 
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THE INTERACTION OF ALL THREE DOCTRINES 
It has been established that there is much in common between the doctrines of undue influence, 
unconscionability and duress. The common elements that the three doctrines share have in some cases 
been highlighted to the extent that it is conceivable that if these cases are considered in isolation, it 
would seem that the process of merger has already been undertaken. The most prominent example in 
New Zealand law that fails to draw the relevant distinction between the three doctrines is Attorney-
General for England and Wales v R.874 In the case, the Privy Council had the opportunity to consider 
the doctrines of duress, undue influence and unconscionable bargains in the New Zealand context. Lord 
Hoffmann delivered the judgment for the majority.875 In terms of duress, it was held that the threat 
made in the case was lawful. (It may be recalled that the threat was: if the soldier failed to sign the 
confidentiality agreement, it would result in the soldier returning to unit). Further, the demand (signing 
the confidentiality agreement), supported by the threat was lawful. Therefore, the contract was not 
obtained by duress.876 
 
However, when Lord Hoffman went on to discuss undue influence he effectively merged the two 
doctrines. It was held that the army as an institution and the commanding officer were able to exercise 
an influence over the soldier because of the nature of the military hierarchy, strong regimental pride, 
and admiration for the commanding officer. This however, did not give rise to an inference that the 
confidentiality agreement was signed pursuant to unfair exploitation of that relationship. It was 
acknowledged that R signed the agreement because he wanted to remain a member of the SAS. It was 
held that: 
If facing him with such a choice was not illegitimate for the purposes of duress, Their (sic) Lordships do not think 
that it could have been an unfair exploitation of a relationship which consisted in his being a member of the SAS. 
There seems to Their (sic) Lordships to be some degree of contradiction between R’s claim, in the context of 
duress, that he signed only because he was threatened with return to his unit and his claim, for the purposes of 
undue influence, that he signed because of the trust and confidence which he reposed in the army or his 
commanding officer.877 
 
In terms of unconscionability, this was dealt with in a way that inextricably linked it to the two 
previous doctrines: 
If the transaction was not such as to give rise to an inference that it had been unfairly obtained by a party in a 
position to influence the other, it must follow that the transaction cannot be independently attacked as 
unconscionable.878 
                                                 
874 [2004] 2 NZLR 577. 
875 Lord Scott dissented on the issue of undue influence, but he did not discuss the interaction of the three doctrines. 
876 Above n 874, per Lord Hoffmann, p 584. 
877 Ibid, per Lord Hoffmann, p 584-5. 
878 Ibid, per Lord Hoffmann, p 585. 
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Ridge has criticised AG v R879 on the basis that it made little reference to previous authorities; adopted 
Etridge uncritically;880 and there was no logical structure to Lord Hoffmann’s application of the law. 
Lord Hoffmann’s judgment was criticised on the basis that it dealt with duress, undue influence and 
unconscionable bargains “as if they were entirely overlapping, so that if one failed, all would fail.”881 
Ridge argues that Lord Hoffmann could be taken to be assimilating undue influence into the doctrine of 
duress. However, if he considered that there was no illegitimate pressure in the context of duress, he 
should have made a separate consideration of whether there was illegitimate pressure in the context of 
undue influence. Ridge further criticises Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in terms of unconscionable 
dealing, that Lord Hoffmann’s approach in effect renders the doctrine of unconscionability redundant. 
“Clearly, Lord Hoffmann’s conclusion is either wrong, or else supported by reasoning that is not 
adequately spelt out.”882 
 
The views in AG v R are not unique to New Zealand. Thompson argues that given the rationale behind 
unconscionability, to protect ignorant or poor people from entering into unfair bargains, “it is difficult 
to see the scope for such a doctrine to operate when an argument based upon undue influence has 
failed; particularly given the inherently uncertain nature of the concepts of poverty and ignorance.”883 
 
Campbell v Campbell884 also failed to make the distinction between the doctrines. The case concerned 
the validity of a marriage contract. The wife contended that she signed the contract as a result of 
pressure from her husband, and to save her marriage (the husband threatened divorce action if she did 
not sign). She relied on the grounds of duress, undue influence, unconscionability, and inequality of 
bargaining power. On the issue of the improvidence of the transaction, it was held that the doctrines of 
undue influence, unconscionability or inequality of bargaining power require that the contract results in 
an unfair division of property.885 It was held that the wife failed to establish enough fear of emotional 
or psychic violence as to constitute duress. For undue influence, Barry J held that it incorporates the 
same necessary element of pressure as that for duress. It was held that the wife was not in an acute 
mental and emotional state of anxiety and stress. There were no threats by the husband. She was not 
prevented from exercising independent judgment. While there were two incidents of abuse, a history of 
                                                 
879 P Ridge, ‘Uncertainties Surrounding Undue Influence: Its Formulation, Application, and Relationship to Other 
Doctrines’ [2003] NZ Law Review 329, p 343-51. 
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881 Ridge, above n 879 p 352. 
882 Ibid, p 354-5. 
883 M P Thompson, ‘New Wine from Old Bottles’ [1994] Conv 233, p 236. 
884 (1990) 83 Nfld & PIER 340. 
885 Ibid, per Barry J, para 45. 
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vindictiveness, and the plaintiff’s claim that she was of such an emotional and psychological state that 
she could not survive outside the marriage (thus signing the agreement), this did not amount to pressure 
so that an unfair advantage was taken of the plaintiff.886 In terms of unconscionability, it was held that 
there was substantial unfairness in the marriage contract, but there was not such inequality of the 
parties so that the wife was left in the power of the husband. The wife took the contract to her solicitor, 
and he negotiated some changes. Therefore, it could not be construed that the husband preyed on the 
wife in a way that justified a finding of unconscionability.887 
 
In Mahoney v Purnell888 the transaction concerned the sale of shares in a hotel business from Mr 
Mahoney to his son in law Mr Purnell. Both men were 50/50 partners in the business. A year later Mr 
Purnell sold the hotel at price, which on reflection meant Mr Mahoney sold his shares to Mr Purnell at 
undervalue. Mr Mahoney claimed undue influence and in the alternative, unconscionable bargains. It 
was agreed between the parties that the success on the basis of unconscionable bargain presupposes 
success on the basis of undue influence, “and that no additional remedy would accrue from a finding of 
unconscionable bargain.”889 Following this, it was found that the transaction was tainted by undue 
influence. However, no further discussion on unconscionability was given. 
 
The approach taken in AG v R can be contrasted with Hardie Boys J in Walmsley v Christchurch City 
Council.890 His Honour maintained that the doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability were 
“different concepts, although both are founded on fraud, in the sense of an unconscionable use of 
power”. It was held that this was not a case of undue influence or unconscionability, however, “[t]hese 
conclusions are not necessarily an answer to the allegation of economic duress.”891 It was held that 
conduct in the case did constitute economic duress. The limitations of the case are that it did not 
discuss how the doctrines interact, and Hardie Boys J does not really elaborate on what the operative 
distinctions are.892 A similar approach was taken in Rooney v Conway.893 In Engle v Carswell894 it was 
held that “[t]he finding here against undue influence does not conclude the question whether the 
appellant is entitled to relief against an unconscionable transaction.”895 
                                                 
886 Campbell v Campbell (1990) 83 Nfld & PIER 340, per Barry J, para 86. 
887 The wife’s claim also failed on the ground of inequality of bargaining power. 
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889 Ibid, per May J, p 81. 
890 [1990] 1 NZLR 199. 
891 Walmsley v Christchurch City Council [1990] 1 NZLR 199, per Hardie Boys J, p 207. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is a level of similarity between the three doctrines of undue influence, unconscionability and 
duress. It is no coincidence that they are pleaded in the alternative in most cases involving a 
relationship that stems from unequal power, and in most textbooks, are discussed in the same chapter. 
However, do the similarities allow the merger of one or all of the doctrines, or are the distinctions 
between the doctrines so divergent that any notions of merger are not practical or workable? As the 
previous discussion has shown, some cases have unintentionally merged the three doctrines. These 
issues will be explored in the next chapter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy,896 Lord Denning MR held that the single thread that runs throughout the 
doctrines of duress of goods, unconscionable transactions, undue influence, undue pressure, and 
salvage agreements, is that, they all rest on the inequality of bargaining power. Although Lord 
Denning’s exposition has been discredited, there has been a huge amount written about the overlap that 
exists between the doctrines of duress, undue influence and unconscionability. It has been recognised 
that all three doctrines are converging.897 “Lines of demarcation are not now as clearly defined as they 
may have been in the past.”898 Worthington argues that there are parallels between all of the approaches 
classified under the head of procedural unfairness: 
All are concerned with claimants whose consent, or actual intent to commit to a deal and its consequential risks 
and rewards, is impaired by various informational shortcomings or physical, economic, or social circumstances. In 
misrepresentation, duress and undue influence cases, the defendant either knows of the impairment or is 
unwittingly responsible for it. In unconscionable bargain cases, the defendant actually knows of the impairment or 
his knowledge is inferred because of the way the bargain is ‘snatched’.899 
 
There has been extensive debate over whether these doctrines can or should be merged into one or 
several doctrines. It has almost become trite to suggest that actual undue influence should be merged 
with duress, and that unconscionability and undue influence should also be merged. However, despite 
what may seem to be a large degree of overlap between the three doctrines, it may have more to do 
with “the richness of the fact scenarios that may attract the doctrines than about the intertranslatability 
of the doctrines themselves.”900 Any new doctrine will “need to be sharp in its focus, conceptually 
sound and explicit in its policy and underpinnings, and operational in terms of both the process of 
judicial inquiry it envisages and the remedial instruments available to a court to abate objectionable 
phenomena.”901 
DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE 
At this point, it is helpful to consider how duress interacts with the outdated concept of the presumption 
of undue influence, and the Etridge formulation of the evidential presumption of undue influence. In 
pre-Etridge terms, there has always been a familial likeness drawn between class 2B presumed undue 
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900 Bigwood, R, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 230. 
901 M J Trebilcock, ‘The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords’ 
(1976) 26 U Toronto LJ 359, p 385. 
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influence, and actual undue influence,902 and hence duress.903 The main hurdle against any merger was 
the existence of class 2A, the classes of the relationships, and the fiduciary element in that class that is 
not present in actual undue influence and duress.904 Birks and Chin acknowledged that one of the 
advantages of litigating under the head of undue influence was the ability to rely on one of the 
established presumptions. The authors do concede that “every case of presumed undue influence can be 
turned into a case of actual undue influence by a claimant who is able and willing to renounce the help 
of the presumption.”905 
 
In post-Etridge terms it seems that the doctrines have moved even closer together. In Etridge it was 
held that the evidential presumption is merely another way of proving actual undue influence. It was 
conceptualised as the equitable counterpart of res ipsa loquitur. As Lord Clyde held, “whatever the 
relationship of the parties and however the influence was exerted, there will be found to have been an 
actual case of undue influence.”906 Therefore, in light of Etridge the reasons for merging undue 
influence and duress appear to be even more compelling.907 The fact that one lies in equity and the 
other at common law does not pose a problem. “It is time that in this field we overcame the old 
jurisdictional duality.”908 In Elia v Commercial & Mortgage Nominees Ltd909 Gault regarded the 
antipodeans statement that: 
a party may be regarded as unconscientious not only when he knew at the time the bargain was entered into that the 
other suffered from a material disability or disadvantage and of its effect on that other, but also when he ought to 
have known of that circumstance; when a reasonable man would have adverted to the possibility of its existence. 
This is, practically, to import the archetype of the common law.910 
                                                 
902 See Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1992] 4 All ER 955, per Slade LJ. 
903 M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) 
NZULR 509, p 528-9. However, Conaglen goes on to argue that the difference between presumed undue influence and 
duress is that presumed undue influence “involves a mixed concern for both the procedure which led to the impugned 
transaction and the substantive result of that transaction.” 
904 P Ridge, ‘Uncertainties Surrounding Undue Influence: Its Formulation, Application, and Relationship to Other 
Doctrines’ [2003] NZ Law Review 329, p 333. M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), 
p 13 noted that “there may be undue influence in the absence of a fiduciary relationship and, conversely, not in every 
fiduciary relationship will undue influence be presumed.” See also J Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining (1991), p 180. 
905 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 76. 
906 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Clyde p 477-478. 
907 This view has support from Ridge, who writes that “potentially much more of undue influence doctrine can be 
assimilated with duress; that is, undue influence is regarded as a form of illegitimate pressure for the purposes of that 
doctrine.” Ridge, above n 904 p 343. 
908 Birks, and Chin, above n 905 p 63; and N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th 
Australian ed, 2002), p 657. 
909 (1988) 2 NZBLC 103,296. 
910 Ibid, per Gault J, p 103,309. 
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Arguments that duress should be merged into undue influence911 have been raised from both judges and 
academics. In Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation912 Lord Goff 
regarded undue influence as an extended form of duress. Similarly in Farmers Co-operative Executors 
& Trustees Ltd v Perks913 Duggan J held that duress is simply an extreme example of actual undue 
influence, and therefore, duress should be subsumed under actual undue influence.914 Duggan J’s 
judgment was an approval of Cope’s views.915 Ogilvie writes that because undue influence and 
economic duress involve the victimisation of one party by another, economic duress is a misnomer, and 
should more accurately be described as “economic undue influence”. Economic duress should be 
conceptualised as a species of undue influence.916 
 
However, others believe that the merger should proceed by subsuming actual undue influence into 
duress.917 Atiyah and Smith argue that actual undue influence can be conceptualised as a species of 
duress.918 Birks and Chin argue that the modern, expanded notion of duress is wide enough to 
encompass actual undue influence cases. Pressure, or duress is an easy to understand notion, and 
pressure has already dominated this area of the law, and has concealed the nature of relational undue 
influence.919 
 
Despite the arguments for merging actual undue influence into duress, it is submitted that any merger 
must be undertaken by merging duress into undue influence. One must consider the driving force 
behind the creation of undue influence. Equity saw the need to provide relief in cases where there had 
been an exercise of pressure which equity considered illegitimate, or “undue”,920 yet it did not amount 
to the coercion or force inherent in a threat needed to constitute common law duress.921 Equity was 
                                                 
911 N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), p 657. 
912 [1992] 2 AC 152, per Lord Goff, p 169. 
913 (1989) 52 SASR 399. 
914 Ibid, per Duggan J, p 405. 
915 M Cope, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscientious Bargains (1985), para 125. 
916 M H Ogilvie, ‘Economic Duress in Contract: Departure, Detour or Dead End?’ (2001) 34 Can Bus LJ 194, p 227. 
917 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 63. See also E A Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (2nd ed, 1998), p 496-7, where 
Farnsworth argues that the expanded scope of duress has undercut the importance of undue influence. R Bigwood, 
Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 384. 
918 P S Atiyah and S A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction of the Law of Contract (6th ed 2005), p 285. 
919 Birks and Chin’s last argument in support of their proposal was that the future requirement of manifest disadvantage was 
uncertain. Etridge has dispensed with the requirement. 
920 O’Connor v Hart [1985] 1 NZLR 159, per Lord Brightman, p 171; Halsbury Laws of Australia, www.lexisnexis.com, 
(sighted on LexisNexis.com at 9 February 2006), para 110-5010. 
921 Barton v Armstrong [1975] 2 All ER 465, per Lord Cross, p 474; and P Vout, (ed and Current Updating Author), 
Unconscionable Conduct The Laws of Australia (2006), para 35.7:2. 
In Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932, Viscount Haldane LC explained that the “Courts of Chancery and of Common 
Law exercised a concurrent jurisdiction from the earliest of times.” 
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seen as supplementing the common law. “Equity extended the reach of the law to other unacceptable 
forms of persuasion.”922 This is why undue influence is fundamentally a wider doctrine. Secondly, 
following Etridge it has re-established that there is one doctrine of undue influence, but two ways of 
proving it. There is only one route to establish duress. If undue influence is merged into duress, then 
this destroys a crucial route to establishing the defence. 
 
Therefore, if any attempts to merge are made, it is submitted that duress should be subsumed under 
undue influence. This is because undue influence is a wider doctrine and encompasses a wider range of 
conduct. Cases of direct pressure are clearly included, and undue influence can encompass different 
and more subtle types of pressure than duress. This will help clarify the law especially in the cases of 
lawful act duress. The only difficulty in subsuming duress into undue influence is the fiduciary 
elements that are present when utilising the evidential presumption of undue influence. This does not 
integrate well with the opportunistic nature of business transactions. It is submitted that if actual undue 
influence is unable to encompass the factual situation, then unconscionability can also be utilised. 
Unconscionability can also be used to deal with cases of lawful threats in a business context, without 
the need to find a relationship of trust and confidence. 
MERGER OF THREE DOCTRINES 
Having examined all three doctrines, and identified the points of contact between the three, it would be 
helpful to now consider the various arguments in favour of a merger. Much of the discussion on issues 
of merger centre on the theme that unconscionability is the doctrine of choice, which duress and undue 
influence should fall under. 
 
Phang argues that the coercive effect of actual undue influence and duress are similar, and that those 
two doctrines can be assimilated.923 However, Phang goes further and suggests that unconscionability 
is a “more concrete as well as substantive manifestation of the underlying spirit”924 of “equity centring 
on fairness.”925 Therefore, unconscionability “ought to be the “umbrella doctrine” which unites all 
other doctrines.”926  
                                                 
922 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, per Lord Nicholls, para 7. 
923 A Phang, ‘Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552, p 566. 
924 Ibid p 568-9. 
925 Ibid p 568. 
926 Ibid p 569. 
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It is respectfully submitted that Phang’s proposal can only come to fruition if an expanded notion of 
unconscionability exists, as in Australia927 and New Zealand. The doctrine of unconscionability is 
underutilised in England. The question then arises; can the doctrines of duress and undue influence be 
subsumed under the English version of the doctrine of unconscionability? The answer to that is not 
clear cut. From the previous chapter on unconscionability, it can be seen that the doctrinal elements in 
England and New Zealand are the same. If that is so, then a merger can be undertaken. However, on an 
operational level the courts in England apply differing standards to the doctrinal elements. 
Transactional imbalance must be more substantial and the categories of special disability are more 
limited. If the doctrine of unconscionability is utilised to a different standard than to undue influence, 
then a merger in English law cannot be sustained. 
 
The view that unconscionability should be the umbrella doctrine that undue influence and duress 
should be subsumed under has much support.928 Discussing the assimilation of undue influence and 
unconscionability in Louth v Diprose, Pawlowski and Brown argue that there is no reason why duress 
should not also be included because it also “embodies notions of relational inequality and 
unconscionable conduct associated with the doctrine of undue influence and unconscionable 
dealing.”929 
 
Capper proposes to go further than to simply assimilate actual undue influence with duress. He argues 
that undue influence and unconscionability can be merged into one doctrine. Capper would prefer to 
subsume both actual and presumed undue influence under the doctrine of unconscionability. This is 
because relational inequality is present in both, and transactional imbalance would serve as an 
evidentiary function. Capper argues that to maintain the distinction between undue influence and 
unconscionability on the basis that there are certain presumptions available to the plaintiff in an undue 
influence case (even though those relationships are difficult to define) “is to overwork that 
presumption.”930 
 
                                                 
927 K N Scott, ‘Evolving Equity and the Presumption of Undue Influence’ (2002) 18 JCL 15, 2002 JCL LEXIS 15 (cited 
Lexis.com at 10 February 2006), [*17]; and N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), 
para 20-016. 
928 S Todd, Burrows Finn & Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed 2007), p 350; M Pawlowski and J Brown, 
Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 187; N C Seddon, and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of 
Contract (8th Australian ed, 2002), p 670; and J R F Lehane, ‘Undue Influence, Misrepresentation and Third Parties’ (1994) 
110 LQR 167, p 173. 
929 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 211. 
930 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 493. 
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Capper goes further and argues that there is no reason to limit the merged doctrine from also 
subsuming duress. The exercise of duress is usually associated with relational inequality. The exercise 
of duress is a form of unconscionable conduct. Transactional imbalance is compelling evidence that 
duress has been exercised. Therefore, undue influence and duress can be subsumed into 
unconscionability.931 Capper proposes that his new doctrine would work in the following manner: 
the court would have to weigh up the three elements of relational inequality, transactional imbalance, and 
unconscionable conduct, and come to an overall judgment as to whether a particular transaction can stand … 
Transactional imbalance would serve an evidentiary function … The principal grounds for relief would thus be 
relational inequality and unconscionable conduct … Where the parties to a transaction are on very unequal terms 
and the transaction is weighted strongly in favour of one party, unconscionable conduct can be inferred. Where the 
parties are on fairly equal terms and the defendant has clearly behaved unconscionably, the court could infer that 
the defendant’s conduct has induced an unfair transaction if the transaction appears unbalanced.932 
 
Capper’s new doctrine would be neither plaintiff or defendant-sided in nature, however, it would be 
more concerned with procedural rather than substantive unfairness. The substantive unfairness element 
would not be an independent ground for invalidity. It would serve to “provide evidence from which 
grounds of invalidity can be deduced.”933 
 
Conaglen argues that Capper’s new doctrine is unworkable because a unified doctrine would obscure 
“the policy reasons for the differences between the doctrines.”934 A combined doctrine would ignore 
the “fact that the doctrines are concerned with different relational problems arising in transactional 
contexts.”935 
A “unified” doctrine, such as one Capper proposes would suggest that the courts are prepared to look at pretty 
much any transaction and overturn it where they do not consider it fair. That is not the current state of the law and 
it is not a direction in which the law should sensibly be pushed.936 
 
Parkinson argues that actual undue influence should be merged with unconscionability, and “presumed 
undue influence” with fiduciary law. The reason behind this is if undue influence as a whole is 
submerged under fiduciary law, this would not account for cases of actual undue influence, or use of 
actual pressure. On the other hand, subsuming undue influence under unconscionability will fail to 
account for the fiduciary aspects of undue influence.937 Parkinson sees no problem that some of the 
relationships in undue influence are fiduciary and some not. The “function of fiduciary law is to act as 
                                                 
931 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 504. 
932 Ibid p 500. 
933 Ibid p 501. 
934 M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) 
NZULR 509, p 544. 
935 Ibid. 
936 Ibid. 
937 P Parkinson, (ed) The Principles of Equity (2nd ed 2003), p 428. 
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a deterrent against cheating in cases where explicit contractual controls are foreclosed.”938 Therefore, 
all instances where presumed undue influence arises will attract fiduciary law, that is, the need to limit 
self-interested behaviour. He considers that in the United States, presumed undue influence and 
fiduciary law have already merged. 
 
Despite the “fiduciary element” Birks and Chin argue that undue influence should be kept separate 
from the law of fiduciary duties.939 “[U]ndue influence and breach of fiduciary duty are different 
grounds for relief, with different consequences. It is again a matter of alternative analyses.”940 Further, 
defaulting fiduciaries are subject to a different range of remedies, personal and proprietary, which is 
not available for an undue influence scenario.941 
 
Despite the support to merge the three doctrines in various permutations, there is just as much objection 
to any attempts to merge. In 1975 Sealy welcomed Lord Denning’s inequality of bargaining power to 
the extent that it emphasises that “courts ought not to continue to perpetuate the fine distinctions made 
in the old cases,”942 as a stimulus for thought, and as an inducement for courts to depart from 
“unwarranted technicality.”943 However as a general discussion on any merger he doubted: 
whether there is any advantage to be gained in mixing together a number of features which are to be found in some 
– but in no case all – of the old-established categories in which relief may be given, and to put them forward as an 
all-embracing statement of principle to replace those categories.944 
He argued that inequality of bargaining power would be bound to prove a most unruly horse.945 
 
For some, the most cogent reason for opposing the merger between undue influence and 
unconscionability is that if the doctrines are conceptualised as differing in their “operational,”946 and 
“abstract conceptual level,”947 then merger is not possible. Further, although each doctrine is concerned 
with anti-exploitation, each doctrine has assumed “a life force of its own.”948 The differences that 
Bigwood refers to are that the vulnerability required by unconscionability is not normally brought 
about because of some special relation. Parkinson describes this as “ad hoc exploitation of a position of 
                                                 
938 P Parkinson, (ed) The Principles of Equity (2nd ed 2003), p 429. 
939 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 91. 
940 Ibid p 92. 
941 J R F Lehane, ‘Undue Influence, Misrepresentation and Third Parties’ (1994) 110 LQR 167, p 173. 
942 L S Sealy, ‘Undue Influence and Inequality of Bargaining Power’ [1975] Camb LJ 21, p 23. 
943 Ibid p 24. 
944 Ibid p 23. 
945 Ibid p 24. 
946 R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?’ (1996) 16 Oxford J Legal Stud 503, p 
514. 
947 R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence in the House of Lords: Principles and Proof’ (2002) 65 (3) MLR 435, p 435. 
948 Bigwood, above n 946 p 514. 
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advantage.”949 In an undue influence case, the special relation is precisely how the relationship of 
influence arises.950 Bigwood argues that the relationship of influence is so extreme in some cases it 
makes this relationship “so worthy of society’s protection, affirmative proof of ‘exploitation’ is not 
required in the same way as it is in unconscionable dealing cases.”951 
 
Different burdens of proof, use of presumptions, and different remedies,952 all indicate that the 
doctrines cannot be merged. Further, unconscionability is concerned with maintaining the freedom of 
both parties in assessing an arms length transaction. However, in an undue influence case, the 
defendant’s freedom is not an issue. In most cases the defendant is required to put the plaintiff’s 
interest before his own.953 All these issues “militate strongly against merger of the two doctrines into a 
single doctrine.”954 A further reason given by Bigwood against any merger is to “keep the law within 
‘manageable proportions’.”955 
 
A further argument against any process of merger is that it “would introduce excessive uncertainty in 
the judicial process.”956 However, other academic writers assert that this objection should not be 
overstated.957 Waddams argues “that certainty, though an important value in contract law, is not an 
absolute one.”958 Fridman argues that “certainty in contract law is a myth. Hence, to found any 
contractual doctrine, or to dismiss any new doctrine, on the basis of the criterion of certainty is invalid 
and inaccurate.”959 Capper argues that a merged doctrine may provide more legal certainty: 
because it would not obscure the underlying policy considerations, which tend to get buried when differences are 
maintained between what is essentially the same. Cases might be better argued because litigants and their advisors 
would better understand what issues around which evidence and argument had to be organised. Parties with 
abundant resources would not be able to prolong litigation to the prejudice of less well resourced parties by taking 
obscure and unmeritorious points. And in the longer term courts might find it easier to develop clear and rational 
criteria for the resolution of these disputes.960 
                                                 
949 P Parkinson, (ed) The Principles of Equity (2nd ed 2003), p 433. 
950 See also J D McCamus, Essentials of Canadian Law The Law of Contracts (2005), p 425. 
951 R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?’ (1996) 16 Oxford J Legal Stud 503, p 
514. 
952 Bigwood argues that there are more remedies available for a case of undue influence. Phang writes that under duress a 
plaintiff has a positive right of rescission, as opposed to a mere right to approach the court of a remedy in undue influence 
and unconscionability. This is premised on the distinction between common law and equity. Further, Phang writes that 
restitutio in integrum would only apply to undue influence and unconscionability cases, and not to duress. However, he does 
not think that these two issues should be any impediment to merger. See A Phang, ‘Undue Influence Methodology, Sources 
and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552, p 572. 
953 R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003), p 399-400. 
954 Ibid p 399. R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence in the House of Lords: Principles and Proof’ (2002) 65 (3) MLR 435, p 438. 
955 Bigwood, above n 951 p 514. 
956 A Phang, ‘Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552, p 570. 
957 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 211; and S M Waddams, 
‘Unconscionability In Contracts’ (1976) 39 Mod L Rev 369, p 391. 
958 S M Waddams, ‘Unconscionability In Contracts’ (1976) 39 Mod L Rev 369, p 391. 
959 G H L Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada (5th ed, 2006), p 331. 
960 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 503. 
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Pawlowski and Brown agree with Capper. If there is a broader notion of unconscionability, this would 
lead to the laying down of more specific rules regarding its application, and a more systematic 
approach to the development of the doctrine. This would avoid the current confusion arising from the 
overlap from several related, but distinct doctrines,961 “and courts could set about the task of focusing 
their attention on bringing the new doctrine to legal maturity.”962 Phang writes that an argument against 
merger based on uncertainty in the law, expresses “a lack of confidence in the ability of judges to arrive 
at decisions after a fair and logical exercise of their powers of analysis and judgment.”963 It is highly 
probable that new criteria would be laid down, and it is not likely that it would provide any less 
guidance than is currently experienced. 
 
On the other hand, Birks and Chin argue that the law cannot take short cuts: 
If there are two doctrines, there are two doctrines; and the fact that one might do perhaps ninety-five per cent of the 
work is no reason for pretending that the other does not exist. The correct approach will be to treat both undue 
influence and duress as plaintiff-sided factors which ground relief on a degree of impairment of the plaintiff’s 
capacity to make decisions.964 
 
However, Capper argues that the Birks and Chin claim overplays the risk of injustice. Capper argues 
that “[w]here there is a risk of a plaintiff with a meritorious case falling between two stools the court 
might well manipulate the notion of undue influence or that of unconscionability so as to avoid this.”965 
CONCLUSION 
In order to successfully merge any or all three of the doctrines discussed in this thesis, one would have 
to be confident that the doctrines share enough doctrinal elements. In addition to this, one must also 
ensure that the new doctrine will be equipped to handle the range of cases that are currently served by 
the three separate doctrines. 
 
It is submitted that duress can and should be merged with actual undue influence. The range of pressure 
which duress has expanded to include has resulted in an extensive overlap between the two doctrines. 
Undue influence should subsume duress because it is a wider doctrine and better equipped to deal with 
lawful pressure situations. Any factual situations that cannot be dealt with using undue influence can be 
                                                 
961 M Pawlowski and J Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home (2002), p 211. A Phang, ‘Undue Influence 
Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552, p 571. 
962 A Phang, ‘Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552, p 571. 
963 Ibid. 
964 P Birks, and N Y Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (ed), Good Faith and Fault in 
Commercial Law (1995), p 95. 
965 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 498. 
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dealt with utilising unconscionability. Therefore, given the recent developments of the three doctrines, 
it is duress that is the superfluous doctrine. 
 
However, it is submitted that undue influence and unconscionability (and hence a three way merger) 
cannot be achieved. While there is a substantial overlap between undue influence and unconscionability 
the substance, that is, the doctrinal elements of the two doctrines differ. Conaglen provides a helpful 
summary: 
[Undue influence] is concerned primarily with the close relationship between the two parties and is determined to 
prevent any abuse of that relationship. The doctrine of unconscionable bargains, on the other hand, is concerned 
more with improper advantage being taken of a situation which has arisen as a result of cognitive defects in the 
weaker party. Such defects give rise to a significant power imbalance between the parties, but there need not be 
any special relationship between them aside from the fact that they have come together to negotiate a transaction 
and one is aware that the other is labouring under a special disadvantage. That in and of itself is not sufficient to 
create the relationship which is so carefully protected by the doctrine of presumed undue influence, but it will 
suffice under the doctrine of unconscionable bargains.966 
 
However, there is a body of case law in New Zealand that, in effect recognises that a disability can give 
rise to a relationship of influence.967 Given this development, it is submitted that merger still cannot be 
undertaken. This is because of the doctrinal focus of undue influence and unconscionability. It has been 
shown that unconscionability can exhibit some plaintiff-based characteristics. However, it is largely a 
defendant based doctrine. On the other hand, undue influence exhibits both plaintiff and defendant 
based elements. Further, the focus of any independent advice in an unconscionability case is to 
establish that the conscience of the stronger party is not tainted: that abuse of the stronger position did 
not occur. In an undue influence case, it is to show that the influenced party acted with free and 
informed consent. If the doctrines are merged, (especially if undue influence was to be merged into 
unconscionability), then this factor will be obscured. 
 
This element cannot be ignored. Indeed Capper conceded that he had to accept this distinction.968 What 
Capper proposes is a doctrine that is neither defendant based, or plaintiff based. However, it is 
submitted that this is not enough. Merging undue influence into unconscionability would also obscure 
the much larger fiduciary element present in undue influence. That fiduciary standard holds the 
influencing party to a higher standard not required of the stronger party in an unconscionability case. 
Further, utilisation of the evidential presumption will be lost. Capper contends that this argument 
overemphasises the value of the presumptions. It is respectfully submitted that this is not so. The 
                                                 
966 M D J Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18(4) 
NZULR 509, p 531-2. 
967 Milsom v Mazey and Ritz Hair Fashions HC CH A159/84 [May 30 1985]; Westpac Banking Corporation v Chang HC 
CH CP 120/98 [1 December 1998]; Richardson v Harris [1930] NZLR 890; and Brusewitz v Brown [1923] NZLR 1106. 
968 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 493. 
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presumptions were established because it was recognised that in undue influence cases, the use of 
pressure to induce a transaction may be so subtle that it is impossible to prove.969 The presumption was 
designed to assist the influenced party in certain special relationships that were justified in warranting 
special protection. It would be an unhelpful development in the law if such presumptions were 
abandoned.  
 
Ultimately Capper concedes that for his new doctrine to work “a few rough edges relating to 
presumptions and independent advice can be shaved off with ease.”970 Whether this can be done is 
questionable. Certainly, the focus and effect of independent advice can be altered without much effect, 
but it is respectfully submitted that use of the presumptions cannot be abandoned so easily. 
 
At the beginning of my research on this topic, I sought to establish that there was a case for a three way 
merger. However, in conclusion to this thesis, it is submitted that such a development in the law cannot 
be sustained. It is submitted that if clarification and simplification of the law is sought, it would not be 
achieved by merging all three doctrines. Duress can be successfully merged into undue influence. 
However, undue influence and unconscionability cannot be merged. 
                                                 
969 Allcard v Skinner (1885) 36 Ch D 145. 
970 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, p 500. 
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